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Foreword
In September 2005, fifty-five chiefs of navies and coast guards, along with twenty-seven
war college presidents from around the world gathered in Newport for the Seventeenth
International Seapower Symposium. We shared perspectives on a broad range of issues
important to the global maritime community and individual countries through the
mechanism of regionally oriented seminars (eight of them). The two days produced
comprehensive lists of key concerns from each region, the similarity of which was
remarkable. As the symposium drew to a close, a consensus was articulated that maritime security was fundamental to address these concerns, that the scope of security
challenges reached beyond the waters of individual nations, and most importantly, that
the responsibilities in the maritime domain—the great “commons” of the world—were
shared. Moreover, the need was expressed for regional and global mechanisms that
allowed maritime nations to more routinely and effectively bring their particular capabilities together to ensure a free and secure maritime domain. The host of the ISS,
Admiral Mike Mullen, summarized the key proposition of the symposium: “Because
today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are
bound together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of the vast
commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and economic
prosperity.”
Acknowledging that “the United States Navy could not, by itself, preserve the freedom
and security of the entire maritime domain,” Admiral Mullen said that “it must count
on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes
and precluding its use by others that threaten national, regional, or global security.” So
too must each nation count on assistance from other nations.
Over the past two years the Naval War College has found itself in a position of prominence in helping the leadership of our maritime forces, and the leaderships of our
global partners, think through the implications of a new set of global security challenges and opportunities. It has been a very productive period since the College—
against the fundamental notions of the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium—was tasked to work on a new strategy “of and for its time.” Critical to our effort
to rethink maritime strategy has been an extensive scenario analysis and war-gaming
effort and a series of high-level conferences, symposia, and other professional
exchanges with maritime partners here in Newport and at other venues around the
world. This collaborative effort has produced great insight and brought into focus the
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diverse perspectives necessary to make this strategy robust across multiple arguments
and useful for both naval leadership and national policy makers in understanding the
key role maritime forces must play in the evolving international system.
We see some interesting new ideas in this strategy: the preeminent value of maritime
forces to underwrite stability for the global system and an emphasis on unique capabilities inherent in maritime forces to prevent global shocks and to limit and localize
regional conflict. While this enhances the long-standing naval commitment to provide
high-end capability, there are clear new demands related to sustaining the global
system—unique in the maritime domain. The new maritime strategy also recognizes
that capacity must rely increasingly, across the range of military operations, on an
expanded set of more robust, global maritime relationships—in effect, partnerships
that engender trust, enable prevention, and yield more effective maritime security.
The present volume contributes clearly and significantly to building just this sort of
maritime partnerships. As all participants at the ISS recognized, partnerships must be
complementary and built on mutual benefit. In subsequent guidance to the Naval War
College, Admiral Mullen emphasized that any new strategy must be one viewed
through the eyes of our partners.
The essays from the Americas that follow are a compendium of “perspectives on maritime strategy.” They were written and submitted in response to an invitation that provided little substantive guidance beyond the request that they represent perspectives of
maritime nations around the world—not necessarily official views but thoughtful and
candid comments of men and women in countries of our hemisphere other than the
United States.
I commend them without hesitation to anyone interested in maritime strategy generally and in discovering insights into ways in which countries of the Americas that are
bound by shared values and enduring interests can work together in the maritime
domain to achieve results that cannot be achieved by any nation alone.

Rear Admiral JACOB L. SHUFORD
U.S. Navy
President of the Naval War College

Preface
The chapters that follow offer a rich smorgasbord of insights into maritime strategy
from the perspectives of some two dozen experts from five countries of the Americas.
The authors include experienced, senior naval officers, civilian scholars, and people
with both military and academic experience.
When the President of the U.S. Naval War College invited naval leaders from around
the Western Hemisphere to generate articles that could provide insights on maritime
strategy, his request was both comprehensive and open ended. He asked only for “the
thoughts of strategic thinkers who can bring the long view of grand strategy to [the
process of constructing a new U.S. maritime strategy] along with the perspectives of
our maritime partners.” He welcomed submissions from any quarter on any relevant
aspect of the subject.
In keeping with the academic nature of this project, the entire substance of this publication should be considered the personal views of the authors and not the positions of
their institutions or governments.
In editing the papers that were accepted for publication, I have adjusted the translations from the original Portuguese and Spanish to make them accessible to the reader
in English while reflecting the original intents of the authors. I have made every effort
to avoid changes in content and to let the articles speak for themselves.
Rear Admiral Alvaro J. Martínez of the Argentine Navy writes that the sea is a synonym
for nations’ openness to the world. He states further that the progress of nations has
always been associated with their openness to the world. Rear Admiral Martínez argues
that maritime strategy has undergone a paradigm change so that, instead of fighting
and winning wars at sea, countries now can choose to work cooperatively with others
to consolidate peace, cooperation, and security in the maritime domain.
In their essay, Captain Juan Carlos Del Alamo and his colleagues from the Peruvian
Navy and Air Force address changes in the international environment affecting maritime security. They point to new threats in the forms of international terrorism and of
trafficking in drugs and materiel that could be incorporated into weapons of mass
destruction, piracy, smuggling, and illegal overfishing. They see these asymmetrical
threats as having national and regional consequences, and they suggest strategic
responses to them.
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Captain Cristian Sidders of the Argentine Navy makes the case for considering distinctive characteristics of the South Atlantic, specifically those of Argentina’s maritime
interests, in formulating a maritime strategy for his country. He weighs the matter of
governance of the sea against the value of freedom of navigation. In this regard, he
offers insights into achieving cooperation among countries while also protecting their
individual national interests.
Captain Claudio Rogerio de Andrade Flôr, retired from the Brazilian Navy, contrasts
what he calls the different approaches of the United States and Brazil. He argues that
the United States exercises world hegemony while Brazilian policy is focused on cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind. He asserts that the United States
pursues national security through military and technological power, and he offers some
observations about how the two countries might work together within the context of
their different approaches to cooperate against such common enemies and threats as
international terrorism.
Rear Admiral Miguel Angel Troitiño, retired from the Argentine Navy, traces the role of
maritime strategy in the development of Argentina from the land toward the sea. He
suggests that the sea now offers the means for further integrating his country and connecting it more productively with the rest of the world. The strategy he envisions
would require economic, legal, technological, and political measures coordinated at the
highest governmental level.
Rear Admiral Federico Niemann F. of the Chilean Navy explains the importance of the
exercise of sovereignty and control over the maritime space to the development of an
ocean state. He describes the Chilean concept of the “Presencial Sea” as similar to the
concept of maritime domain awareness and writes that it must be respected without
weakening the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or affecting the freedom that governs common areas on the high seas. He examines past Chilean cooperative maritime
activities with other countries and identifies issues that need to be addressed in further
international cooperation.
Captain Antonio Carlos Teixeira Martins of the Brazilian Navy assesses U.S. proposals
for a “thousand-ship navy” and a Global Fleet Station. He wonders whether the United
States is sincere in its proposals for international cooperation. While he recognizes that
Brazil and the United States share interests in fighting terrorism, reducing transnational crime, and seeking greater maritime security, cooperation, and regional peace, he
raises questions about whether it is in the interest of Brazil to join in efforts put forward by the United States for maritime cooperation.
Rear Admiral Jorge Balaresque Walbaum, who is retired from the Chilean Navy, and his
colleagues explore the missions of the Chilean Navy and of the U.S. Navy as a means of
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identifying areas for mutually beneficial cooperation. They see evident synergy, in that
no nation alone can adequately meet the challenges it faces. Cooperation, though,
depends on interoperability. At the operational level technological differences have to
be overcome by effective and timely data links and code arrangements. Interoperability
needs to be improved, too, at the politico-strategic level through comprehensive political coordination and specific agreement on legal issues like rules of engagement.
Captain Luiz Carlos de Carvalho Roth, retired from the Brazilian Navy, discusses the
distinct ways in which the Brazilian Navy and the U.S. Navy approach maritime strategy. He identifies areas of convergence between the two approaches and suggests geographic and substantive points of cooperation that could serve the maritime objectives
of both countries. He acknowledges that elements of the U.S. Southern Command and
the U.S. Africa Command would both have to be engaged for cooperation across the
full range of issues in which Brazil is interested.
Professor Francisca Möller Undurraga of the Chilean Naval War College and her
team of writers undertake an assessment of international law and maritime security.
They cite an extensive body of international agreements and regulations and assert that
a key challenge is to achieve effective compliance. They review the commitment of
Chile to regional and global legal regimes and conclude that the Chilean Navy shares
with the U.S. Navy concepts of cooperation and of the duty to comply with the requirements flowing from the international agreements to which their countries adhere.
Captain Federico Rechkemmer Prieto of the Peruvian Navy and his colleagues point
out that the Americas are less plagued by state-to-state conflicts than some other
regions but nonetheless face nontraditional threats. They see many of these threats as
regional in nature and conclude that a regional response is required. They posit some
objectives for regional security cooperation and sketch out some of the key elements
that any such regional efforts should incorporate.
Dr. James Boutilier, Special Advisor (Policy) to the Commander, Canadian Maritime
Forces Pacific, reviews the long-standing partnership between the Canadian and U.S.
navies. He recounts methods that have succeeded in meeting the challenge of technological interoperability and worked to some degree in the case of informational
interoperability. Also of interest is his discussion of how the two navies have addressed
issues of the division of labor between them. He cites the need for closer cooperation
between the Canadian Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard in an era of global terrorism but
acknowledges problems rooted in cultural differences between the two organizations.
Captain James Thornberry Schiantarelli and his fellow writers from the Peruvian Navy
and Air Force begin their essay with an assessment of a range of security scenarios that
could arise in the Americas. They evaluate the adequacy of existing security
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arrangements for handling these scenarios and find them wanting. They propose an
overhaul of the hemispheric security system with a hemispheric security council at the
political level, a strategic-level hemispheric security system, an inter-American defense
board responsible at the operational level, and operational commands to direct forces
at the tactical level.
Acknowledgments
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of the chapters. Many other people have been involved, though, in bringing the work to
fruition. The chiefs of navies and the heads of naval war colleges in the Americas have
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Naval War College in Newport contributed mightily to the effort. Captain Michael
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editorial advice; Mr. Pelham Boyer, managing editor of the Naval War College Press,
performed countless editorial tasks; and Ms. Elizabeth Davis produced the graphics on
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PART ONE
Formulating Maritime Strategy

CHAPTER ONE

A Maritime Strategy for the South Atlantic
R E A R A D M I RA L A LVA RO J. M A RT Í N E Z , A RG E N T I N E NAV Y

The Significance of the Sea in the Twenty-first Century
In the twenty-first century—which, from the geopolitical point of view, we may consider to have commenced in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, or in 1991, with the
dismemberment of the Soviet Union—the world has witnessed dramatic changes that
have caused our present time to be more dynamic than any before. In this context,
three main effects can be perceived, namely: a strong interdependence and interconnection between states; a growing demand for renewable and nonrenewable resources,
including energy resources; and a spreading of different cultures with their own ideas
and values.
Humanity tends to consolidate a new paradigm of peace and cooperation among peoples of the world, aimed at holding armed conflicts at a distance and encouraging progress. History has shown that the progress of nations has always been associated with
their attitude of openness to the world. It has also taught us that such progress can be
sustained only if embodied in responsible and internationally oriented behavior, free
from any taint of unscrupulous dominance or exploitation.
For us seamen, it is simple to imagine the role of the maritime environment in this new
process: just as the sea is a synonym for nations’ openness to the world and, as history
has shown, the scene of numerous conflicts, it may also be a synonym of peace and
cooperation.
The fact that the oceans are the locus of this evolution implies a fundamental opportunity both for human beings and for the planet: seven-tenths of the earth’s surface is
covered with water, two-thirds of the world’s population has settled in territories
located less than 150 kilometers away from the coasts, and by 2025, it is estimated, 70
percent of the world’s inhabitants will have settled in an even narrower coastal strip of
land, about forty kilometers wide. Moreover, globally speaking, more than 65 percent
of the world’s states are coastal.
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In terms of economic significance, the traditional use of the sea for transportation is
fully evident. In global terms, 80 percent of commercial products are transported by
sea, and in the last fifty years, international trade, as measured in tons per capita, has
quadrupled. We may, therefore, assume that international shipping will continue to be
the main means of transport of raw materials and manufactured products, given the
geographic distance between the world’s supply centers and the growing consumption
centers; oil and its by-products constitute a highly significant volume of international
shipping.
The continental shelves (Argentina has the fifth largest) and exclusive economic zones
(Argentine is distinguished for its EEZ) must also be mentioned. These areas take up
more than 36 percent of the maritime surface and have more than 90 percent of
exploitable fish species, which supply approximately 25 percent of the animal protein
consumed in the world. A wide variety of resources can be found in these areas, including about 80 percent of offshore oil fields. In addition, there are a variety of metallic
nodules, the exploration and exploitation of which are growing, as would be expected
in view of increasing demand and the exhaustion of the terrestrial deposits.
But such a vast and dynamic environment as that posed by the oceans offers a wide
variety of possible fields of activity: observance of the international rules and regulations and of the international order; safeguarding of human life; preservation of the
marine environment and its sustainable exploitation; provision of humanitarian assistance; scientific exploration; scientific/technological research and development; and
integration of economies, even of education. These are only a few examples of the possible fields of work that can be expanded and improved.
So far, we have mentioned a number of factors that emphasize the importance of the
sea, without mentioning an even more transcendental dimension of the oceans. In this
sense, we can appreciate that the South Atlantic constitutes a space that is distinguished
by its potential to embody this new paradigm.
The South Atlantic as a Geographical Area
South America, our subcontinent, mainly extends along the “Oceanic Hemisphere.”
The dynamics of its countries and regions define it as a huge island, which may be symbolically named “Amerisur.” This island extends between two oceans and needs the sea
if it is to communicate with the rest of the world. The relative distance between the
majority of the countries forming the island and the centers of world power and consumption emphasize this necessity.
We will focus here on the South Atlantic Ocean, which extends along the eastern
Amerisur coastline and is of vital interest to Argentines because their country is one of
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its coastal states. Before we start talking about the South Atlantic, however, we must
specify its limits. The meridian going through the Cape of Needles on the east and the
meridian going through the Cape Horn on the west delimit the South Atlantic from
east to west; the sixtieth parallel south is considered its southern limit, where the Antarctic Convergence is drawn. As regards the northern limit, although there is no uniform criterion, from the geopolitical point of view it is reasonably considered to be the
imaginary line from Cape San Roque in Brazil going diagonally to Cape Verde in
Africa—that is to say, the Atlantic area narrowing between both continents.
The South Atlantic has two fronts. One is the South American front, including Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and the other is the African front, including twenty-one African countries, with South Africa the pioneer in the development of relationships with
South American countries with coasts on the Atlantic.
Additionally, the South Atlantic has particularly relevant geostrategic areas, such as the
“Atlantic Throat,” extending between the Brazilian northeastern coast and West Africa,
which is a passage necessary for carrying vital provisions to the most developed economies; the southern passages joining the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, constituting an
alternative waterway to the Panama Canal, particularly for ships larger than the canal’s
locks; and the vicinity of Cape of Good Hope, connecting the South Atlantic with the
Indian Ocean and offering also the best maritime access to Antarctica.
From the economic standpoint, the importance of the South Atlantic lies in the fact that it is the main
business sea lane. However, the importance of the South Atlantic to coastal countries, mainly of African countries, cannot be overlooked. Suffice it to say that the United States buys 15 percent of its fuel
from western African countries, and such purchases are projected to increase by approximately 25
percent by 2015. In this regard, Nigeria and Angola are the first and second continental oil producers
respectively and have large gas fields. In light of the new world scenario after 9/11 and in accordance
with U.S. economic forecasters, sub-Saharan Africa is the largest crude oil and gas supplier.

We also need to mention the growing offshore oil exploration along the Brazilian and
Argentine coasts. The South Atlantic also has important fishing grounds on both coasts
and a variety of metallic nodules. All these interests make the maritime domain an area
of great value.
The South Atlantic may be projected as a natural economic area and a supplemental
land extension of the states on both its coasts. On the one hand is the South American
front, with its north/south axis running from the vital geographical Brazilian triangle
formed by São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte to its southern end located in
the Humid Pampa, Argentina. On the other hand is the African front—of course, the
African coast.
It is important to bear in mind that from the point of view of economic integration,
sub-Saharan African countries belong to the Southern African Development
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Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), while Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay belong to the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR).
In terms of defense and international security, these South American countries, which
have abandoned any possible conflict scenarios, have converted the subregion into a
peaceful area and have worked toward a mutual understanding so as to become real
strategic allies. In this sense, we cannot avoid mentioning the Political Statement
Declaring MERCOSUR, Bolivia, and Chile as “Peace Areas,” signed by the respective
presidents on 24 July 1998 in the city of Ushuaia, capital of the Argentine province of
Tierra del Fuego.
The commitment to “strengthen consultation and cooperation efforts between the signatory parties on security and defense issues, to encourage implementation thereof, to
promote cooperation in confidence and security-building measures and to promote
implementation thereof ” is included, inter alia, in the foregoing statement. The permanent bilateral mechanisms now in place and the level of military cooperation among
the countries of the subregion clearly reflect that policy.
This cooperation among the states forming the South American front can be an instrument of great value to the strengthening of relationships among the twenty-four countries on both coasts. In other words, it may provide a firm basis upon which to expand
and redirect the South/South relationships in political, social, diplomatic, economic,
and military fields of action.
Argentina and the South Atlantic
Admiral Segundo Storni, an outstanding promoter of Argentine maritime awareness,
said in 1916 that naval power must be based upon three pillars: production, transport,
and the market. He considered trade and exploitation of resources of the sea as driving
forces behind economic growth, creation of wealth, and development. He also foresaw
clearly that the destiny of our nation was closely linked to the sea. In fact, our country
is defined as “a maritime-Atlantic country,” a point that is particularly important
because of the nation’s great influence on the southwestern section of the South Atlantic. An example of such influence would be Argentina’s search and rescue responsibility
as assigned by the International Maritime Organization (IMO); another would be
Argentina’s situation as a privileged port of entry for bi-ocean passages to the Pacific
Ocean and to the Antarctic Continent.
This role derives from Argentina’s geostrategic position in the southernmost part of
Amerisur; its 4,275 kilometers of maritime coasts; its large continental shelf (eighth
largest in the world) and island system; its significant dependence on the shipping of
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imports and exports (90 percent of the foreign trade is conducted through fluvialmaritime sea-lanes); the strategic areas of fishing and nonrenewable resources at a
global level; the availability of abundant, high-quality, and varied sea flora and fish
fauna; and the great influence of the marine meteorological system as a factor bearing
upon the weather conditions of most of the country.
Considering Argentina as a leading actor in the regional and world maritime scene, the
Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCAS), approved as Resolution
41/11 by the United Nations General Assembly on 27 October 1986—with a vote of
127 in favor, one against (the United States), and eight abstentions (Belgium, France,
Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Holland, Portugal, and the former Federal Republic of Germany)—is a significant tool for the nations that form the basin. This tool also serves to
guarantee certain vital interests of the nation as established in our constitution: sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, respect for the life and freedom of the
inhabitants, and self-determination. In this regard, the president of the nation, Dr.
Nestor Kirchner, expressed the following when he delivered his speech on the occasion
of Army Day: “These are not issues about which we may have doubts or allow for any
distinctions; they are permanent goals of the Government agenda.”
The vital interests of our nation, as well as the strategic interests supplementing them,
invariably have an essential maritime component, given the fact that we are a traditional maritime nation.
The South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Area
Since its creation, the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic has provided a flexible regional mechanism for cooperation on political, economic, technical,
cultural, and security issues among its member states. It would be possible to fulfill the
expected peace and cooperation objectives only as effectively as democratic institutions, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms are exercised and
implemented.
The international community has acknowledged that the South Atlantic is a region
with a specific identity and that the twenty-four countries of the area have responsibilities and interests that must be respected. This is well interpreted by George Lamaziere,
spokesman of the former president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. He
observed that ZPCAS is “a region in which security and defense have shifted, since the
end of World War II, from an area integrated by the Americas and subordinated to the
logic of global confrontation—embodied in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (the Rio Pact)—to a recognition of South America as an area with its own
features and politically, diplomatically and militarily as impervious as possible to
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global threats . . . for a better concentration of resources on development and rescue
from social deficiencies.”
We know about the potentialities of this basin and about its importance for the overall
development of our peoples. This implies the necessity of acting responsibly with
regard to its management and preservation. It constitutes an important asset that
should be protected from nonregional tensions and confrontations by joint and common actions taken by the countries involved. In this connection, cooperation is being
developed based on the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the states and on other relevant principles of international law, as well as on all peoples’ right to determine freely their economic and political systems.
Within this framework of action, the proposal is to examine those related interests
(shared and complementary) that commend themselves, to set attainable goals without
negatively affecting the states’ interests of other regions, and, of course, to carry this
out within a legal framework recognized by the United Nations.
Accordingly, among the policies to be established, at least the following must be
included:
• To help strengthen international peace and security efforts and promote the United
Nations’ principles and aims
• To promote the sustainable development of ZPCAS
• To protect the sea environment: mass of water, seabed, subsoil, and air and coastal
areas
• To facilitate and promote freedom of navigation
• To exercise control of the exploration and exploitation of renewable and
nonrenewable resources in respective jurisdictions
• To preserve the South Atlantic area from illegal activity
• To prohibit ships violating the regulations in force from navigating the South
Atlantic, whatever their natures and origins might be
• To keep the area free from national and international militarization measures
(conventional and nuclear weapons) and “urge all States from all other regions, in
particular those States which are important from the military point of view, to
strictly respect the South Atlantic area as a peace and cooperation area, especially
through the reduction and possible elimination of the military presence in the area,
the nonintroduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and
the nonextension of rivalries and conflicts which are alien to them” (Article 3,
Resolution 4111, United Nations).
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The policies are mere statements; their implementation requires strategies that, in
short, constitute policies in process. The strategies to be outlined will require close connection, on different levels of cooperation; they necessarily fall within the context of
Argentine foreign and defense policies, which go hand in hand; and they have as their
priority the consolidation of an active and committed presence in the South Atlantic,
increasing the cooperative activities linked to the area.
Consequently, the Argentine maritime strategy for the area should take into account
possibilities based on dialogue and consensus, including
• Coordinated implementation of research and development, technical, scientific, and
logistic activities intended to obtain detailed information of the existing and varied
natural resources in ZPCAS, allowing the participating countries to envision clearly
their maritime potentials and the levels of economic development to be achieved
• Efforts to increase regional development of “areas with poor demographic density”
on the maritime littoral
• Efforts to promote sea-related educational initiatives, including the participation of
national universities
• Active participation in international forums that favor the discussion of South
Atlantic issues and the creation of related commissions with the intention of
• making the international community aware of the importance of preserving
ZPCAS as a world peace reservoir, and
• reaching common objectives, within the international framework, taking into
account the best cost-benefit ratio.
• Drafting of common rules and regulations for the area, in accordance with the
national rules and regulations effective in the member countries
• Formulation of joint policies allowing for better economic development of area
resources and seeking rational, appropriate, and sustainable exploitation thereof
• Signing of agreements among the diverse productive sectors from each of the
countries participating in ZPCAS, with a view to promoting the creation of joint
ventures to diversify activity in the whole region, providing more competitiveness
and developing commercial relationships with the new regions for the introduction
of their products.
The need to control, preserve, develop, and protect the regional jurisdictional maritime
area requires military representatives of member states to be present at discussions of
the creation of a collective defensive system in ZPCAS. Such military participation will
by no means be condemned by the other states, whenever its presence will be in the
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best interest of the world. Given both the specific features of the sphere in which such
activities are carried out and the characteristics of the operations involved, navies are
likely to be the primary military actors.
The defense systems of the ZPCAS-participating countries, especially their armed
forces, could then have a distinct key mission in the future—to interpret and join the
regional integration in progress. In my opinion, this would be a historic mission
reserved to the current military generation of our countries.
A collective system of regional defense such as that outlined here, based on the progressive and growing consolidation of higher levels of mutual confidence, is included in
current Argentine legislation—mainly the National Defense Act 23554/88 and its Regulation 727/06, as well as Executive Order 1691/06 on the Organization and Operation
of the Armed Forces. This will help create an effective environment for peace and cooperation. Therefore, the following tasks, among others, could be included:
• Achievement of appropriate and effective military compatibility, interoperability,
and complementarity among the forces of regional countries
• Ample exchange of information related to ZPCAS among member states
• Protection of maritime communication routes
• Effective presence in the designated areas
• Coordination with other regional organizations to guarantee the achievement of
ZPCAS objectives.
Argentina and ZPCAS
As mentioned before, a maritime nation like Argentina, committed to international
peace and cooperation, cannot avoid having an interest in, and optimism about,
ZPCAS.
There has been a paradigm change in the purpose of maritime strategy. It no longer
exists merely to fight and win wars at sea by exercising unilateral control of the oceans.
Today this concept of a zero-sum game has been modified, and the maritime strategy
should be redesigned in line with a cooperative pattern agreed upon among the participating actors, pursuant to the synergistic principle of playing a win-win game, with a
view to consolidating peace, cooperation, and security in the maritime areas. These
were the goals that led to the creation of ZPCAS.
This being the case, “the main innovation introduced when the ZPCAS was created was
the addition of the word ‘cooperation’ to the expression ‘peace area.’ The intention is to
neutralize the ‘negative’ aspect of a ‘peace area,’ intended primarily to preserve the
peace and avoid or eliminate any obstacles likely to threaten it, with another ‘positive’
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quality which would entail the consolidation and strengthening of intra-zone
relationships.”
As has been stated before, there are different courses of action that must be followed in
order to consolidate these noble objectives, and they have come to be considered as priorities of navies in the South Atlantic. In this regard, during a ministerial meeting held
in Rio in July 1988, it was agreed to establish an integrated system of maritime control
for the exchange of data about ship movements in the area, with the purpose of protecting the sea environment.
In this spirit, we understand that it is necessary to continue strengthening the excellent
bonds that Argentina has developed for so many years with the navies of South America, which are an example of cooperation and mutual confidence at a global level.
At the same time, it is imperative to continue increasing the historical relationships
that our country has established with friendly navies on the African coast, especially
the long-lasting relationships developed with the Republic of South Africa, the fundamental interlocutor on the eastern coast of the South Atlantic. It is worth noting the
maritime cooperation efforts among the navies of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and
South Africa in regular naval exercises, such as ATLASUR.
But our challenge does not end there. We are aware that without neglecting our relationships with the rest of the friendly navies of the continent and the world, we may
contribute to building a common maritime strategy aimed at strengthening ZPCAS.
This will favor the security, well-being, and the progress of our peoples, as well as international harmony and security.

CHAPTER TWO

Changing Asymmetrical Threats Require
New Responses
C A P TA I N J UA N C A R LOS D E L A L A M O C A R R I L LO, PE RU V I A N NAV Y
C A P TA I N J O S É C A RVA JA L RAYM O N D, PE RU V I A N NAV Y
C O LON E L C H A R L E S L A M B RU S C H I N I AC U Y, PE RU V I A N A I R FORC E

Analysis of Scenes
The Global Scene
The concept of international security has changed as a product of the appearance of
international terrorism in all continents, evidenced by the attacks registered in the last
years, such as the attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York
and on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001; on 11 March 2002,
against the Metro in Madrid; and finally in 2005 against the public transportation system in London.
These kind of actions show that international terrorism may occur in any country of
the world, whether directly against American interests or against states that are allies or
friends of the United States in the struggle against terrorism. In that sense, Peru and
other countries of the region are not exempted from risks; international terrorism is
recognized as a serious threat to internal and external security.
The security and defense policies of countries are influenced in various degrees by the
political and military unipolarity that the world has experienced in recent years. Likewise, states, international organizations, multilateral entities, and other forces also
influence such policies directly or indirectly, formally or informally. As a counterbalance to the unipolarity and as a part of the globalization process, the world economy is
increasingly multipolar. This has generated economic, social, cultural, and ideological
changes in the entire world and increased the commercial flows among widespread
zones. Most of this activity is carried out by sea, reflecting the complex and increasing
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financial and economic interdependence among countries and states. The international
scene is increasingly more complex and competitive, which implies as well a critical
weakness of countries viewed separately.
This process has given rise to numerous intrastate conflicts affecting world peace, arising from ethnic or religious problems, heightened nationalism, tribal conflict, and
political confrontations. Drug trafficking is also a worldwide problem.
The Regional Scene
The American states are devising a new concept of hemispheric security with a multidimensional reach and total respect for international law and the rules and principles
established in the charters of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the
United Nations (UN).
Within the context of that effort, the enormous disparities existing in several countries
of the region in economic, social, educational, and health dimensions, among others,
generate points of political instability, which represent an indirect threat to peace and
regional security.
On the other hand, globalization has initiated an accelerated process of change
in South American countries, a process that underscores the importance of
Latin America in its international commercial relationships. Also, the speed with
which several countries of the Pacific basin have become attractive markets for
products of the region opens the possibility that the Pacific Ocean will be a communication channel of higher importance in the future, mainly with emerging
Asian economies, which are anxious to negotiate in both directions. This will generate a high degree of economic activity that will in turn require a secure and suitable control of the sea to prevent this communication channel from being used to
promote illegal activity.
The countries of the Pacific basin have similar deficiencies in the control and surveillance of maritime areas near their coasts; the situation worsens in states that are
farther north and nearer to the United States. The poor capabilities for control and
maritime monitoring of these countries are largely due to logistical deficiencies
that can be classified in two major categories: economic and technological limitations. The first one means that such states do not have enough resources to carry
out maritime control and surveillance permanently, whereas the latter involves the
lack of modern technologies for such missions, such as the use of satellite systems
that would allow better supervision of extensive ground and maritime areas.
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The National Scene
Although globalization has generated positive effects for the economy of this country,
it also has intensified political, social, and economic problems that could constitute
threats to national security. We will review some of them.
• The economic stability of recent years and the intensification of bilateral commerce
with countries with which we currently are negotiating free trade agreements will
increase maritime traffic. This will project an image of confidence in the country
abroad that will attract higher investment, which in turn will increase production
and generate jobs, thus consolidating Peru as having one of the higher economic
growth rates in the South American region.
• In the realm of internal security, the continuing threat of drug trafficking and the
alliance between drug traffickers and remnants of the terrorist organization Sendero
Luminoso is creating instability in certain regions of the country. Although it is
clear that the level of terrorist threat cannot be compared to what we experienced in
the 1980s and 1990s, both threats must be controlled, because the highly corrupting
power of drug trafficking can destroy values that maintain Peruvian society, creating
social problems and thus a fertile field for terrorism.
• The actions of the Colombian guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (FARC) in the areas adjacent to the Putumayo River (which forms the
border between Peru and Colombia), in financial collusion with drug trafficking,
have increased drug trafficking across the Amazonian rivers. This action brings in its
wake the destruction of the environment and of biodiversity.
• In the same way, linked with such other illegal activities as the illegal cutting of trees
or prospecting for gold using contaminated chemicals, organized groups of
dangerous common criminals have arisen, whose transnational activities threaten
the security of other states.
Analysis of the Threats
For this study we will bound the analysis to those threats that, even if not actually new,
are considered new or emerging. Also, as we are addressing the maritime dimension, we
will deal with those new threats that exist in the maritime domain, in internal, territorial, or international waters. Given the character of these threats, we can categorize
them as “common” or “unique.”
Common Threats
Common threats are illegal actions that affect Peruvian interests as well as those of
other states. Among this kind of threats we can identify the following:
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Terrorism: international threats of transnational origin and operations, having no particular nationality but motivated by ideology, religion, ethnicity, or concepts of liberation.
Drug trafficking: criminal activity that now is found almost all over the world, with the
potential for increasing and insinuating itself into the networks of international terrorism. In recent decades, air transportation was favored for this illegal activity; today the
higher volume of drugs that can be transported by sea is causing drug trafficking by sea
to boom.
Illegal traffic of radioactive substances and nuclear waste: a matter of increasing importance since the end of the 1980s. Its repression is a problem of controlling supplies of
nuclear and radioactive material for nuclear powers, and it involves both the countries
that produce this material and the large chain that effects its commercialization and
transport. The main danger involving nuclear materials is the proliferation of nuclear
weapons by states, terrorist groups, or arms traffickers. With spent nuclear fuel, the
dangers are radiation and its damaging effects on health, goods, and the environment.
Unique Threats
Unique threats are those that directly affect national interests and may have negative
repercussions on the interests of other states. Among them we can mention:
Piracy: a criminal practice as old as navigation and not limited to assaults on ships on
the high seas. Often these criminal activities are carried out in port facilities or anchorages. The area of highest activity will be states that do not have real control of their
jurisdictions.
Smuggling: the entrance and exit of merchandise traded without paying customs duties,
thereby defrauding the national authorities and treasury. In the maritime context this
kind of illegal activity is most common when ships are in port, permitting the possibility of detecting, intercepting, and seizing such merchandise in one’s own territorial
waters when the necessary intelligence is available.
Illegal overfishing: a phenomenon that has turned into a challenge of worldwide dimensions. Excessive fishing not only threatens the existence of species but devastates the
marine ecosystem. In some cases, fishing operations have surpassed the reproductive
capacity of species, in spite of regulations of governments and international organizations, putting those species at risk of extinction and making legitimate fishing less viable.
Actions of foreign irregular forces: the action of Colombian military forces against terrorist groups in that country’s territory may result in these groups entering our
national territory, disturbing free riverine transit and violating our sovereignty.
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The Peruvian Maritime Strategic Approach
The Legal Framework
The political constitution of Peru approved in 1993 considers one of the fundamental
duties of the state to be protecting the population from threats against its security
(Article 44). One of these threats is illegal drug trafficking, which must be fought and
punished throughout the national territory. In order to meet these and other problems,
the System of National Defense, coordinated by the Ministry of Defense, in accordance
with Article 118 of the constitution, relies on the armed forces.
On the other hand, in 2002 the various political forces of the country reached a consensus, called “the National Agreement,” on long-term policies that lay out guidelines for
national security and the struggle against drug trafficking (see www.acuerdonacional
.gob.pe).
Finally, several international commitments assumed by Peru, at the multilateral,
regional, and bilateral levels, imply particular attention to the safety of human life at
sea, safe navigation, and the protection of the marine ecosystem.
Definition of Strategic Variables
Several factors can be identified as strategic variables. They are:
Interdependence of Markets and Economies. It is undeniable that as a part of the globalization process, which demands increased competitiveness by companies to serve
global demand, a growing process of strategic alliances among organizations in diverse
countries is emerging. Apart from factors of an ideological or sociopolitical character,
both globalization and strategic alliances have increasing and irreversible importance
in the current economic scene, at least in the medium term.
Security and Freedom of Maritime Commerce. The role of navies throughout the history of major powers has been linked to the protection of maritime commerce and
support of foreign policy. This role is still in effect, but the increasing interdependence
of economies shows us that it is more complex than ever before. Today it is necessary
that emerging countries count on naval power that, besides offering security and freedom in its jurisdictional seas, can protect an increasingly diversified foreign trade, acting in accordance with a wider foreign policy.
Surveillance and Control of the Territorial Sea. World peace and the welfare of states depend to a great extent on security in the worldwide maritime domain—ports, coastlines,
territorial waters, and high seas—because through it most commerce is carried out and
important economic activities take place. As Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy,
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mentioned during the Current Strategy Forum at the U.S. Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island, in June 2006, every year more than fifty thousand large ships
cross the oceans carrying almost 80 percent of worldwide commerce, 60 percent of
all the petroleum produced, and more than eleven million passengers. All of this makes
the sea not only a means of transit for new threats but also the scene in which they can
be carried out.
Asymmetric Enemies. Threats are increasingly present that do not fit classic definitions but instead use and have methods, technologies, values, organizations, and perspectives significantly different from those of regular forces of a state. Their primary
intention is to exploit weaknesses of the system against which they fight and to maximize their own advantages, obtain the initiative, and gain greater freedom of action.
The center of gravity of the actions is located in the minds of their enemies more than
in their enemies’ armed forces. These threats act through subversive organizations
equipped with weapons of mass destruction; international terrorist groups; criminal
organizations, drug traffickers, Mafias, and money-laundering networks; hackers; and
mercenaries or paramilitary groups. This kind of enemy has drawn on military strategies to conceive a new model of warfare that depends, for the first time, more on cultural elements than on warfighting potential.
A Peruvian Maritime Strategy Proposal
We propose the following new maritime strategy for Peru: “Peru, within the framework
of the sovereignty of states and firmly adhering to the rules and principles of international law, will contribute to the security and freedom of maritime commerce, as an
integral element of hemispheric security, by surveilling and controlling its jurisdictional waters, and protecting the freedom of international trade in the region and with
the world, against asymmetric enemies that could affect the market economies.”
To do this, it would be necessary to create a permanent organization in the maritime
domain, a kind of task organization, of flexible character and suitable to the threats to
be faced, and to exploit the synergy of different operational or administrative components of our naval institution. The proposed organization would be an operational unit
of high mobility, centralized command, and decentralized execution, with a capacity
for joint and combined operations and for work with other agencies that have the same
objectives. That would give it an acceptable capacity to fight against asymmetric enemies in the short and medium terms.
Long-term planning is not applicable, since success in the short and medium terms will
cause the new enemies to redefine their ways of operating against the law. This
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phenomenon will force a constant redesign of strategies and tactics to fight against
them, turning the process for neutralizing them into a permanent cycle of change.
Execution of Strategy
The execution of the proposed strategy would be carried out in two phases:
Phase I
The Peruvian Navy will work closely with other governmental organizations, mainly
the National Police of Peru, attempting to maximize resources and the information
available to fight against our enemies in an efficient way. To do so the following steps
have been proposed:
• Establish a central command post and also subordinate, decentralized command
posts in the ports of Callao, Paita, and Mollendo to allow the handling and
management of information throughout the maritime domain and zone of
responsibility. Each of these command posts would have assigned aviation and naval
units, both surface ships and submarines, capable of deploying quickly in the area
under control.
• Use the infrastructure and equipment currently available to the Navy, adapting its
means and resources for operations under a task organization of high flexibility,
specifically fulfilling control functions. Decisions on taking action would fall solely
to the commander of the task organization.
• Conduct geographically layered defense, cover, and interdiction operations. Use
equipment allocated in coastal zones, the littoral, and on the high seas.
• Carry out coordinated intelligence operations and also independent ones with
decentralized detachments. These new organizations must do this work at the
outset. The intelligence organization must work full-time, whereas operational units
will act “as ordered,” being decentralized and ready to engage.
• Establish and coordinate permanent relations with institutions and governmental
and nongovernmental security agencies at high levels in order to receive timely and
effective information for the execution of operations.
• In order to optimize interrelations, structure the proposed organization with only
one level of coordination, which would act as a unique interlocutor among the
different actors fighting asymmetric enemies, at the national and international
levels.
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Phase II
The institution would work with, in addition to the Peruvian agencies and divisions,
other navies and international agencies, seeking to improve its logistic elements and
exploit satellite information. This would make it possible to extend the area of coverage
and operation of the proposed task organization. For that, the following actions should
be taken:
• Sign agreements of cooperation with the navies of countries that are interested in
fighting against these threats and can offer satellite intelligence that can be used by
the operational commanders for interdiction.
• Implement cooperative security policies with countries of the Pacific basin,
consistent with policies of national security and defense. Institutional adjustment to
these new complementary roles to the Navy’s traditional function should be given
priority, allocating equipment and resources to implement the approach in the
short term.
• Establish cooperative mechanisms between states so as to create the capability and
influence needed to anticipate and respond flexibly to the threats posed by
asymmetric enemies. A relationship with the United States is a privilege, because
that country can offer superior logistical support and information to achieve
success in these kinds of operations.
• Implement systems of control similar to the maritime one for rivers and lakes. To do
so it will be necessary to count on international support, because it is much more
difficult to control illegal activities in the vast Amazonian region than in the
maritime domain.
Conclusion
It is necessary to design new strategies to fight against asymmetric enemies, strategies
that have at the same time a particular emphasis on the security and control of seas,
both at the regional and at the global levels. Only in that way can the threats to maritime commerce be avoided, thus enabling globalization, interdependent markets, and
economies to act on behalf of the country and the region.

CHAPTER THREE

From a Local Perspective
Toward a Maritime Strategy for the South Atlantic
C A PTA I N C R I ST I A N SI DD E R S, A RGE N T I N E NAV Y

A New Maritime Strategy?
The invitation to contribute elements that would allow us to define a new maritime
strategy leads us to new, innovative thoughts, as if prior considerations had suddenly
lost their validity. After a first reflection, however, we notice that the criteria we use
today have been established over a long period of time, by applying a logic common to
this part of the globe. They have never remained unchanged, as our understanding has
been gradually updated in light of the evolution of technology and international
relations.
Therefore, we can consider the current situation to be a stage of a long, evolutionary
process, one that has involved alternating periods of cooperation and tensions among
different actors. Today, the international community seeks to strengthen security
through progress and cooperation among peoples.
In the following paragraphs we will try to outline the factors that have guided the evolution of Argentina’s maritime strategy.
Elements of the Maritime Strategy
It is necessary to begin by highlighting the most significant elements that make up the
concept of maritime strategy. Obtaining and transporting resources, mostly fish and, to
a lesser extent, oil and gas, have traditionally been the two main activities carried out at
sea. In addition, several engagements, though few decisive battles, have taken place in
our waters, where control of the sea was a critical factor for the victor.
The evolution of maritime strategy, both at a national and a global level, is an important matter to the human race and the planet. This judgment is strongly supported by
widely known data about the percentage of the earth’s surface covered by oceans and
the population settled near the coasts or expected to move there. This demonstrates
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that shipping will remain a principal means of transportation of goods. In the last
decades, international maritime trade has quadrupled. It is worth noting that oil and
its derivatives are among the most important seaborne cargoes.
From the local point of view, the growth achieved in these areas has considerably
exceeded the previous average. The increase of passenger traffic on pleasure cruises
must also be noted.
Geographic Factors
Considered as a route that connects nations, the South Atlantic has distinctive characteristics. First, the South Atlantic’s connection with other oceans defines focal areas of
particular importance. In a westward direction, the Atlantic’s connection with the
Pacific is the only alternative path for ships too large to transit the Panama Canal. The
Cape of Good Hope area likewise concentrates shipping headed for and proceeding
from the Indian Ocean. From south to north, vital supplies for the most developed
economies flow through the Atlantic Narrows. Tierra del Fuego has the closest ports to
the Antarctic.
From the production point of view, we cannot forget to mention exclusive economic
zones (EEZs) and continental shelves. Argentina possesses an EEZ of a size similar to
that of the nation’s land territory, and a continental shelf whose extension beyond the
EEZ amounts to a million square kilometers.
The navigable rivers allow transit between the vast ocean and productive zones inland.
New technological possibilities, together with the increasing market demand for raw
materials, have drawn the heart of South America into closer contact with the maritime environment. Hence, a comprehensive maritime vision must take into account the
importance of major rivers.
We could say that the sea limits, which used to be close to the coast and exclusive to
coastal countries, have become remote and mobile frontiers that raise questions about
the future evolution of international law. Each nation will be able to enjoy the benefits
of international law only by exercising the powers and honoring the obligations prescribed by that body of law.
Customary Concepts versus Evolution of the Law of the Sea—Freedom of the High
Seas—New Users—New Threats
Apart from the use of the oceans for shipping, there is a wide range of activity in that
vast and dynamic environment: enforcement of international law and order, safeguarding of human life, protection and sustainable exploitation of the marine environment,
humanitarian assistance, scientific exploration, scientific and technological research
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and development, integration of economies, and education. These are just examples of
activities in the maritime domain that may be enhanced and improved. All these considerations emphasize the importance of the sea and its use, giving it an even more
transcendent dimension.
In carrying out such actions, in response to single current issues, conflicts with ancient
principles such as the freedom of the high seas may arise. To what extent may countries
advance toward the governance of the sea? When crossing the ocean from one shore to
the other, shipping will navigate through highly exclusive zones, then through those
where it may enjoy freedom restricted only by the flag state, finally reaching the maritime jurisdiction of individual coastal states.
The challenge, therefore, is how to cope with this situation without failing to respect
the international order and each nation’s interests and within a framework of indisputable cooperation. In this sense, it is widely believed that multinational organizations
play a key role in helping countries arrive at understanding.
The Concept of the Use of the Sea—National Expectations—Argentine Interests in
the Sea
The strategic area where the Argentine Navy operates is defined as the “maritime and
riverine areas of national jurisdiction or interest.” It is not geographically delimited but
covers the zones where naval assets can be employed for pursuing the goals established
by legislation in force, in line with national interests.
In this context, and following the trinity of naval functions laid out by Ken Booth, the
Argentine Navy directs its actions toward three institutional goals:
• Protecting maritime and riverine interests
• Supporting the nation’s foreign policy
• Contributing to the national defense.

1

If we observe the evolution of maritime jurisdiction throughout the last century, we
may observe that it has been considerably extended in favor of coastal states, as far as
exploitation rights are concerned. But at the same time, new duties aimed at the ocean’s
preservation and care have also been imposed for the future benefit of mankind.
The southwestern Atlantic and its bordering nations have begun to assume increasing
economic importance. In the last two decades, interstate relations within this regional
strategic area have made highly satisfactory progress in defense and security affairs.
The security atmosphere existing in South America is unprecedented, as a consequence

22

THE NEWPORT PAPERS

of the degree of dialogue, cooperation, and agreement achieved, distinguishing it as a
2
region with one of the highest levels of stability and predictability in the world.
Naval power has always been an efficient tool of state policy, and it has been increasingly used given the will of nations to reinforce their bonds of friendship, guarantee
agreements, and form coalitions. Within the region, conventional challenges are currently tempered by the implementation of confidence-building measures.
In recent years, the global and regional security scenes have been marked by the emergence of nonmilitary phenomena, usually called “new threats,” such as transnational
terrorism and organized crime, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. At present, these
threats constitute a large part of the security agendas of the international community
as a whole and of individual states, in line with their national policies and domestic
legislation. The maritime environment is particularly susceptible to these dangers.
These factors pose a dilemma as to whether to preserve the customary principle of freedom of the sea or to exercise increased control over all maritime areas—that is, by
guaranteeing their use to those who have the right to use them and denying their use to
those who intend to carry out unlawful acts.
Guaranteeing the benefits of the sea to Argentina and the international community as
well as providing maritime transport with security, protecting human life, contributing
to the preservation of the marine environment, and ensuring compliance with national
and international laws call for a basic capability to control maritime and riverine areas
of national jurisdiction and interest. Control is intended to protect our resources and
rights and to undertake our responsibilities in such areas.
The wide range of missions and tasks to be carried out at sea to turn it into a safer
environment require the upgrading of many current capabilities. Today many navies
are redefining the concept of security in a way that provides a basis for the development and constitution of each force. At present, when a critical situation arises, the
immediate response is provided by an ad hoc coalition. Cooperation among nations
must be based on respect for each other’s domestic law. In this regard, much progress
has been made. Many long-standing combined activities occur in the region. Most
nations carry out bilateral exercises with their neighbors as well as multilateral exercises with countries from distant regions. The forums held to discuss sea-related issues
are no less important. In line with Admiral Mullen’s proposal to create a “thousand3
ship navy,” the establishment of a Hemispheric Naval Cooperation Network, as
approved by a recommendation of the XXII Inter-American Naval Conference, is
aimed at providing immediate responses to incidents involving maritime security or
4
assistance in the event of natural disasters.
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A combined capabilities assessment based on a principle of strategic complementarity
would probably arrive at a more effective and efficient solution for the region. This
assessment should be made not only by all participating navies but also by their corresponding governments, which are ultimately responsible for providing the strategic
framework required for the success of the naval network.
The concept of global security is focused on the important fact that responses to incidents occurring in this new dynamic scene are to be provided by the nations of each
region, which will organize and coordinate the relevant activities to be carried out
within their areas of responsibility. In this respect, the exchange of information would
be useful for the development of a “common surface picture.” In 1965, Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay formed the South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination
(CAMAS). Since then this organization has worked daily in the areas of management,
control, and protection, in order to contribute to a safe use of sea lines of communication. Through the analysis of several exercises done regularly doctrine is updated in
5
line with the present-day scenario. The U.S. Navy and the South African Navy have
recently joined as observers. Integration through this kind of organization would contribute to improving the conditions for the use of the sea.
Maritime Strategy Elements to Remain Unchanged
There are some factors that will not undergo any significant change:
• The importance of maritime shipping, because there are no other feasible
alternatives for the massive transport of goods.
• The value of focal areas, which are weighed differently according to temporal
criteria but tend to increase in value in times of crisis.
• The immensity of the sea makes the presence of “manned” assets irreplaceable for
effective control, although technological advances facilitate the gathering of
information. The presence of naval assets in maritime areas of interest helps reduce
potential conflicts and provides a progressive response to different kinds of
incidents.
• Coastal states and flag states will continue to be key players in legitimizing the
actions resulting from the evolution of maritime strategies.
Conclusions
Going back to the concept of maritime strategy as an evolving process, it is appropriate
to highlight some aspects that deserve to be analyzed when updating the principles in
force today. The first to consider is that a maritime strategy is, by definition, the strategy applied by a particular actor to the maritime scene consistently with its own
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interests. It is by no means an abstract construct. Second, like any other strategy, maritime strategies of various actors should somehow link together, taking advantage of the
synergistic power of cooperation, which multiplies the gains of all participants. Moreover, they should realistically assess the direct and indirect costs of policies of confrontation at present and in the future.
Third, reciprocity, as a measure of cooperation, should be understood in terms of
mutual benefit beyond our own interests. Fourth, the concept of evolution itself
implies that many things are already in place and provide a point of departure for any
update. Fifth, the search for cooperation and integration in naval issues requires establishing mechanisms designed to bridge the technological gap among the different
actors involved.
Finally, cooperation among states does not suppose the absence of conflict but the
search for a solution to facilitate lasting arrangements for the greatest benefit of the
participants involved. The current state of affairs has allowed the United Nations
General Assembly, by virtue of Resolution 4111 of 27 October 1986, to declare the
South Atlantic region as a peace and cooperation zone, a status that strengthens day
after day.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Two Approaches to Security
Cooperation and Obstacles to Cooperation
C A P TA I N C L AU D I O RO GE R I O D E A N D RA D E FL Ô R , B RA Z I L I A N NAV Y
(RETIRED)

At the request of the U.S. Naval War College (NWC), the Brazilian Naval War College
agreed to write essays on the topic “Global and Regional Security Cooperation: Implications for a New U.S. Maritime Strategy.” That seems to be a difficult task, especially if
we believe our studies will have implications for a new maritime strategy. We are talking about suggestions aimed at a country that, according to some scholars, has or
1
believes it has “command of the commons”—command of the sea, air, and space. No
doubt this supporting pillar of U.S. hegemony is at least an ultimate goal to be sought
and achieved. However, it would be a more reasonable target if the United States could
2
count on the cooperation of allies and partners.
This essay is intended to examine concisely our vision of the impending threats to
maintaining U.S. hegemony and the proposed cooperation signaled by NWC. Next, we
will proceed with identifying partnership issues that may be of interest to Brazil. However, we cannot be misled by the ambiguous factors involved in a cooperation agreement under the leadership of President George W. Bush, which may cause—
3
deliberately or not—irritants in the relationship with regional countries.
Development
A Theoretical Platform
For the purpose of this essay, we will use Robert Gilpin’s theory of “hegemonic war,” as
4
it is closely tied to the current scenario and the topic proposed by the Naval War College.
Thinking about the underlying aspects of the issue, we understand that the current
international system is anarchic and comprises independent states. According to
Gilpin, the international system consists of three dimensions: hierarchical prestige, ter5
ritorial division, and international economy. Once the international system is structured under the hegemony of one dominant state, power can be distributed among the
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6

strong states. Transforming one or more such strong players may impact the established international system, which resists change.7
The situation described above is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for hegemonic war. A challenge is also required. In other words, internal changes may occur,
provided that they do not pose threats to the vital interests of dominant states, at the
risk of being understood as a challenge. Nevertheless, other states may threaten vital
interests within the international system. That would give rise to another kind of war,
aimed at maintaining order. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars exemplify a situation of
system instability.
According to Gilpin, international relations have a close causal connection with a differential in the growth of state power. An alteration of this power differential can
unbalance the international system. In the case of war to maintain order, we have one
state that has no increased power to threaten but challenges the hegemonic state.
Contextualizing
Based on this theoretical approach, we will summarize conceptually the post–September
11th situation of the United States.
No doubt the United States exercises world hegemony. The country’s military, economic, and technological power is undeniable. Nonetheless, some time ago China
began to present itself as a potential challenger of U.S. hegemony as a result of its eco8
nomic and—in particular—military growth. Based on figure 1, which compares Chinese and U.S. military spending, a certain trend toward a reduction in the difference is
9
apparent, with the narrowest gap witnessed in 1999. We do not wish to claim that
FIGURE 1
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China will challenge the United States but to point out the impending Chinese threat
to U.S. hegemony, which could set off a war—hot or cold—in the competition for
world hegemony.
However, September 11th showed the United States that a new threat had been
mounted against the country—one that takes advantage of its vulnerability and causes
damage, particularly to its prestige as the world’s greatest power. No doubt that event
has had an impact on the international system. Yet the cause of such a threat is not one
of the traditional components of that system; in addition, it can be posed by any state
in the international system. Compared to a missile that is fired into the defensive system and follows through by its immutable logic until hitting the target, the terrorist
works with a changeable logic, destroying himself along with his targets. Therefore,
while he is not a state, he poses a threat to the foundations of the international system.
In this respect we can identify a departure from Gilpin’s theory, but the effect on stability is similar.
While its perpetrators did not act in the name of one or more states, the September
11th terrorist attack can be seen not as a consequence of a variation in the power relationship but as a challenge to the existing hegemony, resulting in a “war to maintain
order,” or the “war against terrorism” declared by President Bush.
In view of the above, the international system is assumed to be unstable, for two reasons: the variation in the power differential with China and the challenge posed by
transnational terrorism. In other words, the hegemonic power is witnessing the growth
of a country that may challenge its vital interests, while continuing to be challenged by
a type of non-state organization whose logic and rationale differ from Western
standards.
U.S. Strategy
The strategies announced by the Bush administration after September 11th include the
National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) and the National Security Strategy of
the United States of America (NSS), published in July 2002 and March 2006 (currently
10
in force), respectively.
The NSHS sets forth the following three strategic objectives to maximize U.S.
11
security:
• Preventing terrorists’ attacks on the United States
• Reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism
• Minimizing damage and recovery from an attack.
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Two initiatives from the “critical mission area” called “border and transport security”
12
can be pointed out, as both are relevant to this study. These initiatives consist of creating “smart borders” and enhancing maritime container transport security.
Finally, the following principles of homeland security should be considered: law, science and technology, information and system sharing, and international cooperation.13
Science and technology, we note, constitute a strength that Americans are not willing to
share. The fourth principle—international cooperation—is set aside from the other
three. An obstacle to international cooperation is imposed on American universities by
14
the U.S. government in the form of the Technology Alert List.
The core strategy is the NSHS; all other strategies and actions derive from it—including
the NSS. The NSHS can also be evaluated for its consistency, as it has not been
amended since publication, in contrast to the NSS, which was issued in September 2002
and again in March 2006.
U.S. Southern Command
This analysis will be based on the lecture delivered by Rear Admiral James W.
15
Stevenson, commander of Naval Forces, Southern Command. We will identify important points so that we can be aware of the kind of cooperation suggested—an early
aspect has already been reviewed—and its impact on Brazil’s vital interests.
The basic text consists of a proposal from the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations to the
U.S. Navy, and it comments on the capabilities the Brazilian Navy may consider in the
16
next twenty or twenty-five years. According to Admiral Michael G. Mullen, “Cooperation is of the utmost importance as no individual country is able to do what has to be
done.” The admiral emphasizes that “we have to work in a combined environment,”
and, we add, it is obviously important for U.S. security and reduced instability in the
international system.
Two points are highlighted by Rear Admiral Stevenson: that the U.S. Navy must “continue to be the prevailing force in the open seas” and that it must “have increased
capacity to operate in both green and brown waters.” Therefore, it wishes to capitalize
on the “ability of partner nations to develop a working relationship, as well as to communicate and operate both at sea and ashore.” Given such “cooperation in the various
world scenarios,” it can reduce its U.S. fleet support infrastructure and “maintain a
global maritime supremacy.”
Meanwhile, we can say that in this way the U.S. Navy achieves two goals—extending
outward the U.S. line of defense and improving maritime container transport security—
in accordance with the NSHS principle of international cooperation, thus contributing
to a reduction in U.S. vulnerability. All that can be summarized in the words of Rear
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Admiral Stevenson during his lecture: “We would like to see a scenario of cooperation
among the world’s navies, in order to ensure security in certain areas.” Again, it is
important to add that those are areas of interest to the United States.
Once the strategic goal of reduced vulnerability is addressed, Rear Admiral Stevenson
moves on to the next goal—the terrorist threat—and the “global war against terrorism”
campaign. The proposal to fight terrorism consists of sharing U.S. “global supremacy”
at sea in a regionalized manner—so that, in other words, the United States is able to
operate in green waters and conquer the brown waters of other states by means of
17
regional partnerships. On the other hand, we could say the Southern Command
agrees to build partnerships with other navies in green waters, which in turn would
accept U.S. cooperation in their brown waters.
That cooperation requires encouraging trust and interoperability, according to the
same document, which states: “We want to increase the capacity of our partners, the
capacity of their navies.” We understand that interoperability may be an interesting
aspect if the Brazilian Navy is provided with state-of-the-art technology and financing.
While not an incentive for the domestic industry or, in particular, for our science and
technology in terms of defense innovations, that alternative would offer enhanced
equipment with beneficial consequences for the readiness of the Brazilian Navy in the
short term.
Trust, to paraphrase Vinícius de Moraes, “will be eternal while it lasts.” Remember,
once the United States is no longer interested in the subject, Brazil may be required to
18
cut its military budget back to what it once was.
We can finish Rear Admiral Stevenson’s thought with his own words, according to
which it is important to the Brazilian Navy to “maintain security within one’s own
country, territorial sea, and EEZ [exclusive economic zone]. That is what navies are
for.” In this case, he includes at least the Paraguay/Paraná and Amazon river basins,
located “within the domestic territory.”
The 1988 Constitution and the National Defense Policy
According to the Brazilian constitution, international relations are governed by ten
principles: national independence, prevalence of human rights, self-determination of
peoples, nonintervention, equality among states, defense of the peace, peaceful settlement of disputes, rejection of terrorism and racism, cooperation among peoples for the
progress of mankind, and granting of political asylum.
We can see that terrorism is at the same level as the principle of cooperation. Yet, in
contrast with the NSHS proposal, where cooperation is aimed at U.S. national security,
the Brazilian proposal is aimed at the progress of mankind. That difference can be
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easily understood if we look back on the U.S. president’s visit to Brazil in March 2007.
Figure 2 illustrates such differences.

19
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As far as the Brazilian National Defense Policy—NDP—is concerned, terrorism is
highlighted explicitly in sub-item 2.6: “Currently, nonstate players, new threats, and the
tension between nationalism and transnationalism pervade international relations and
state security arrangements. Varied transnational violations and international terrorism pose a potential threat to peace, security and democratic order—usually countered
by state intelligence and security instruments.” Continuing, the NDP defines Brazil’s
areas of interest as including the South American subcontinent and adjacent countries
20
in Africa, where the country seeks to “build stronger cooperative relationships.”
Sub-item 3.3 shows a concern with processes that contribute to reducing the likelihood
of conflict within the strategic zone. Those processes include “the strengthening of the
integration process, close relations among Amazonian countries, intensification of
cooperation and trade among African countries, facilitated by ethnic and cultural ties;
and the consolidation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone.” Again, the
term “cooperation” comes up as a way to achieve peace, not as a way of increasing our
military power. Therefore, “the process of integrated and harmonic development of
South America becomes a priority, which covers the regional defense and security
21
area.” We can see that Brazil is not concerned about hegemony but about “an international order based on democracy, multilateralism, cooperation, the banning of chemi22
cal, biological and nuclear weapons, and a search for peace among nations.”
Finally, the NDP sub-item 4.8 states that “Brazil believes terrorism puts world peace and
security at risk. It emphatically condemns terrorist actions and supports UN resolutions,
recognizing that the world’s nations need to work together toward preventing and
fighting terrorist threats.” Based on this premise, the Brazilian Navy—through the Port
and Coast Management Office—helps create initiatives based on the International Ship
23
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. It is a post–September 11th kind of cooperation involving member countries of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
In short, Brazil is in search of a way to peace for the sake of its own security, however
utopian that may seem. While admitting that threats do exist, it believes they are not
likely to have an impact on the Brazilian territory and people. In addition, the banning
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of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is expected to enhance the country’s
security.
Conclusion
First, let us point out the differences between two concepts of security. For the United
States, national security is dependent upon the military and technological power that
undergirds the country’s hegemony. The United States intends to increase its hegemonic power as much as possible, in an attempt to meet any challenges in the international system. For Brazil, in contrast, national security is based on a belief in peace
among the world’s peoples and on a kind of cooperation quite different from that proposed by the United States. The case of technology transfers facilitated by partners in
the South but blocked by Northern partners is an example of the different approaches.
All agree that terrorism poses a threat to peace and the international system. In order
to fight terrorism, the United States is seeking to build partnerships to expand its borders and field of activity. The country is willing to enter the green and brown waters of
partner countries upon the consent of the latter. Should it not find partners and be
forced to invade a country in the name of U.S. national security, it will do so, spending
24
billions of dollars. Iraq and Afghanistan are recent cases in point.
The Brazilian Navy–U.S. Southern Command partnership in green or brown waters to
prevent and fight terrorism is not of interest to Brazil, as it could lead to a form of
intervention. That would contradict one of the principles of international relations
established in the Brazilian constitution. In order to cooperate with international peace
and security—including U.S. security—the Brazilian Navy must stand up to any terrorist threat identified within its scope of jurisdiction, which it has done in compliance
with the ISPS Code. In addition, it may integrate naval means of communication in
missions like those of the U.S. Southern Command. That kind of interoperability may
be key to the success of a military operation against terrorism.
In the short term, such prospects as interoperability and the increased capacity of the
Brazilian Navy suit the interests of defense against enemies of both countries. However,
in Brazil, interoperability cannot be dissociated from the national defense industry and
must not affect strategic developments and innovations.
Finally, Brazil understands that U.S. ships that come to participate in any cooperation
effort should not carry chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, as those are certainly
not appropriate to fight the terrorist threat and may even pose a threat to Brazil’s interests in the consolidation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Toward a Maritime Strategy
M I G U E L A N G E L T ROI T I Ñ O, A RG E N T I N E NAV Y (R E T I R E D )

When we review our origins, the birth of our nation, and our early years of national
life, and then travel through time until we reach the present moment, we may clearly
appreciate a series of national interest groups that must be harmonized with the life
and existence of the Argentine people. These interest groups have sequentially accompanied the growth of our nation. The national interests embraced by these groups gave
rise to the public policies that have provided, together with the particular circumstances governing life among the different nations, the foundations for the maritime
strategy of the nation. Although in all the stages of our national life there was a need to
develop a maritime strategy, this need became stronger as our nation developed.
A Country Is Born
During the colonial period preceding its birth, our nation, Argentina, unlike most
South American countries, did not have its origin in the sea. On the contrary, Argentina was born from the need of the Spaniards in the Viceroyalty of Peru and in the
Captaincy of Chile to take their wealth and treasures to Spain safely. The Spaniards
considered that the best way to do that was to cross the vast plain from the Andes to
the River Plate, from which they would set sail toward Europe, instead of trying to navigate the dangerous sea-lanes to the south of the continent.
Trade encouraged this movement, and the need for security in trade promoted the
development of a maritime strategy. It was necessary to safeguard the maritime traffic
from the River Plate to the port of destination in the mother country. From the beginning, this situation clearly transformed the River Plate into a major strategic point, at
which the main fleets of those times would call.
By 1799, some years before the birth of our nation, Manuel Belgrano, a lawyer who
would later become an army general, was encouraging the creation of the National Merchant Marine School, arguing that “no nation is free if it has not secured its foreign
1
trade.” After the birth of the nation, illustrious patriots made their own
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contributions—like Francisco de Gurruchaga, who would make all his fortune available for the new navy, and Juan Larrea, whose fervor for maritime power would
become a determining factor in the naval future.
When our country was born in 1810, our founders had to settle two major issues
requiring urgent attention. First, the events that unfolded on 25 May in Buenos Aires
were replicated in other cities along the roads connecting both Alto Perú (currently the
Bolivian altiplano) and the Captaincy of Chile with the port of the River Plate. The
dream realized in Buenos Aires had to extend to the rest of the cities. The second issue
referred to the way this emerging nation would relate to the rest of the world, so as to
be accepted and even assisted in doing what was needed to ensure its survival.
The greatest threat to these goals obviously came from the sea, and was directed at the
aforementioned strategic point: the mouth of the River Plate. General José Francisco de
San Martín, our liberator, considered that a good naval strategy would provide the best
contribution for his liberation effort in America. Thus, he appreciated the naval combat in Montevideo, where naval control was obtained in the region of the River Plate,
acknowledging it as the best support provided for his liberation campaign. In turn,
Juan Manuel de Pueyrredón, another patriot serving in the government, recognized—
as General San Martín did—the significant contribution of naval action in the River
Plate estuary and its vicinity to the development of the nation.
Developments through the 1880s
Once the national organization was in place and the fundamental law—the constitution of 1853/60—was in force, the leaders faced three major problems involving the
national interests at the time.
First, it was necessary to integrate the provinces that had been annexed within the
Argentine nation. To that end, Juan Bautista Alberdi, one of the authors of our constitution, suggested that President Nicolás Avellaneda “educate” the Argentine people so
that they would know how to produce wealth from the land. This is how the “granary
of the world” emerged in the northern half of the country.
Moreover, the southern half of the country, Patagonia, was to be united into the
national patrimony. The national government, complying with a resolution of the
National Congress, undertook the so-called Desert Campaign and effectively incorporated the southern territories under Argentine sovereignty.
Finally, our nation had to develop a relationship with a changing world that recognized
the United Kingdom as the dominant power. With the support of this power, trading
activity with foreign countries commenced, and in a few years the country’s
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transformation was so spectacular that Argentina had become one of the foremost and
most promising nations.
The maritime strategy demanded moving away from the coasts, accompanying trade,
and fully exercising national sovereignty. Therefore, Commodore Luis Py deployed to
the south with the first fleet in 1878, bringing about the transformation of the “brown
water” navy into a “blue water” navy. In that time also, Commander Luis Piedra Buena
showed the world our naval skills, helping sailors of different nationalities who were
navigating these austral waters, and the corvette Uruguay introduced the Argentine flag
in Antarctica, on having rescued Otto Nordenskjöld’s expedition in 1902, constituting a
definite landmark.
Today
History unfolded differently in the years that followed. The world changed in 1930 as a
consequence of the deep global economic crisis, but Argentines did not become fully
aware of those dramatic changes. The national government continued to follow the
former policy without accommodating it to the changes dictated by global developments, and our nation went into a slow decline, which continued until the present
time.
Today we are beginning a century in which nations will appropriate the sea. Coastal
states have a huge responsibility to keep under their sovereignty those waters prescribed by the Law of the Sea. Argentina possesses the eighth-largest continental shelf, a
vast and rich area with a high potential for sustainable exploitation of very valuable
resources. This is the current situation—in a world in which players are closer and
multiply everywhere, and in which differing trends impel nations to act quickly and
wisely in the interests of their welfare and development.
Unlike preceding generations, today’s Argentines have four major interests before
them:
• We need to develop the northern half of our country, the same area that in the
1880s had been transformed into the granary of the world. We need to do that in a
way that exploits its rich resources in the best way and to the greatest extent.
• Besides, we feel a strong urge to integrate Patagonia fully into the life of our
country, making this integration both sustainable and appealing to the other
Argentine regions.
• We are faced with the task of incorporating the sea—that area of it constituting our
legitimate possession and recognized as such by the world—into our national
patrimony. We cannot merely claim sovereignty.
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• Finally, it is desirable to maintain our connection with the world in the best possible
way, taking into account that the hegemonic power is the United States; that there
are two other focal points of power in the world—Europe and Asia; and that
globalization has brought everyone closer together and turned interdependence into
an unavoidable reality.
The maritime strategy calls for abandoning the coasts and also projecting our power in
depth to prevent existing threats from reaching the shore and the sea-lanes used by our
foreign trade. In other words, if we want to secure our land today, we have to commit
ourselves as far offshore as possible. In reviewing our history, we understand that the
moments in which our navy performed most efficiently were those in which the design
of the force was based on rationality, consistent with foreign policy goals. It is important to remember this factor, because by analyzing it we will know how to seek the
most relevant solutions.
But let us analyze the life and existence of the people of Argentina today, in terms of
four sets of interests. The first is concerned with the “development of the northern half
of the country, mainly the River Plate Basin,” namely, a “geostrategy for regional integration.” The development of the potential of the richest basin in the subcontinent
depends on the decisions adopted by the countries bordering it. This potential is huge
and will be even larger and more sustainable if decisions taken result from reasoning
and negotiation among such countries. The River Plate basin does not present difficult
problems, since it runs in the same direction as the meridians, making it totally exploitable in different ways according to each latitude.
Most of the Argentine wealth that is traded with the world departs from this area and
follows two trade routes: the first route heads for Europe or the United States along an
Atlantic sea-lane northward and bordering Brazil or western Africa; the second route
heads for the rest of Africa, Asia, or Oceania by crossing the Cape of Good Hope. From
this perspective, the mouth of the River Plate is a major strategic point, just as it was
before our nation was born. A third route goes southward and crosses the bi-oceanic
corridors between Chile and Argentina. Although it is less important from a commercial point of view, it demands continuing attention. Many issues arising from this simple description represent incentives for particular and operational strategies.
The second interest relates to the integration of Patagonia. Due to its unique
hydrography (rivers running in the direction of parallels of latitude), preceding generations of Argentines believed that the different sections, or compartments, between parallels should provide different, rich resources and that harmony among them and with
the rest of the country would be easy to achieve because each was located in a different
latitude. Like the first set of interests, this one reflects strategic importance. Patagonia
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is the territory that generates the most important arguments concerning the exercise of
our rights over the eighth-largest continental shelf in the world. Rights are given by the
land, and in this case, most of the land is in Patagonia.
The issue addressed by the 1880 generation comes up again: the “maritime highway”
(defined as the maritime area between the mouth of the River Plate and the southern
bi-oceanic corridors) will be the best tool for the integration of Patagonia within the
nation. It is exactly for this reason that leaders in the 1880s decided to build bases and
maritime support locations to the south of the River Plate. We must enhance that effort
by providing the support required for the “exploitation of the best route to Antarctica”;
performing the tasks derived from future foreign trade in relation to each of the aforementioned territorial compartments; and supporting the incorporation of the sea into
our national patrimony consistently with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The third interest is, precisely, “incorporating the sea into our national patrimony.”
From a strategic point of view, this interest may well create more tasks. If we are going
to incorporate the sea, titles and claims do not suffice. We have to go to sea and be present in it. In that sense, we, the Argentines, have just begun to develop our real calling to
integrate the aforementioned territories into our national patrimony. As mentioned
before, Argentina was built as a nation from the land and toward the sea, following the
same sequence or order in which the interests have been described. This has recently
led us all to acknowledge the significance of our sea. What has always been the concern
of men of the sea now arouses the interest of all the Argentine people. From a strategic
perspective, this situation demands an urgent and serious educational effort.
Finally, our existence as a nation and the work of our predecessors has created international obligations and agreements (for example, search and rescue at sea) that we must
honor and that demand our effective presence in locations far away from our naval stations. These efforts involve the permanent and unavoidable use of significant resources.
Our relationship with the world constitutes our fourth interest. This increasingly interdependent relationship is characterized by permanent demonstration of reliability,
threats beyond those arising from the relationship between states, increased cooperation, a tendency toward geopolitical regional integration, lasting problems related to
adaptation to the global economy, uncontrolled migratory movements, difficult-tocontrol transnational structures, and a growing gap between rich and poor nations.
The maritime strategy must help preserve the South Atlantic as a peaceful and harmonious zone. Correct and safe communication between the North Atlantic and South
Atlantic, the connection through the Cape of Good Hope and the Atlantic–Pacific corridors, and facilitation of movement to Antarctica are all aspects that must be incorporated in such a strategy.
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To conclude, we may state that we must
• Enhance our vocation for the sea through intensive, relevant education, supported
by international maritime law and the Law of the Sea.
• Develop the necessary capabilities through, first, the construction or acquisition of
naval assets to build a navy capable of having effective presence at least in the
western South Atlantic and, second, the necessary regional alliances to safeguard our
foreign trade and international commerce in the South Atlantic.
• Develop our own technology through research and the acquisition of technical
knowledge.
• Continue, increase, and facilitate third countries’ involvement in Antarctica through
the technical, port, and logistical support that such countries may require.
• Understand that developments in the maritime domain do not pertain exclusively to
the military but are rather joint responsibilities, to which all strategies must make
valuable contributions.
• The conduct of this strategy must be centralized at the highest governmental level.
• The foregoing goals entail the search for a role to be played by our country in this
globalized world, in the understanding that such a role must not only be useful for
us but also appealing to a world that is pursuing development and welfare in an
orderly framework. Our actions should be both consistent and lasting.

Note
1. Argument used by the secretary of the Royal
Consulate, Don Manuel Belgrano y Gonzalez, to create the Royal School of Navigation

in 1799, “the first Nautical School of the
Viceroyalty,” www.escueladenautica.edu.ar.

PART TWO
Suggestions for a New U.S. Maritime Strategy

CHAPTER SIX

Views of the Chilean Navy on a New
U.S. Maritime Strategy
R E A R A D M I RA L FE D E R I C O N I E M A N N FI G A R I , C H I L E A N NAV Y

This essay attempts to make a clear definition of the areas of cooperation that can be
established between the Chilean Navy and the U.S. Navy, taking into consideration the
different alternatives for a new naval strategy for the United States. We will start by
referring to the phenomenon of globalization and its influence in the contemporary
reality as a whole. Then we will analyze the problems derived from globalization and
how they have affected the international system, highlighting the deficiencies of the
organizations that were meant to solve them. We will then show the way in which Chile
involves itself in a world affected by globalization, indicating that it does so by observing and exercising international law as an active member of the United Nations and
regional organizations.
Then we will discuss the fact that an ocean state like Chile can prosper only in an environment of stability, security, and respect for international law. In this regard, we will
review the similarities between the concepts of U.S. Maritime Domain Awareness and
Chilean “Presencial Sea,” for they pursue very similar objectives related to maritime
1
security. We will emphasize the facts that maritime security is the responsibility of all
and we must therefore contribute proportionally and according to our capabilities,
laws, and national interests. We will compare U.S. strategic objectives and Chilean
national interests, determining potential fields of cooperation.
We will examine the concept of a “thousand-ship navy,” concluding that it is a realistic
and practical way to define a cooperation initiative. We will identify activities of
mutual support between the two navies, taking as an example 2007 and making special
mention of the support and restrictions to the cooperation. We will also compare the
mission areas defined in the concept of operations of the U.S. Navy with the ones
defined by the Chilean Navy. This comparison will show that there are several opportunities for cooperation. Finally, we will review those conditions that may facilitate
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cooperation between the navies, suggesting methods to achieve them, and then arrive at
some conclusions.
Strategic Vision
Globalization is a political, economic, and cultural reality that has brought enormous
benefits to mankind, such as meaningful progress in technology, communications, and
the exchange of people and goods. However, the concept of globalization is perceived
differently depending on the region, the culture, and even the social status of people
within a community. Some cultures and countries reject globalization, claiming that it
violates their beliefs and traditions, generating antiglobalization movements that have
developed into anti-Americanism, in some cases even a rejection of Christian Western
society as a whole.
Inequality in the effects of globalization generates tension and polarization and has
created conflicts. Also, together with the advantages, there are a number of negative
aspects of globalization and threats to international peace and security, such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, illegal
immigration, organized crime, drug and human trafficking, and illegal fishing.
Another crucial element of today’s world is the concern for human beings and their
rights, as well as democracy, free trade, and interconnectivity. Furthermore, even
though the state is still the main actor, there are several others: international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals whose opinions must be taken
into account.
Changes that occurred in the past decades have affected the international system,
exposing deficiencies of some organizations that were originally created to satisfy the
needs of other eras and to solve problems that no longer exist. Ignacio Walker, former
Chilean minister of foreign affairs, describes this situation:
The main weakness and at the same time the main challenge of globalization is the lack of institutions
to support it. . . . If we do not want to be governed by globalization, then we have to find a way to
govern it. The way to do it is via solid institutions and rules of the game that are clear, stable and fair.
Therefore, besides making use of the advantages and opportunities associated with the phenomenon
of globalization, we have to face the challenge of redesigning its institutions; that is, the need for a new
architecture of globalization.2

Chile is a democratic, developing country with a rule of law that respects the international legal order. Chile is involved in and related to the world order by the observance
and exercise of international law and by its active membership in the United Nations
and other, regional organizations. Chile is an enthusiastic promoter of peaceful coexistence at the global, regional, and local levels, regulated by international treaties of maritime, economic, social, and political natures.
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Chile is committed to promoting comprehensive reform of the United Nations, seeking
to adapt that organization to the demands of the twenty-first century. Chile has supported such measures as the universal recognition of democracy; the concept of human
security, which consolidates a new vision of international security; the strengthening of
the ability of the United Nations to react to massive violation of human rights; assistance to nations in a postconflict stage (consolidation of peace); and support for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Chile agrees with the need for the United
Nations to engage actively when confronted with extreme situations, such as civil war
and significant internal disturbances, and it supports reform and modernization of the
Security Council. In the economic field, Chile strongly supports the World Trade Organization and efforts to achieve trade liberalization.3
The improvement of international security must be a shared effort; countries that seek
to gain influence and respect must do their best, based on their national capabilities
and possibilities. It is unethical to benefit from the security conditions and subsequent
stability without participating actively in their achievement. A lack of commitment to
these efforts would be politically and morally unacceptable. It is for that reason that
gaining international peace and stability must be a shared effort involving economic,
diplomatic, and military involvement and contributions.
The exercise of sovereignty and control over the maritime space is essential for the
development of an ocean state. This fact places Chile in a security environment characterized by complexity, uncertainty, surprise, and quickly changing and highly mobile
threats. In this scenario, Chile has decided to pursue development based on free trade.
Therefore, its prosperity, to which its welfare is firmly linked, depends on stability,
security, and respect for international law and the commitments Chile has assumed
with the international community.
In the maritime area, Chile has participated actively in the creation of the law of the
sea; Chile has been part of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) since
4
1997 and encourages the observance and reinforcement of this law. Therefore, Chile
rejects any initiative that may endanger the rights that were agreed upon through significant effort. We believe that this convention has built for the seas and oceans a legal
order that facilitates international communication and promotes their peaceful use.
Chile considers of paramount importance the protection of maritime areas, natural
resources, and the marine environment. Chile has also fought against illegal fishing in
the South Pacific.
Chile has developed the concept of the Presencial Sea and incorporated it in national
legislation. The idea is to be attentive to, observe, and be part of the activities that take
place on the high seas, to be prepared to defend against the threats that may come from
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the common space, without weakening the UNCLOS or affecting the freedom that
governs those common areas. The concept of Maritime Domain Awareness has caught
our attention because it contains certain similarities to the concept of the Presencial
Sea.
We are aware of the fact that maritime security is a common responsibility and that we
must contribute according to our capabilities. That is why Chile participates actively in
maritime conferences related to this subject—in particular, in the International Maritime Organization.
Chile also participates in regional cooperation related to maritime security with a
number of organizations, such as the Operational Network of Regional Cooperation of
5
Maritime Authorities of Latin America, Panama, Mexico, and Cuba (ROCRAM). Chile
was the first Latin American country to become part of the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code and is involved in APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooper6
ation) and in its activities related to maritime security.
Given the geographic location of Chile and the active maritime trade that takes place
along its coast, maritime security is a priority. That is why Chile has signed a number
of international agreements, such as the Eastern South Pacific Coordinator for the
International Hydrographic Organization, Naval Control of Maritime Traffic, and the
treaty on Tsunami Warning. Chile is also in charge of a huge area (even bigger than its
Presencial Sea) for maritime search and rescue.
We also cooperate on maritime security and order at sea by controlling our maritime
spaces and observing the Presencial Sea, preventing as much as possible illicit activity in
the maritime areas adjacent to our coasts. Chile also exercises the power conferred by
national and international law, such as the laws of the flag state (estado de pabellón),
coastal state (estado costero), and port state control authority (estado rector del puerto).
We concur with the idea that global maritime security is not only the task of the navies
and coast-guard services. “Maritime security is more than physical security and deterrence from patrolling ships and aircraft of a global fleet. Maritime security is achieved
by blending public and private maritime security activities on a global scale into a
comprehensive, integrated effort that addresses all maritime threats. Maritime security
demands a close partnership between governments and the private sector to put in
7
place a rigorous maritime security regime for prevention.”
Accordingly, Chile would be willing to cooperate—according to its capabilities—with
the U.S. maritime strategy, taking into consideration the national interest, humanitarian motivations, and the international legal order.
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Common Commitments, Interests, and Restrictions
U.S. Strategic Objectives
The U.S. strategic objectives are:
• Secure the United States from direct attack by actively confronting, early and at safe distances,
those who would threaten us—especially those who would do so with catastrophic means.
• Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action by ensuring that key regions, lines of
communication and the global commons remain accessible to all.
• Strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships to address common challenges.
• Establish favorable security conditions by countering aggression or coercion targeted at our part8
ners or interests.

From the above, it is obvious that the last three U.S. objectives are directly related to
Chilean national interests. We also find a similarity in the basic guidelines to “preserve
freedom of the seas, facilitate and defend commerce, and facilitate the movement of
desirable goods and people across our borders, while screeing out dangerous people
9
and material.”
It is interesting to note that some U.S. articles consider South America an “emerging”
10
area of interest. Our economic development plan states that marine areas are essential. Chile depends heavily on maritime communications (totally, in terms of fuel).
This, plus the growing traffic of post-Panamax ships carrying dangerous cargo through
Cape Horn/Strait of Magellan and the expected growth of maritime traffic between
Asia and countries of the Southern Cone through Chilean ports, makes it easy to understand our interest in this area and the clear need for cooperation with the United States.
Chilean and U.S. Navy Missions
The United States envisions a series of tasks for its navy to which the Chilean Navy could
contribute via our strategy. These tasks fall into three areas of action: national defense,
accomplished through joint action with the Chilean armed forces; international participation, which includes joint and probably combined work; and tasks related to the protection and promotion of maritime interests, which are carried out in coordination with
other governmental organizations and are of paramount economic importance.
The interesting cooperative initiative called the “Thousand-Ship Navy” seems to be a
realistic and practical instrument with which to face one of the biggest challenges of
the globalized world, where success depends on maritime communications. An interruption, even partial, of maritime transport could cause an economic failure of
unimaginable proportions. Chile is participating actively in this initiative, through a
number of agreements that seek a “positive order at sea.”
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Situation of Mutual Support
Our navies have been participating in combined exercises for the last fifty years, and
these activities have increased significantly lately. Take the year 2007 for example (see
table below): a Chilean frigate has been integrated into a U.S. surface expeditionary
group for almost five months, a Chilean submarine has supported training with the
U.S. Third Fleet for five months, and Chile has participated in the PANAMAX, UNITAS,
and TEAMWORK SOUTH 2007 exercises. This is a reality, and even though they are only
exercises, Chilean participation highlights our interest in enhancing interoperability in
all areas, because we strongly believe that this is the best way to be as ready as possible
to contribute in effective, not token, terms when the time comes.
Naval Operations and Exercises 2007
DATE

PLACE

ACTIVITY

26 Feb–11 July

USA

Frigate Latorre joins the U.S. Navy Surface Expeditionary
Group (UNITAS Atlantic, TWS, and UNITAS Pacific).

23 Apr–4 May

USA

BELL BUOY international exercise.

June

Chile

Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercise. Combat
diving exercise and land operations between Chilean Buzos
Tácticos and U.S. SEALs.

11–24 June

Chile

CENTAURO (SOUTHERN EXCHANGE) Phase Chile. Chilean–U.S.
Marine Corps Exchange.

16–29 June

Ecuador

UNITAS Pacific 2007, international exercise with U.S. units.

1 Aug–20 Dec

USA

USS Simpson participates in support of the U.S. Navy battle
group training, in San Diego, Calif.

27 Aug–7 Sep

Panama

PANAMAX 2007, multinational exercise for the protection of
the Panama Canal with units from the United States and
fifteen other countries.

13–23 Nov

USA

CENTAURO (SOUTHERN EXCHANGE) Phase USA. Chilean–U.S.
Marine Corps Exchange.

Other Ongoing Support
Equally important are the growing interactive efforts of other agencies, such as the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Chilean DGTM (Directorate General of Maritime Space), to
include short-term ship-rider activities for officers and enlisted personnel on board
U.S. Coast Guard ships, a project derived from the U.S.-Chilean Operational Naval
Committee (ONC); Chilean visits to U.S. Coast Guard bases; exchange of naval experiences in formal conferences, such as the ONC; multinational exercises like PANAMAX;
and training for officers at the U.S. Coast Guard station in Georgetown, South
Carolina.
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Restrictions
A realistic approach to the problem under analysis will reflect the fact that the Chilean
and U.S. national interests are different in magnitude. This conveys different motivations
for the use of force. Chilean Defense Policy accepts the coercive use of force for selfdefense and other actions supported by UN resolutions.
On the other hand, in spite of the slow pace of UN efforts to establish suitable norms
and the fact that “bilateral agreements” may be more expeditious, it is preferable for
our democratically elected political leaders and for the civilian society in general to
develop naval cooperation with the United States within the frameworks of UNCLOS
and the International Maritime Organization.
Potential Contributions of the Chilean Navy
Mission Areas as Defined by the U.S. Navy
11

The mission areas defined in the U.S. Navy Concept of Operations include
• Forward naval presence
• Crisis response
• Expeditionary projection of power
• Maritime security operations
• Sea control
• Deterrence
• Security cooperation
• Civil-military operations
• Counterinsurgency
• Counterterrorism
• Counter-proliferation
• Air and missile defense
• Information operations.
If we compare these thirteen mission areas with the areas of action defined by the Chil12
ean Navy, we can expect willingness for cooperation in the following:
• Naval presence
• Crisis response
• Projection of power
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• Maritime security operations
• Control of the sea
• Deterrence
• Security cooperation
• Civil-military operations
• Information operations
• Counterterrorism
• Counterinsurgency.
In general terms, these opportunities arise not only from the mission areas common to
both strategies but from the decision to participate cooperatively under the command
of the United Nations when, where, and with what the government deems necessary.
Counterterrorism deserves a special comment. Under national policy, the Chilean Navy
can participate in counterterrorism activities only in local waters via the National Maritime Authority, which is exercised by the U.S. Coast Guard–equivalent DGTM and the
13
merchant marine. Such tasks are spelled out in the ISPS Code, ratified by our country.
The participation of the Chilean Navy in counterinsurgency can be carried out only for
the purpose of neutralizing the insurgency via a “peace enforcement operation” under
a mandate of the United Nations.
Others
Chile has offered the United Nations a number of reserve assets with a lead time of
fourteen days for operations under UN command, to include:
• One frigate with a helicopter
• One Chilean Marine Corps company
• One section of logistic support
• One command element
• One section of military police
• One team of combat engineers
• One public affairs officer
• Staff officers and military observers.
Chile has the capacity to offer other naval assets as well, depending on availability and
approval of the national command authority and the Chilean Congress. Together with
maritime activities in international territory, the Chilean Navy is carrying out a
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number of tasks inside the national territory, executing operations that also benefit the
international community in the area of maritime security. There is a certain level of
cooperation in the logistics area. A memorandum of understanding that allows mutual
support for fuel replenishment has operated satisfactorily for a long time.
Conditions for Participation: Interoperability
One of the main principles of the U.S. Navy is interoperability. The ability to operate
with others is a basic condition for achieving effective cooperation. The participants
are responsible for developing mutual knowledge and common procedures, reinforcing
trust, training the units, and sharing real-time information, goods, and services, in
order to unite efforts so as to meet common interests.
The Chilean Navy and the U.S. Navy have both advanced in this respect. The latter has
made significant contributions, but this support needs to become permanent. It is also
important to keep in mind that though we are developing interoperability between
navies, in order to achieve effective cooperation that interoperability must be built
among such other entities as governmental law-enforcement agencies (e.g., customs
and police).
Conditions for Participation: Methods
The U.S. Navy’s Naval Operations Concept 2006 includes an annex with methods of
organization, training, equipment, deployment, and operations. Two main aspects of
the annex are operations in globalized networks and building capabilities to become
partners.
Operations in Globalized Networks. One aspect of interoperability—where technological development presents an ever-changing situation—is connectivity, defined as the
capacity to connect information management systems in order to function in a globalized network and maintain a common operational picture. Connectivity is a very sensitive aspect that includes access to a highly protected database, a sine qua non.
At the tactical level, the acquisition by the Chilean Navy of new units with NATO
equipment and the U.S. Navy’s willingness to support the needs of combined operations have contributed to a high level of connectivity between the two navies. This connectivity has been tested successfully during the RIMPAC multinational exercises and
other bilateral navy operations.
Building the Capacity to Become Partners. Common training is a key aspect in developing interoperability. In this respect, the interaction between the navies at the tactical
level has been constantly improving. Such interaction started in exercises many years
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ago with UNITAS, followed by BELL BUOY, TEAMWORK NORTH/SOUTH, and RIMPAC,
among others, helping the Chilean Navy improve its interoperability.
Exchanges at the operational level have been less significant. There are Chilean officers
stationed with the Pacific and the Atlantic fleets as well as in the U.S. Southern Command, but it is not possible to compare this level of interaction with that at the tactical
level described above. However, there are opportunities to improve in the human
resources and other areas, such as sharing the maritime picture of zones of common
interest.
Another important element in achieving an effective contribution to global security is
a structure for rapid response. The Chilean Navy, besides efforts made to improve and
complete its information networks, is responding to this challenge in two areas:
• By making a commitment with the United Nations to keep its forces at a high level
of readiness for rapid response, in accordance with the rules of that organization
• By developing goods and assets that allow a quick response to challenges that may
appear in national waters.
Final Considerations
The Chilean Navy is aware of the fact that we live in a changing world and that Chile
cannot avoid possible new scenarios and the effects these changes may have. Those
changes drive new challenges that must be met.
Chile’s prosperity is based on free trade. Now that the country is open to the world, it
can grow only in an environment of stability, security, and respect for international law
and of agreements with the members of the international community. The protection
of this environment is vital for Chile’s security and progress. This is why Chile has to
cooperate. Isolation is not an option; on the contrary, history requires Chile to participate actively in the international scene, contributing to the governance of globalization
and to the development of our region.
Every member state in the international community is responsible for international
security. This is especially true for countries that seek influence and respect; these have
to contribute as much as possible, according to their capacity. Taking advantage of the
benefits of security and stability while avoiding commitment to effective participation
to maintain them would be politically incorrect and morally unethical.
Based on the above, the Chilean Navy is ready to contribute to advancing regional and
global interests. This contribution stems from the fulfillment of national interests,
humanitarian motivations, and support for the regional and multilateral international systems.

NIEMANN

51

Notes
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is no direct equivalent in English, carries the
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5. ROCRAM, Red Operativa de Cooperación Regional de Autoridades Marítimas de América
Latina, Panamá, México y Cuba [Operational
Network of Regional Cooperation of Maritime Authorities of Latin America, Panama,
Mexico, and Cuba].

12. Rear Adm. Eri Solis (Ret.), Reflexiones
político-estratégicas (Academia de Guerra
Naval de Chile, 2006), p. 166.

6. In April 2006, Chile hosted the ninth Forum
of the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Agencies, created by the Secure Trade in the APEC
Region initiative.

11. Ibid., p. 11.

13. However, the Book of the National Defense of
Chile (the Libro de la Defensa Nacional de
Chile 2002 [Ministerio de Defensa, 2003])
states on page 64 that “the role of the Armed
Forces is to support the authorities of the
country (that is, Order and Security).”

CHAPTER SEVEN

A Brazilian View of
U.S. Maritime Initiatives
C A P TA I N A N TO N I O C A R LO S T E I X E I RA M A RT I N S , B RA Z I L I A N NAV Y

The sea is the pathway for about 90 percent of total international trade, a basic activity
that ensures the economic expansion and the stability of nations. In addition, a significant portion of the world production of oil and gas comes from the sea. Besides, the
sea represents a considerable source of mineral resources, although not currently, inasmuch as a huge amount of mineral resources below the sea floor is not yet recoverable
economically. The exploitation of renewable marine resources, such as fish, is another
factor of great importance for the economies of a number of nations.
This rich patrimony remains relatively secure, although occasionally it is disturbed by
fairly insignificant terrorist actions and by criminal actions perpetrated by pirates.
However, many world leaders consider that due to its importance for their nations and
in view of the difficulty of maintaining effective control, the sea is likely, in the rather
near future, to become the target of not a few threats to maritime security. These would
include piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking and slavery, trespassing in exclusive
economic zones (EEZs), interruption of trade, movement of weapons, organized crime,
environmental attacks, political and religious extremism, and terrorism.
The actions referred to above, besides other actions that will be discussed later in this
paper, were a determining factor that drove many nations, led by the United States, a
hegemonic world power, to initiate studies to examine an integrated approach among
all nations for the purpose of guaranteeing marine security around the world. The participation of a large number of navies in the evacuation of Lebanese citizens during the
recent conflict between Israel and Hezbolah was an example of such cooperation.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze such actions, especially those that concern a
new maritime strategy to be implemented by the United States.
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A New Strategy for the United States
The Strategic Scenario
Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, the director of the U.S. Navy’s Strategy and Policy
Division, included in a lecture on U.S. naval strategic planning a discussion about the
1
main topics in the American strategic scenario, according to the U.S. Navy. Principal
topics include the global war against terrorism, nonconventional warfare, homeland
security and homeland defense, the traditional threats that still exist (e.g., regional
powers with considerable conventional and nuclear capacity), unrestricted war with
weapons of mass destruction, and disruptive high-technology systems.
According to this view, homeland security is the first priority for the nation, and the
country’s first line of defense is located abroad. Therefore, the threats to the North
American territory are to be suppressed at their very origins and with the effective
cooperation of allied countries.
According to Admiral Martoglio, the American strategic objectives include defending
the country against direct attacks, ensuring strategic access and guaranteeing global
freedom of action, strengthening partnerships and alliances, and establishing favorable
security conditions.
In order to attain these objectives, certain vulnerabilities will have to be eliminated or
at least substantially reduced: the North American ability to cope with global security
challenges is insufficient; allied and partner nations may decide not to act in an integrated way or may lose the ability to act in an integrated way; not a few nations are
resentful of the North American predominance in the solution of world problems and
object to the way the United States acts; and, finally, the United States and its allies will
be the main target of terrorist attacks.
Admiral Martoglio talked about those topics he considered to be the main points in the
national strategy for attaining maritime security and the ones most likely to assume
highest national priority in ensuring the freedom of the seas, access to ports, freedom
of navigation in international waters, and innocent passage. Admiral Martoglio closed
his speech by presenting a diagram of partnerships and coalitions on which the desired
integration of nations seeking to establish and maintain maritime security would be
built.
Another diagram represented the “global network.” The structure supported by the diagram is divided in three parts. The first part, the base, would include ports, territorial
waters, exclusive economic zones, and boundaries. This level refers to the nations individually. The intermediate part would include international straits, regional waters,
boundaries, and archipelagic waters. This level is directly linked to initiatives in
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FIGURE 1
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regional security and is based on such regional associations as the South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination, or CAMAS. With the participation of Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay,
and Argentina, CAMAS manages maritime traffic to enhance the safety of sea lines of
communication. The top of the pyramid would include the boundaries and the open sea.
FIGURE 2

Building the Global Network

Reasons for a New Strategy
The breakup of the former Soviet Union brought with it a new and major challenge for
U.S. Navy. U.S. naval strategy, which used to be focused on the fight against one single
enemy and emphasized strategic deterrence, power projection, sea control, and naval
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presence, became meaningless. A new situation came about, and to this new situation
the U.S. Navy has no satisfactory answer.
This new situation is represented by globalization, whose three main effects point to
the need for a new maritime strategy. These effects include the ever-increasing interdependence of markets and world economies. Most of world trade is dependent on the
sea, which causes maritime security to be key for all nations. The search for new oil
wells and maintenance of existing oil wells in the sea could generate conflicts among
nations, which introduces another security consideration. Finally, globalization has
introduced what some authors refer to as “fourth generation” enemies—terrorists, traffickers in weapons of mass destruction, criminal organizations, smugglers, drug deal2
ers, and pirates.
Another reason for a new strategy is that the nature of the changes in military operations is forcing all powers to reassess their structures and doctrines, because information may have become the most valuable resource of war.
If the reasons referred to above were not enough, the 2001 terrorist attacks, which
occurred when the United States was facing a recession, led to an increase in homeland
defense expenses, besides the increased cost of the Afghanistan war and, later, the Iraq
war. These wars forced an increase in the budget deficit. As a consequence, the budget
of the Navy came under severe pressure. Cornered by such facts and pressed by former
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s statement that “the Global War on Terror
gave new impetus and urgency to transformation efforts already well underway, and a
new determination to remake the U.S. military into a more agile, efficient, and expeditionary force, ready to meet the asymmetric challenges of a new and uncertain time,”
the U.S. Navy was forced to choose between proportionally reducing its fighting
resources, prioritizing one type of combat over others, or taking new steps to increase
3
its capacity without increasing the number of ships.
According to some American writers, the U.S. Navy needs both a threat and a strategy
that enables it to cope with asymmetrical threats. Without that, it will be competing in
4
a disadvantageous position with other forces for scarce budget resources.
The New Strategy according to the Chief of Naval Operations
In 2006, responding to the situation faced by the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), then Admiral Michael Mullen, decided to start a discussion about a new maritime strategy by presenting some assumptions regarding the study of this issue. The
first of these assumptions, and certainly the most relevant, is that “no country, no mat5
ter how strong it is, is capable of doing what needs be done.” This led to a discussion
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about the participation of allied countries and partners in the new strategy. The second
assumption, of critical importance for the countries involved, is that
the strategy would require a multilateral dimension and have to be governed by clearly defined principles of international law, such as respect for sovereignty and self-determination, nonintervention, and
equality between states, always in keeping with the legislation and the interests of the participants, taking account of the stability and well-being of an area. Internally, the strategy has also to be aligned
with the demands of the society, emphasizing the major topics of the time—that is, the effort to reduce the social inequalities and ensure the valorization of human life and the environment. 6

Thus, the new policy should result from a consensus among all sectors involved,
including citizens, politicians, armed forces, allied countries, and private companies,
besides considerations related to humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and preconflict operations. In the U.S. internal context, the CNO considered it critical to bring
the discussion about the maritime capacity of the country and the relevance of the
Navy for the future of the nation to the level of the national agenda.
In the strictly military field, he believed that the key to the success of the new strategy
was to avoid classified information, in view of the restrictions for disseminating it. He
also believed that establishing a permanent and international naval force was not the
goal. To his mind, the new strategy should be based on three basic characteristics of
naval forces—that is, to influence, anticipate and respond flexibly, and build friendships and partnerships.
The effects to be attained by the new strategy were as follows: to hold sway over the
open sea and over inland and coastal waters, as necessary, in order to provide naval
capability to combined naval forces, as well as other capacities of interdependent
nature, as requested by the combined force; to maintain a frontline presence aimed at
attacking and dismantling both terrorist networks and conventional campaigns; to provide support to the combined force acting to deter any other potentially opposing
nation-state, as well as transnational threats; to deepen cooperation with the naval
forces of strategic partners, as well as with emerging partners; to build and align the
coastal infrastructure in order to provide effective support to the fleet; to size, train,
7
and motivate human resources; and to reduce the stress of the combined force.
Regarding joint action with other navies, increased cooperation at the operational level
and in technological issues should be undertaken. Increased exchange of information
and a larger number of multinational exercises should also be foreseen.
In summary, the new strategy is expected to gain support from the American people, as
well as international backing, and should be appropriate for the challenges of the
twenty-first century. The new strategy must be capable of both fighting a single enemy,
just like previous strategies, and attacking fourth-generation threats. It should stress
elements that provide regional, cooperative, and multilateral security, including shared
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responsibilities and nimble mechanisms capable of timely operational action. It should
also ensure free lines of communications and free sea traffic; prevent and fight terrorism and criminal activity on the sea, in waterways, and in port areas; provide humanitarian assistance or help to the victims of natural disasters; and restrict damage to the
environment.
The Thousand-Ship Navy and the Global Fleet Station
As discussed previously, the U.S. Navy is facing significant cuts in budget, which forces
us to believe that a reduction in the number of ships may occur. Besides, as also discussed above, the Navy believes it to be virtually impossible to fight alone against all
such threats.
On the other hand, it is well known that the economic welfare of the American people
and people worldwide will depend strongly on the trade that transits the seas, a fact
that causes maritime security to be critical for everybody. All nations regard defense
against terrorism to be as critical as protection of sea trade. As a consequence, the new
maritime strategy should consider that if everybody benefits from collective security, it
is everybody’s responsibility to share the obligation to preserve such security by controlling threats within each one’s domains.
The idea of a thousand-ship fleet, the building block of this new strategy, is based on
these facts. Such a force, to be formed by three hundred American ships and seven hundred ships from other navies, builds on the idea of reestablishing lost strategic depth
and global maritime awareness.
Another idea, conceived together with that of the thousand-ship navy, is the “Global
Fleet Station” (GFS). The GFS would consist of a “command” and a “base” to be used
by military, nongovernmental, and international organizations, with a focus on
regional maritime security. Each GFS would include one command ship, one or more
smaller surface ships, and perhaps one riverine unit, as well as helicopters. The GFS
would also rely on an information center, medical facilities, and other sorts of support.
The idea of creating such a GFS was proposed by the CNO, who believes that GFSs may
8
provide the means for creating a flexible response capacity.
An important aspect to be considered regarding the implementation of this fleet has to
do with the necessary interoperability among the forces. Navies usually have their own
rules, systems, and procedures. Therefore, issues related to command, control, and
technology may arise as challenges to be overcome, thereby requiring standardization
of equipment and procedures.
The United States believes that the ideas of a thousand-ship navy and GFS have been
receiving effective support from a number of nations, which is evidenced by
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international cooperation in the evacuation of citizens during the recent invasion of
Lebanon, relying on the participation of 170 ships from seventeen countries. The
installation of a base on the African coast is also in full swing, specifically in São Tomé
and Príncipe; it will be capable of watching over a significant portion of the South
Atlantic Ocean. In return, and within the spirit of the new strategy of collaborating
with all countries, the United States affirms that the center will collaborate with the
9
Africans in the control of illegal fishing, piracy, and illegal immigration. Recently, during a symposium held in Europe that included countries from that continent as well as
Mexico, Singapore, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the subject
was thoroughly discussed and, in principle, accepted by the countries attending.
Hindrances to Implementation
The world is facing insurrections, ethnic shocks, and regional competition, phenomena
against which the new strategy will have to act, although such issues have been known
for a very long time. The complexity of the current time has to do with one new aspect,
referred to by some as “the individual holding a significant power of decision (person
or group capable of inflicting strategic damage to a nation by applying advanced
10
technologies).”
The new strategy has to be able to overcome three different types of obstacles. First, the
new strategy has to gain the trust of those in charge of making it work—that is, the
U.S. Navy staff. Second, it has to convince the politicians who will analyze it. Finally, it
has to be persuasive to friends and allies, as well as pose a threat to adversaries. The latter seems to be the most difficult challenge. As a matter of fact, the new strategy may be
seen as a contemporary revision of Mahan’s theory of naval power and also as a new
form of American imperialism.
On this latter aspect, a relevant comment is in order. The ascension of the United States
to the condition of world leader, notwithstanding the undeniable advantages that stem
therefrom, places on the United States the responsibility of being the policeman of the
world, which is not always an enviable situation. It also invites rejection by some countries of positions advanced by the United States or of policies adopted by many American administrations—as in the recent case of Iraq, when the U.S. government acted
without regard for the decisions of international organs. It is also relevant to say that
this country that is willing now to rely on international support in the area of maritime
security is the same country that so far has refused to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Although in the beginning of this paper a reference was made to the position of the
CNO that the sovereignty and self-determination of the peoples should be fully
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respected, most countries will not trust someone who, backed by his military power,
ignores the decisions made by a consensus of nations.
Brazil: Interests in the Sea, Threats, and Strategic Thinking
Some 95 percent of our international trade—U.S. $191 billion in 2005—is moved
through our 4.5-million-square-kilometer sea and forty ports. About 90 percent of our
oil production comes from the sea. Such figures are enough by themselves to give an
idea of how important the sea is to our country.
Therefore, our main security areas include the South Atlantic, where our main sources
of energy are located (gas and oil), and the Amazon, both the Blue Amazon and the
Green Amazon. The Green Amazon is, of course, the internationally recognized Brazilian Amazon region, whose rain forest has been called the “lungs of the world.” It
encompasses four million square kilometers, vast freshwater supplies, extensive mineral
reserves, and the greatest biodiversity on earth.
The Blue Amazon—a term created by the former commandant of the Brazilian Navy,
Admiral Guimarães Carvalho—is the maritime area off the coast of Brazil, which is
recognized by UNCLOS as the exclusive property of the coastal state. This Amazon
extends to 4.5 million square kilometers, which increases the country by an amount
equal to 50 percent of its landmass. This area is extremely rich in petroleum and has
great potential for the exploration of a variety of metallic nodules found on the seabed.
For these reasons, the idea of increasing international maritime security seems to be
relevant, as supported by the United States, because, although we are not likely to face
any kind of military threat in the short run, we should not overlook the fact that in the
future we may come to be threatened by disputes over our supplies of water and energy
or over our borders; actions against our biodiversity; international terrorism; and
transnational crime. Politically our government recognizes the need of a strong, integrated effort of all nations to prevent and to defend against terrorist threats, which
brings us even closer to the American security ideas.
Still, in the political realm, Brazil has acted with self-confidence on behalf of the integration of all Southern Cone countries, seeking to strengthen the South American
regional integration process.
Background of Brazilian–U.S. Navy Joint Action
During World War II, two factors drew our navies closer together. First, the Brazilian
government granted permission to the Unites States to use the facilities of the naval
base of Natal. The second factor, focused more specifically on naval operations, had to
do with the protection provided by Brazilian warships to the Allied fleets. In both

TEIXEIRA MARTINS

61

situations, there was a significant exchange between the two navies, with an emphasis
on the fact that modern antisubmarine equipment was installed in our ships.
After the war, the close relationship between us was sustained, both through the transfer of naval goods and in the form of an officer exchange program. The Mutual Assistance Program (MAP) was started at that time. This program, on the one hand, enabled
new equipment to be passed to our navy; on the other hand, however, it prevented the
building of naval ships in our country. It should be highlighted that our officers were
for a long time influenced by American thinking, mainly in the activity then of most
interest for the United States—that is, antisubmarine warfare. MAP also caused us to
be dependent on the supply of spare parts for the equipment installed on our ships.
As for joint exercises, the Brazilian Navy always took part in UNITAS operations and in
many other operations. Currently, the presence of ships originating from the U.S. Navy
in our navy is significantly lower.
Thus, we believe that increased cooperation between our navies is possible if such
cooperation includes mutual support in the field of military security, in the exchange
of intelligence, in the implementation of joint exercises, in academic and doctrine
exchanges, and in the exchange of technology. The interests that bring us together have
to do with the new ways of fighting terrorism; enhancing maritime security, cooperation, and regional peace; and elimination or reduction of transnational crimes.
The Brazilian position, with regard specifically to participating or refusing to participate in the world network proposed by the United States, will depend largely on
whether that country takes a position as a true participant and not as a mentor, and
also whether the United States shows a genuine willingness to implement an operational and tactical exchange.
Conclusion
After analyzing all the facts related to the American proposal of implementing a new
maritime strategy with a view to considering the effective participation of navies from
other countries, coast guards, nongovernmental organizations, and international
organs, we can conclude that the objective of increasing the level of international maritime security meets the desire of most countries, which also wish to attain such a goal.
In the particular case of Brazil, considering that a pillar of Brazil’s defense policy is
increased international security, this conclusion will apply fully. The ties that have
united Brazil and the United States since World War II should also be taken into
account. However, it should be remembered, following the CNO’s reasoning, that the
key to a successful strategy is that the U.S. Navy listen to the American people and
major political leaders. Our navy should act similarly.
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In view of the above, one can anticipate that not a few problems will have to be overcome before Brazil may integrate itself into such a new international network.
Although this may be fairly convenient and appropriate for the Navy specifically, the
political leaders and the Brazilian people may think differently, inasmuch as both have
become used to seeing our country ignored in the discussion of the major international
problems.
Finally, it is relevant to consider that, although the American discourse points to the
need for international trade to be free and exempt from protection, practice shows that
in fact the opposite is true. That is easily evidenced by the hindrances often posed by
the United States in the Doha round of international trade negotiations, with significant damage to the Brazilian economy though an effective inhibition of free trade
between the two countries.

Notes
International Conferences Cycle on Maritime Power, Brazilian Naval War College, Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil, November 2007), p. 2.

1. Rear Adm. Charles Martoglio, “U.S. Navy’s
Strategic Plan” (address, Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium, Naval War
College, Newport, R.I., 21 September 2005).

6. Chief of Naval Operations, 2007.

2. “CNO Calls for New Maritime Strategy,”
Navy News, 20 June 2006, available at www
.military.com/features/.

7. Stevenson, “Marinha dos Estados Unidos
tem em mente para os próximos 20 ou 25
anos,” p. 3.

3. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs, Facing the Future: Meeting the
Threats and Challenges of the 21st Century
(Washington, D.C.: February 2005), p. 3.

8. Amy Klamper, “Traction: The 1,000-Ship
Navy,” Sea Power 49, no. 12, pp. 10–13 (December 2006).

4. Sam Bateman, “Analyzing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy,” International Relations and
Security Network, 15 August 2006, www.isn
.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?=16527.
5. Rear Adm. James W. Stevenson, “Marinha
dos Estados Unidos tem em mente para os
próximos 20 ou 25 anos” (lecture,

9. “EUA vai financiar um centro regional de
supervisão marítima,” S.T.P. Vitrina, ano 4,
no. 14 (June 2006), available at www.estome
.net/vitrina/EUA.htm.
10. J. L. Shuford, “A New Maritime Strategy: Admiral Mullen’s Challenge,” Naval War College
Review 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006), pp. 7–10.

CHAPTER EIGHT

A New U.S. Maritime Strategy for the
Twenty-first Century Viewed from an
Institutional Perspective
R E A R A D M I RA L J O RG E BA L A R E S QU E WA L BAU M , C H I L E A N NAV Y
(RETIRED)
V I C E A D M I RA L OS C A R L . M A N ZA N O, C H I L E A N NAV Y (R E T I R E D )
C O M M A N D E R H U GO F. FON T E NA , C H I L E A N NAV Y (R E T I R E D )

In Admiral Michael G. Mullen’s introduction to Sea Power for a New Era, we find all the
elements that provide clear guidelines to his subordinates—that is, the U.S. Navy—of
1
his vision and what he expects from his institution.
When we examine his paper, some questions inevitably arise as to the method used to
set such an important and fundamental strategy. If a strategy has objectives, alternative
ways, and means, it is apparent, without discussing which of these elements is the most
important, that objectives must come from the superior level, which means in this case,
from the politico-strategic realm. Likewise, it is this superior level that—if it has set the
objectives—must provide the means to accomplish them; further, if those means are
going to be put to use, that higher level should be the one that authorizes their use.
This sequence follows “top down” logic, similar to what is seen, for example, in the
British government’s periodic defense policies published as “white papers” or “strategic
reviews,” where the government clearly defines future scenarios, objectives, and means
for the armed forces. Admiral Mullen’s paper appears to represent a professional appreciation from a subordinate to a superior—that is, “bottom up” logic.
Although in theory a top-down approach would seem to be better (although in some
cases that has meant very painful reductions for the armed services!), the bottom-up
road is not necessarily bad or undesirable, because it constitutes professional judgment
coming from a service with more than a century of expertise achieved by active and
successful participation in various conflicts. So it is an absolutely valid proposition
that, in the end, can be totally or partially accepted or completely rejected at the political level. Only when it has been accepted will it be effective, through the acceptance of
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scenarios, setting of objectives, and allocation of resources to obtain the means. In that
sense a bottom-up proposal can achieve a top-down resolution.
Another interesting thing to highlight is that the admiral’s view seems to be an exclusively naval perspective. The degree of coordination with the other services is not clear.
Important changes in the international environment, especially if nobody knows for
certain who will be the probable enemy, will always be very difficult to confront. Historical examples are abundant, and failures have been very costly. In the First World
War, large fleets were not only insufficient to prevent the war, they were not even decisive, nor did they play the predominant role expected of them. In the Second World
War, German and British naval forces again confronted each other with inappropriate
and insufficient means to accomplish their objectives.
The “appropriate balance” between ends and means will be very difficult to reach. In a
relatively fixed scenario like the Cold War, it was “easy” to develop and integrate means
with new technologies to meet the selected strategy—to deter the Soviet threat. There
was no other.
Today, we are in the midst of a Pax Americana scenario. The Pax Britannica period after
the battle of Trafalgar succeeded in preventing big conflicts (not “less significant” or
local ones) for a hundred years, through the Royal Navy’s unmatched naval power and
global reach. At the zenith of its enormous power, however, the Royal Navy was not
able to prevent the biggest war until that time. Now, the equally unrivaled power of the
U.S. Navy finds itself facing an asymmetrical adversary, very probably not traditional,
that may attack at all levels, utilizing unconventional means from commercial airliners
to very sophisticated, more conventional means and weapons of mass destruction.
All this is happening in a globalized world that depends on maritime transportation for
its functioning. Big problem! Difficult solution!
The New Scenario Viewed from the South
After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the United States realized that its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East had created a profound aversion among the most
radical Islamic sectors. This aversion was manifested in the very violent response characteristic of state terrorism. The characteristics of September 11th’s attacks presented
an enormous challenge for U.S. national security. With the attack on the U.S. homeland, it was evident that the military instrument designed for traditional scenarios in
the post–Cold War period was inappropriate for these new threats in a globalized
world.
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Thus national security analysis concluded that the problem—apart from requiring a
complete reformulation of the nation’s operational strategies—had no solution within
its own defensive capacities. Thus global collaboration was required. For global threats,
global responses were needed! Consequently, the United States undertook various analyses and efforts to design strategies and configure its own means and those of its allies
that wished to join in reaching common objectives of international security, following
the objectives established by the U.S. national defense:
• Secure the United States from direct attack
• Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action
• Strengthen alliances and partnerships
• Establish favorable security conditions.

2

What has been analyzed so far deserves some comment regarding strategic options for
the U.S. Navy. These options are studied at the U.S. Naval War College from the perspective of the interests of likely allies, including countries with smaller navies, like
Chile. Given their special relevance, we will mention them briefly.
Maritime Strategy of the United States
The United States, with no traditional threats near its boundaries, has asserted and
obtained global supremacy through the application of a maritime strategy capable of
projecting military power from the sea (in a Mahanian sense) anywhere in the world,
where threats to its national security are perceived.
The new post–Cold War scenarios, the nonconventional asymmetrical threats of a
globalized world where the boundaries are more permeable and any terrorist group can
have access to the homeland by sea, make the proven strategy of combat and power
projection insufficient. Now it needs to be complemented with a defensive maritime
strategy of a global nature.
While yesterday’s enemy was confident, homogeneous, inflexible, hierarchical, and
resistant to change, today’s enemy is dynamic, unpredictable, diverse, and networked.
The enemy benefits from new technologies and materials easily available illegally in
world markets and uses them to interrupt vital systems, such as command and control,
communications, roads, and energy grids and even to build weapons of mass destruction. This kind of enemy does not operate on conventional battlefields, and it flourishes within weak states and obscure zones where terrorists can mount organizations to
pursue transnational crime. The U.S. Navy for years has enjoyed dominion and control
of the sea at the tactical level, employing aircraft carrier groups, but now, in the context

66

THE NEWPORT PAPERS

of a global war on terrorism, the maritime domain takes on a strategic dimension for
which such forces are not sufficient.
In order to respond to multiple threats of this nature, it is necessary to deny the use
and exploitation of the maritime environment, including transportation systems, to
these adversaries. The first step for increasing maritime security is to get better information related to the maritime environment. The concept of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is another way of expressing this point. Maritime Domain Awareness has
been defined as the collection, analysis, and dissemination of a great quantity of information and intelligence to be processed for governmental agencies, commercial entities, and U.S. and allied forces. The information obtained from different sources is
processed so as to shape a common operating picture. Without intelligence,
counterterrorism operations and enforcement of international maritime law will rarely
succeed.
U.S. Strategic Options
With the emergence of new nonconventional threats, the rise of new powers like China
and India, and highly unstable areas like the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East,
the United States faces the challenge of structuring new maritime strategies to serve the
political objectives of hegemony and national security.
Considering various strategic schemes, several centers of strategic studies have considered various options that included some common elements:
• Action of conventional forces (sea-strike groups) designed with an increased
capability of power projection from the sea, complemented by marine forces (for
combat and projection)
• Homeland defense emphasizing Maritime Domain Awareness, where the U.S. Navy
works closely with the Coast Guard.
As to the question of where to focus the effort, taking into account relationships and
the levels of different states, it is necessary to see that although short-, medium-, and
long-range analyses can be made, situations can change very quickly. Logic would suggest developing flexible and agile maritime power to be present where required,
emphasizing areas where future powers are emerging. In both approaches, integration
of allied forces is possible and desirable, notwithstanding a large difference between
traditional U.S. allies from the West and forces from other states that might be able to
help meet new nonconventional threats by accepting the MDA initiative.
The first approach to international cooperation is easily recognized and involves countries from the European Union that have helped the United States in recent crises and
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conflicts in the Middle East (e.g., in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq). Other programs with
small navies, like the Latin American, have been so far of little operational relevance.
With regard to the second approach, we can foresee integration and cooperation in
defense against such nonconventional or asymmetrical threats as international terrorism, piracy, weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, and failed states, because we see it as
the most feasible option akin to our national interests. The U.S. Navy has developed the
“thousand-ship navy” concept in order to illustrate the idea of a union of the efforts of
all the organizations and forces of those countries that are interested in sharing the
burden of providing multinational security—that is, ensuring freedom of navigation,
maritime commercial transport, protection of marine resources, and good order at sea.
As to the integration of small navies, it is possible to foresee schemes whereby they can
be part of U.S. operational groups (as in PANAMAX) or simply assume surveillance of
their own maritime spaces, with an organization in charge of common, networked
information and operational control. Whatever these options, one must take into
account a realistic and objective vision of Latin American allies.
Some Considerations for Operational Integration
Political
The relations of Latin American states with the United States are unequal. This is more
evident in the political field than in the commercial (Venezuela and others, for example); the Chilean government assigns a high priority to its relations with its Latin
American counterparts. This is why full operational integration with the United States
is highly complex politically. Therefore, a regional agenda reflecting objective and
reciprocal interests is required so that initiatives of strategic integration can gain backing and authorization at the political level.
A basic requirement for obtaining the necessary support is that any initiative for joint
employment of forces must be undertaken in the letter and spirit of international
agreements approved by the United Nations. Every integration initiative must be based
on common multilateral security objectives, as there are no understandings or legal
tools against nonconventional threats. State terrorism is not considered a real menace
by many Latin American countries, and their means to neutralize it, according to their
particular legal standards, are diverse. The majority consider it an internal problem
against which only the state security organisms must act, expressly forbidding the
employment, or even the cooperation, of the armed forces.
Undoubtedly, the most sensitive aspect for the international community is free access
to areas where coastal states have sovereign rights, or to adjacent areas. The key for a
proper international relationship is deference to the authority established by
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international maritime law. Failure to observe and interpret it in the same way could
become a source of conflict or at least of discrepancies that could affect any multilateral cooperation initiative.
Strategic
A favorable legal situation exists in Chile because the person authorized by law to act in
the field of maritime security is the Director General of Maritime Space, whose organization is part of the Navy. The organizations share their assets and operate jointly, in a
complementary fashion. These are important factors to be considered for achieving
objectives successfully and efficiently when facing challenges or maritime threats.
These, then, are the Chilean tools for defending good order at sea.
However, considering that the majority of nonconventional threats originate, or at least
consolidate and reinforce themselves, within nations and mainly use the sea as a means
of transport, it is essential to cooperate strategically with related organizations, such as
the police and national intelligence services, in order to act effectively in maritime
operations.
On the other hand, since the characteristics of a future crisis will be less related than in
the past to traditional competing interests and conflicts between neighbors, it would
seem that the navies of medium-sized powers like Chile should assume expeditionary
roles, participating with multinational operational organizations in an attempt to stabilize areas of common political interest and to mitigate the impact on their particular
economies. Toward that end and taking into account the political considerations
already mentioned, it will be essential to achieve a strong international commitment to
address the needs of certain nations under a UN authorization (peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance).
In any case, given the relationships among countries of Latin America, where longstanding and sensitive boundary disputes still remain, the use of armed forces, while
maintaining a long-established policy of action in national defense, must be well
thought out each time that the Chilean Navy is required to participate in multinational
efforts, especially under the operational and logistic considerations described in this
paper.
How, Where, and in What to Participate
The center of effort of the United States is defined by its “homeland,” and its operational theater is the world. To that end the United States has developed a force that
allows it to operate in that huge area. The U.S. Navy’s strategy that involves “Sea
Shield,” “Sea Strike,” and sea basing reflects this reality. Nevertheless, despite the
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enormous capabilities that the U.S. armed forces have developed, they cannot operate
simultaneously everywhere, whereas smaller countries are effective in their respective
areas of influence. Therefore the U.S. armed forces need collaboration from these
countries.
Chilean Area of Responsibility
The maritime territory of Chile, including its exclusive economic zone plus its continental shelf, comprises more than 4.5 million square kilometers, and if we consider the
Presencial Sea, this area increases to 17.5 million square kilometers. Ultimately, the area
of responsibility for Chile of maritime search and rescue under international agreements is over 26.4 million square kilometers. These details are shown in the figure
below.

Compatible Mission Areas
Having analyzed the mission areas defined in the operational concept of the U.S. Navy
and comparing them against the scope of action defined by the Chilean Navy, following
its Three-Vector Strategy, we can conclude that commitment and will to cooperate in
the fields stated below exist, taking into account that this congruence will depend on
the political will of the government, which has a very clear posture, as stated, of observing commitments to participate cooperatively under UN mandates, as well as the reso3
lution to do it:

70

THE NEWPORT PAPERS

• Naval presence
• Crisis response
• Power projection
• Maritime security operations
• Sea control
• Deterrence
• Cooperation to security
• Civilian-military operations
• Information operations
• Counterterrorism
• Counterinsurgency.
In counterterrorism, it is worth mentioning that the Chilean Navy can act only under
the National Maritime Authority, the Directorate General of Maritime Space, and merchant marine—which is part of the Navy in the Chilean organization. Activities within
this area are derived from the application of the International Ship and Port Facility
Code, ratified by our country.
Together with these activities in the maritime areas outside national territory, the Chilean Navy, in its own jurisdictional territory, executes operations aimed at maintaining
sea control and the general protection of its own marine environment. This implies the
will to perform the relevant actions within the Chilean Presencial Sea.
Implementing Mutual Support: Interoperability
Just as Rear Admiral Federico Niemann declared during a seminar held in Valparaiso in
March 2007, in his presentation on the “Views of the Chilean Navy toward a New U.S.
Maritime Strategy,” interoperability is an important consideration for operating in a
4
combined way, interacting, or simply exchanging information. In other words,
interoperability is vital to achieving effective cooperation. It is the responsibility of
both parties to achieve mutual understanding, confidence building, commonality of
procedures, training, and information sharing in real time. Achieving these, we will be
able to share goods and services to be able truly to complement efforts in pursuit of
common interests. Much has been accomplished between the two navies. One of the
major contributions of the U.S. Navy is, for example, the supply of fuel for special
activities. This cooperation should be made permanent.
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We cannot forget that the interoperability that we have been building so far is among
navies; it is necessary to advance farther in order really to achieve effective cooperation,
that is, to implement this interoperability in other areas, like law enforcement (police,
customs, etc.).
In order to integrate any scheme of multinational security it is fundamental that the
participating forces have the capability to interact, both to complement capabilities and
to avoid mutual interference that endangers the success of any operation. In this
respect interoperability acts on at least two levels:
• The politico-strategic level: interoperability at this level is reflected in rules of
engagement (ROE), tools designed to allow political leaders to apply forces
gradually and manage the political consequences. Coordinating these political and
operational aspects is one of the major problems the coalition commander has to
solve.
• The strategic-operational level: if a multinational operation is conducted by the
United States, great technological differences become the main factor affecting
interoperability. If no interface and code arrangements are made to permit fast,
effective, and timely data links among units and commands, the operations will lose
the synergistic benefits of cooperation, and we will have only modest, or perhaps
even risky, operational results.
Thus interoperability is the major incentive for medium- and small-sized navies to join
in multinational operations with the United States. If interoperability cannot be
obtained, it will generate frustration, and all the operational and logistic potential will
be lost.
Integration of databases for exchanging information and intelligence with the United
States must safeguard the national security of the participating countries.
The lesser logistical capabilities of Latin American navies require, considering the need
for training to perform their priority roles in the field of national defense, “compensations” that facilitate the use of budgetary resources on tasks or activities not always well
understood by the national political community. Agreements on access to professional
training and education, exchange of personnel, no-cost use of U.S. naval bases, supply
of fuel for operations under UN authorization, opportunity to purchase naval material
of interest, and support for upgrading weapon systems are all elements that could
undoubtedly enhance political support and facilitate the execution of these operations.
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Conclusions
Nobody should be allowed to bring globalization to a halt. All nations depend on the
world economy for their social and economic development; it is in that way that we can
safeguard worldwide peace and stability. This is a global challenge that requires a global
response, and therefore the United States, beyond its own political realities and objectives, needs international cooperation, at least in dealing with those scenarios that
require responses beyond its particular resources.
Any alternative for cooperation or integration will require political resolve, which, in
the case of Latin America, means an international political involvement manifested on
collective organizations such as the UN, Organization of American States, etc. Unilateral solutions made in the United States will probably handicap any Latin American
attempt at cooperation.
Integration of smaller navies to cooperate with U.S.-designed forces in keeping good
order at sea, or in expeditionary operations to mitigate international instability that
affects world commerce, in particular that of countries in a coalition, requires enough
interoperability for the operational effort to be effective.
At the same time, and given the strategic and budgetary realities of these small navies,
it is desirable to have material compensation to allow their participation in multinational activities, as well as reciprocity in access to American forces, provided that sovereign safeguards are maintained in conformity to the standards of international
maritime law.
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CHAPTER NINE

Contributions to Designing a New
U.S. Maritime Strategy
C A P TA I N LU I Z C A R LOS D E C A RVA L H O ROT H , B RA Z I L I A N NAV Y (R E T I R E D )

A strategy may be understood as the road to be followed between “where we are” (the
present) and “where we want to be” (the future). This extremely simple concept serves
to show us that in achieving the goal that is envisioned, the reason for the strategy
ceases to exist, thus requiring a new strategy to be designed in the light of a new goal.
Therefore, every strategy is finite. Similarly, while a successful strategy is in force, corrections must be implemented in order to prevent deviations from hindering the
achievement of the established goals.
In charting this course several steps must be followed. First, we must understand “where
we are” and, therefore, be aware of the prevailing circumstances. Second, vital interests
must be established. Finally, a vision of the future must be created, in which scenario
techniques play a major role. More often than not, a strategy—though not yet written—
has its main lines drawn up beforehand. This is the case because a strategy normally is the
result of concepts set forth in high-level, periodically revised documents.
Our aim is to comment on three topics underlying the approach to a proposal for cooperation: What is the strategy to be discussed? In which areas of strategic interest are the agreed
actions to be implemented? How can we work together? Additionally, we will introduce a
few thoughts on the designing of a new maritime strategy by the United States.
A U.S. Maritime Strategy or a U.S. Navy Strategy?
In order to facilitate a few contributions that may assist in designing a new strategy, we
must ensure that the concepts employed by both parties are at least understood in
much the same way, thus avoiding misunderstanding.
The United States defines the “maritime domain” as “all areas and things of, under,
related to, next to, or limited by the sea, ocean, or any other navigable body of water,
including all maritime activities involving infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels and the
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1

like.” This concept is quite similar to that contained in the Brazilian definition of elements of maritime power, in which the means a nation employs to achieve its own
objectives associated with the sea, rivers, lagoons, and navigable lakes are “of a political,
economic, military and social nature and include, among other things, the maritime
awareness of its people and political class, the merchant marine and the Navy, the shipbuilding industry, the ports, and the maritime trade structure.”2
According to the Brazilian concept, the Navy comprises naval power, with its naval/
air-naval units and marines, and material and staff infrastructure. It is the military
component of maritime power. However, in U.S. texts the term “seapower” is employed
3
as meaning either “naval” or “maritime” power. Some U.S. authors flag this dichotomy.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has ordered that the term be given a new
4
interpretation: “We have a pretty good idea of what we can’t do without [seapower],
but do we really know all the things that we can accomplish with it?”
Though this discussion may seem merely semantic, it has much to do with how we contribute to a future strategy. In view of the above, a maritime strategy, by encompassing all
of the elements of naval power (or rather, included in the maritime domain), is validated
by detailed studies specially prepared by governmental and nongovernmental agencies
and bodies associated with foreign trade, the merchant marine, the international relations community, shipbuilding and maritime equipment industries, and the Navy,
among others. In addition, each of these sectors can relate to counterparts in other
countries, whether on a global or a regional basis. Because of its comprehensive scope,
a maritime strategy has to be drafted by a country’s highest echelon—the presidency of
the republic. In this spirit, the United States designed on September 2005 the National
Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), which, supplemented by eight supporting plans
5
written by various cabinet-level bodies, is fully targeted on maritime security.
On the other hand, in determining that a new maritime strategy should be designed,
the CNO Guidance for 2007 establishes that “such strategy shall reflect the roles and
missions that we [the U.S. Navy] intend to carry out: in the war against terror, in conventional campaigns, in national defense, and in ‘shaping’ and ‘stabilization’ opera6
tions.” It must strike a proper balance between the long-term requirements of
traditional naval capacities and those required to face and influence “the highly
7
dynamic security environment of the 21st Century.” The American society has not
been left out of the process of designing this new strategy. The CNO himself has
included in the process a number of seminars called “Conversations with the Country.”
However, that is not to say that the focus is not on the U.S. Navy.
It is worth pointing out that in the United States responsibility for the naval power is
shared by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. In Brazil, responsibility for those
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three institutions is embodied in the Navy, with few exceptions. The principal exceptions involve maritime activities of the Federal Police and inspection functions in the
marine environment of the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources. Therefore, in seeking to achieve a balanced vision of conceptual understandings, we can infer that the problem entails establishing a U.S. Navy strategy that
contributes to the nation’s maritime strategy. Such understandings seem to be most
appropriate, considering the U.S. effort toward designing the NSMS and bringing
actions to guide the future strategy under the scope of the CNO.
Where Will Cooperation Take Place?
Another relevant aspect is elaboration of a common strategy among the parties when
the interests of two countries may be in conflict. On the part of the United States, the
first indication can be found at the beginning of the text of the National Security Strategy (NSS), which states that
seeking and supporting democratic movements and institutions of each nation and culture is an integral element of U.S. policy in order to eliminate tyranny in the world. Today, the fundamental character of the world’s regimes is just as important as the distribution of power among them. Our
government is determined to help create a world of well-governed democratic states committed to
meeting the needs of their citizens while conducting themselves responsibly within the international
system. This is the best way to provide long-term security to the American people. 8

Notwithstanding the various interpretations of tyranny and democracy, it is clear that
9
the United States will have to play its role at a worldwide level. Also at the beginning of
its text, the NSMS concisely and objectively establishes the coverage area of naval
power by stating that “the safety and economic security depends above all on the secure
10
use of the world’s oceans.”
In order to be militarily active on the global scene, the United States has created the
Unified Combatant Command (UCC) system, whereby general officers of the highest
rank hold the combined command of military forces, both within predetermined geographical areas of responsibility and in the performance of specific functional activities
11
around the world. Civilian officials from various governmental agencies also participate in the unified combatant commands.
In accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, those commands report to the
president through the secretary of defense. Command-and-control channels among
12
them are conducted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Figure 1 is a map of UCC areas
of responsibility, effective October 2002 through 6 February 2007, when President
George W. Bush authorized the creation of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM),
13
placing Rear Admiral Robert Moeller in charge of the transition team. USAFRICOM
was to be fully operational by September 2008. That command will be responsible for
14
areas previously assigned to three other UCCs, according to figure 2.
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FIGURE 1

FIGURE 2

Draft Areas of Responsibility

On our part, the National Defense Policy (NDP) notes that “the South American subcontinent is the regional environment of which Brazil is an integral part. In an attempt
to narrow its cooperative relationships, the Country envisions strategic surroundings
that extend beyond the subcontinental territory into the Southern Atlantic and Africa’s
15
bordering countries.” It further mentions that “defense planning includes all regions
and, in particular, the core areas of political and economic power. In addition, it prioritizes
the Amazon and the South Atlantic on the grounds of their resources and vulnerability to
16
access through land and sea frontiers.” It states that “Brazil gives priority to South American and African countries—particularly those in southern and Portuguese-speaking

ROTH

77

Africa—with a view to deepening its relationships with those countries. Increased cooperation with the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, comprised of eight countries spread over four continents connected by the common components of history, culture
and language, is another relevant element of our foreign relations.”17 Finally, it provides that
“because of their strategic importance and wealth, the Brazilian Amazon and the South
18
Atlantic are priority areas for National Defense.”
This geostrategic dimension stemming from aspects of the NDP that were previously
explained has been brought into the naval scenario by the Chief of Staff of the Navy
(CEMA), who introduced “the key strategic maritime areas for the deployment of
19
Brazil’s Naval Power,” in order of priority:
• Core Area: the area covering the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ), and Continental Shelf (CS).
• Primary Area: the South Atlantic area located between parallel 16° N, the West Coast of Africa,
Antarctica, Eastern South America and the Eastern Lesser Antilles, except for the Caribbean Sea.
• Secondary Area: engulfs the Caribbean Sea and the South Pacific area located between the Beagle
Channel—the Coast of South America, the 085° W meridian, and the Panama Canal parallel.
• Other areas of the globe.

20

In order to illustrate the points we have been discussing, we have drawn figure 3, where
the areas of responsibility of Southern Command, Africa Command, and the core and
21
primary strategic maritime areas of the Brazilian Navy are highlighted.
This figure highlights two important aspects. First, it shows that the strategic interests
of the Brazilian Navy are not just associated with the U.S. Southern Command, as we
have traditionally thought, but extend over the future USAFRICOM area. Second, at an
FIGURE 3
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operating level, the agreed actions must be coordinated by the commander of the U.S.
Southern or Africa Command (according to the area of responsibility involved) and
Brazil’s Chief of Naval Operations, or CON (considering that the fleet, the Fleet Marine
Force, and the district forces report to him).
How to Cooperate?
The former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen, personally advocated the idea of building “global maritime partnerships”—the “thousand-ship navy.”
That initiative is aimed at encouraging all of the world’s navies to engage in the fight
against terrorism and sea piracy, in addition to promoting economic and political stability as a way to offer maritime nations the benefits of globalization. According to this
vision, the U.S. naval force, consisting of an estimated 313-ship fleet by 2020, would be
supplemented by naval units of friendly and partner countries of the United States.
Both the concept of the thousand-ship navy and the future maritime strategy will be
based on the following principles:
• The objectives of the U.S. armed forces, included in the National Military Strategy:
protecting the United States against a direct attack, ensuring strategic access and
retaining the freedom for global action, reinforcing alliances and partnerships, and
establishing favorable security conditions.
• The mission of the U.S. Navy, consisting of organizing, training, maintaining, and
preparing combat-ready naval forces capable of winning the global war against
terrorism and any other armed conflict, countering any enemy attack, preserving
freedom of the seas, and promoting peace and security.
Introducing the actions carried out on behalf of the thousand-ship navy in 2006, the
Chief of Naval Operations mentioned the multinational efforts undertaken in eastern
Africa to curb piracy; training operations conducted with navies of the Gulf of Guinea
22
and Latin America; search and rescue exercises conducted with the Chinese navy in
waters off Hawaii, southern California, and Zhanjiang; a deployment of the hospital
ship Mercy on a five-month humanitarian mission in Southeast Asia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, East Timor, and the Philippines; and the evacuation of thousands of U.S. citizens
from Lebanon. He further mentioned the contribution of supplying small boats and
automatic identification systems (AISs) to the nations of the Gulf of Guinea, thus
expanding control of maritime traffic in that area.
The Chief of Naval Operations also commented on the idea of creating a Global Fleet
Station (GFS), a support center for the thousand-ship navy within the area of regional
interest, structured on the “sea basing” concept. A GFS is a maritime operations base
primarily focused on “shaping” operations, on security cooperation in the operational
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theater, and on global maritime domain awareness. According to the CNO, the GFS
provides the means for increased regional maritime security by exploiting the combined efforts of military forces, agencies, multinational partners, and nongovernmental
organizations, without the necessity of a presence on land.
For our part, the vision of the future of the Brazilian Navy consists of becoming “a
modern, balanced and appropriate force possessing surface and aviation resources and
marines that are consistent with the political and strategic role of our country in the
international scene and, consistent with the desires of the Brazilian society, permanently ready to act—individually or jointly—in ‘blue,’ ‘brown,’ and inland waters, in
order to carry out its mission.”
In discussing the Brazilian Navy’s mission, the CEMA has made a point of clarifying
our understanding of such terms as “modern” (consisting of up-to-date resources,
twenty years old or less), “balanced” (ensuring simultaneous deployment in blue,
brown, and inland waters), and “appropriate” (capable of gradually carrying out the
basic tasks of naval power—controlling maritime areas, denying the use of the sea to an
23
enemy, projecting power over land, and contributing to dissuasion). In blue waters, or
areas off the coast, Brazilian Navy units will be deployed on naval war and naval patrol
operations and activity; in brown waters, or coastal and inland areas, those units will be
deployed on naval patrol operations and naval inspection actions for the purpose of
complying with maritime authority responsibilities.
The CEMA has argued that today Brazil is threat free from a military point of view, but
that does not mean it will continue to be so in the future. Therefore, our naval power
must be able to dissuade possible threats, enforce our laws, and defend our economic
interests in Brazilian jurisdictional waters, ensure the safety of maritime traffic within
the areas of interest to Brazil, project power over land, participate in peace operations
and coalitions with allies, and influence neighboring navies in the South Atlantic.
In addition to these actions, the Brazilian Navy often takes part in activities similar to
those introduced by the CNO that fit within the context of the thousand-ship navy,
such as
• Civil and social actions carried out by our vessels in the rivers of the Amazon and
Paraná-Paraguay basins (figure 4), not just on behalf of the Brazilian people but also
our Bolivian, Colombian, Paraguayan, and Peruvian neighbors.
• Preventive naval patrols conducted within the “Blue Amazon” and focused on two
specific areas. One, in which the Navy acts independently, involves a commitment to
defend our national sovereignty, in cases such as non-innocent passage of vessels or
inappropriate exploitation of natural resources in our EEZ. The other, in
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FIGURE 4

cooperation with other governmental agencies, contributes to curbing illegal actions
within Brazilian jurisdictional waters, such as smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal
fishing, and terrorism.
• Actions to secure navigation, do hydrographic work (producing nautical charts,
maintaining lighthouses and buoys), and naval inspections, in order to ensure ideal
conditions of use of vessels by various users.
• Safeguarding of human life at sea through the Search and Rescue Service
(SALVAMAR), supported by the Information System for Maritime Traffic
(SISTRAM) (figure 5), in order to provide rescue services to damaged vessels that
might be within Brazil’s search and rescue (SAR) (figure 5) area.
• Support for international relations at various levels with African countries, as
highlighted by the Naval Cooperation Agreement with Namibia, through which the
FIGURE 5
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Brazilian Navy has transferred the former corvette Purus to that country. In
addition, we have supported the education of Namibian officers and enlisted
personnel at our schools and training centers, the building of a patrol vessel and
four patrol boats, and the implementation of that country’s continental shelf
delimitation program—similar to that of our Blue Amazon.
We can conclude that in the realm of cooperation, the areas covered by the Brazilian Navy
and the U.S. Navy coincide considerably, especially as far as the issue of the thousandship navy is concerned.
A Few Thoughts on a New U.S. Maritime Strategy
This document is intended to answer three questions. First, it is aimed at defining the
level at which cooperation proposals should be submitted, according to the Brazilian
Navy’s scope of action. Second, it is intended to identify the areas of common interest
to both navies, while establishing the parties responsible for implementing the cooperation effort. This approach points to the importance of bearing in mind the interests of
both parties and the relevance of interactions between the Brazilian Chief of Naval
Operations and the commanders of the U.S. Southern and Africa commands. Finally, it
is intended to offer a wide array of converging efforts of cooperation between the Brazilian Navy and the U.S. Navy.
However, while these answers may contribute to designing a maritime strategy for the
United States, they are not sufficient for actually doing so. That leads us to reflect on a
few additional points. The first one refers to the beginning of this document, stating
that a strategy is a road to be followed. Such a road may only be followed by those who
have paved it. Outsiders—whether friends or partners—can offer no more than “contributions” that may be taken into account or not, and, even in the former case, be
assigned a relative weight by their contributors and confirmed by the strategic decision
maker. A strategy adds value only to those who have to carry it out.
Another factor to be considered is the “act of consulting.” This act may be understood
in two distinct ways: a positive way (seen as a search for cooperation, closer friendship,
and mutual trust) and a negative way, corresponding to an effort or action intended to
win support for a future decision (since the strategy has not yet been designed and
approved) that may be disputed by any interested party. In this case, the answer to
objections may as well be, “But you have been heard and had the opportunity to voice
your opinion on this matter.” Such an attitude would only reduce the level of trust initially earned by the call for cooperation, thus weakening the initial effort to build the
partnership, which seems to be a higher goal to be achieved by this strategy.
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Finally, the success of any strategy involving international partners must be focused on
a desire to share “intelligence.” Technological superiority allows a greater amount of
data to be obtained in the shortest possible period of time. Yet unprocessed data are
just data. Data analysis conducted in the light of other information available between
the parties, thus turning data into “intelligence,” is what actually adds value. Exchanging the results of such intellectual activity may be what makes a difference within the
context of the thousand-ship navy. A single vessel in the right place, at the right time,
and under the right conditions to curb a threat is worth more than several vessels wandering through the vastness of the ocean.
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CHAPTER TEN

A Chilean View of Regional and Global
Security Cooperation and the Implications for
a New U.S. Maritime Strategy
PROF. FRANCISCA MÖLLER UNDURRAGA, CHILEAN NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
C A P TA I N OM A R GU T I É R R E Z , C H I L E A N NAV Y (R E T I R E D )
V I C E A D M I RA L GE R M Á N GO D DA R D, C H I L E A N NAV Y ( R E T I R E D )
V I C E A D M I RA L J O S É M A RC H A N T ORT E G A , C H I L E A N NAV Y (R E T I R E D )
M R . M A RC E LO PA L M A , C H I L E A N NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E
C A P TA I N JA I M E S E P Ú LV E DA , C H I L E A N M A R I N E C O R P S ( R E T I R E D )

The purpose of this essay is to examine how the Chilean Navy, from a strategic perspective, sees maritime security cooperation at the regional and global levels, and its implications for a future U.S. maritime strategy. We will start by examining the meaning of
international law in relation to maritime security. In doing that, we will analyze some
specific responses to maritime security threats, ranging from actors who prefer to take
preventive actions to the use of force, and finally to the unrestricted enforcement of international law.
Then, we will emphasize, from a geopolitical approach, the relevance that maritime
security acquires in regional and global security regimes. The new global network of
exchange and the form in which it has been affected by “new threats” are also examined, leading to the conclusion that these threats tend to exceed the individual capacity
of states to address them, requiring multilateral responses. Some thoughts are presented in relation to the cooperative contributions to maritime security and our particular regional situation, where, as a result of many agreements, a multistate response has
been achieved. Likewise, some reflections are made about the concepts of effective sovereignty and enduring friendship.
Then, we will examine the concrete commitments undertaken by our country as to
regional and global security. We will review our posture, which favors the use of multiple agendas. We stress that Chile promotes multilateralism and participation in peace
operations. Also, we reiterate that Chile cannot refrain from contributing to
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international stability through commitments linked to international law and international operations.
We will also examine the strategy of the United States for maritime security and its
implementation on a global scale. That examination leads us to conclude that the United
States itself believes that it will not be able to reach the goal of its strategy alone but must
do so through a powerful coalition of nations and in conformity with international law.
Then, we refer to the general guidelines for cooperative participation of the Chilean Navy
with a new U.S. maritime strategy. We will present the bases for the participation of Chile
and the efforts of that nation to comply with the requirements of international agreements related to maritime transportation to which it has subscribed. Chile’s aim to work
collectively in facing hemispheric security threats and to use that kind of response in
other parts of the world where its interests are at stake is also emphasized.
Lastly, in the conclusions, we indicate how the Chilean Navy could participate cooperatively with its U.S. counterpart within the framework of a new U.S. maritime strategy.
International Law and Maritime Security
Nowadays, the threat of war has decreased, but other menaces have emerged. Though
they are not new, they broadly affect the interconnected world in which we live. In the
face of these threats, there are different responses: some countries emphasize preventive
actions but encourage the use of force when they fail; others promote multilateral
responses; and there are some others that act regionally or bilaterally, and in some cases
unilaterally. In doing that, some are more respectful of international law than others.
Not all the actors implement and comply with international rules in the same way, particularly some developing countries that, more often than not, do not take their treaty
obligations as seriously as they should. For this reason, and despite the efforts to harmonize legislation and its application and interpretation among various states, differences still exist in subjects relevant to the application of the law of the sea, the use of
force, and the law of armed conflict, among others.
Considering the impact of international law on international security, we believe that
in order to have a more secure world, it is indispensable to act through the international community and under the rule of law. In this context, it is interesting to underline what is expressed on the Princeton Project on National Security, referring to what
the U.S. performance should be. In our judgment, this should also be applicable to the
1
other members of the community of nations.
Still, some of the greatest moments in our history have come from standing for our values and defending them on behalf of others as well as ourselves. We have recognized at those moments, as we
should recognize today, that we have to stand with other nations rather than above them, and that we
must play by the same rules that they do if we are to achieve common goals. And if we truly believe
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that our values are universal, then we cannot think that we have a national monopoly on their inter pretation or implementation.
Pursuing liberty under law both within nations and among them is a grand strategy for making America more secure. . . . Recognizing the complex balance that must be struck between order and liberty
to secure true liberal democracy means engaging some governments on securing order and others on
2
promoting liberty, but without sacrificing order.

On the other hand, we agree with those who claim that order and security can best be
achieved if international organizations are adapted to the new times, which make absolutely necessary overall reform of the United Nations organization and other international organs.3
It is indispensable that all international actors feel that they are participants in the new
institutionalism and have confidence that they will be heard, and that smaller and
needier nations perceive that they can count on the support of developed countries in
helping them to resolve their vital problems.
In the naval and maritime context, Geoffrey Till states the need to have “good order at
sea”: “Because the sea is increasingly important, in relative terms, to local economies,
disorder at sea only makes things worse ashore. The success of transnational crime
such as drug smuggling elevates the power of the kind of people who challenge civilized states and the ability to connect with other countries. Countries that fail for such
reasons tend, moreover, to become the security concerns of others. . . . [T]he maintenance of good order at sea requires an improved level of awareness, effective policy and
4
integrated governance.”
When referring to order at sea, it is important to highlight first the significance of the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the preamble of which recognizes the need to establish, “with due respect to the sovereignty of all States, a juridical
order for the seas and oceans.” In the International Maritime Organization (IMO), various agreements, protocols, codes, recommendations, and guidelines on maritime security and pollution prevention, as well as other matters, have been adopted. As a
consequence of the attacks of September 11, 2001, a great many measures on maritime
security were intensified—amendments to the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) were passed, the International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code was approved—all of which provided the basis for a set of regulations creating an international arrangement aimed at detecting and preventing acts on board
5
vessels and in port facilities that endanger maritime shipping.
In May 2006 another security mechanism was adopted for maritime safety and protection: the Long Range International Tracking System (LRIT), incorporated in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, which establishes multilateral
6
arrangements to share information about search and rescue at sea.
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It is true that a reasonably adequate juridical framework to keep order at sea exists
through many international agreements and international and national regulations
but, as already stated, the problem is its implementation, because states occasionally are
7
unable or unwilling to enforce the agreements. Therefore it is important to establish
adequate, realistic, achievable, and effective standards for compliance.
Regional and Global Security Regimes and Maritime Security
Having established the scope and the relationship of maritime security to international
law, it is necessary to underscore its relevance to regimes of regional and global security, taking account of the changes and trends affecting previous security strategies.
The expansion of the geographic scope of the economic interests of nations has created
an intensive network for the exchange of goods and services, making the states participants in, and at the same time dependent on, a global system. In that context, international security—together with potential conflicts of interests beyond their borders
among big, medium, and even smaller powers—has been affected by the appearance of
new threats. In some cases these threats are due to the effects of a serious socioeconomic situation within a country or region not benefiting from globalization. In other
cases, they are the results of actions by nonstate actors—such as corporations, religious
groups, terrorist organizations, drug-trafficking cartels, and organized crime—that
attack any country or society opposed to their own ideological, religious, or political
concepts, or accomplish illegal objectives of material benefit to them but to the detri8
ment of important sectors of society.
Particular features of these emerging threats tend to exceed the individual capacities of
states to neutralize the vulnerabilities, risks, and threats to their vital interests, resulting
in the need for coordinated, cooperative, and multilateral responses that must be incorporated into a multidimensional, mainly transnational scenario. This fact has led to the
reformulation of traditional theories and the design of new strategic schemes based on
international cooperation at regional and global levels, conceptually called “cooperative
security.” This approach allows for preventive and constructive confrontation of new
threats to global stability that previously were not part of the international security
agenda but now are perceived as risks and threats to the security that nations desire in
9
order to achieve development and provide for the welfare of their peoples.
Under the concept of cooperative security, the international community seeks to
achieve security by institutionalized consent among the international actors involved
rather than using force or the threat of force to settle disputes. It assumes that the partners’ security objectives are common and compatible, amenable to the establishment of
easy, collaborative relations. This implies that the regional and global security systems
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depend on flexibility, providing a capacity for coordinated, cooperative, and multilateral responses to new threats and the changing demands and characteristics of the world
market. Likewise, these systems must serve to reduce, not increase, the gaps between
developed and developing countries, while allowing growth in the global commitment to
free trade. In sum, the security systems must accommodate to new technologies, changing trade practices, emerging markets, and other forces guiding the course of free trade.
In the regional context specifically, increasing disparities in development among various countries of the Americas make unequal the effects of globalization and render it
impossible to come up with a relatively uniform formula for their contributions to
cooperative maritime security.
Regional and global security regimes must take responsibility for maritime security,
which, now more than ever before, demands cooperative and coordinated action by
states and between states and private enterprises to neutralize the threat of terrorism,
which finds in the maritime environment favorable conditions for achieving its ends;
trafficking in weapons and dangerous materiel; the use of weapons of mass destruction; piracy and armed attacks on vessels under way; and drug smuggling.
Within the parameters provided by international law and the institutions that enforce
its rules, the system at the global security level should operate through common efforts
oriented toward creating harmonious development and the expansion of world trade
in an environment of cooperation among beneficiary countries. In the maritime environment, that purpose is accomplished by the actions of navies and the commitment
of their respective countries’ foreign policies to maintain peace, stability, and security,
not only in trade routes but also in the geographic areas where their shared interests are
affected. Each state’s involvement makes a concrete contribution to international maritime security and, at the same time, a legitimate and inescapable payment for the benefits of the globalization process.
A similar situation can be seen at the regional level wherein geographically close countries work through established agreements in activities intended to maintain conditions
of peace and security at sea and restore them when they are upset. As one state alone
might not be able to do this, it is indispensable to develop cooperative strategies and joint
10
actions among navies of neighboring countries that can.
This scenario has guided Latin American actors to take important steps toward major
economic, commercial, and political integration. Chile particularly has undertaken
various initiatives to strengthen relationships among the navies of the region. These
initiatives include three combined naval exercises between the Chilean and Argentine
fleets in the southern zone, increased measures of mutual confidence, study of largescale joint projects, reciprocal visits of naval authorities, and participation in peace
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operations. All of these have resulted in a more stable regional environment and protection of shared interests.
Furthermore, countries of the region are developing efforts intended to establish
“effective sovereignty” by means of presence and control over their jurisdictional maritime area, which in U.S. terms is seen more as a duty than a right.11 At the same time,
those whose navies have major capabilities provide permanent contributions and cooperation for maritime stability, participating in combined large-scale exercises, controlling oceanic accesses, supporting the war against terrorism, and taking other steps that
the United States defines as part of an “enduring friendship.”12
In sum, maritime security achieved within a cooperative security system forms an integral part of the regional and global security regimes and is indispensable in the current
globalized scenario to neutralize new threats and, consequently, to achieve the benefits
of international trade, for developed countries and developing countries alike.
Chilean Commitments to Regional and Global Security Regimes
After examining regional and global security regimes from a geopolitical point of view,
it is necessary to mention the concrete commitments of our country in this respect.
According to a former Chilean minister of foreign affairs, José Miguel Insulza, “In this
new and complex international reality, the interests of different nation-states have been
diversified, leading to multiple agendas that require mechanisms that guarantee more
cooperative and solid relations.” He adds: “It is not only to prevent conflicts and war
tensions, but also to face the new risks emerging from political, economic and social
instabilities.” He concludes: “With that purpose, [we] have sought to increase international cooperation on such issues as the promotion of democracy and human rights,
peace enforcement, cooperation for economic and social development, encouragement
of equity among states and individuals, preservation of natural resources and protection of the environment, regulation of common spaces, liberalization of world trade
13
and the fights against drug trafficking and terrorism.”
Considering these challenges and without changing Chile’s essential objectives of protecting its territorial integrity and national interests, Chilean foreign policy has
increased the scope of its international action. Chile has made a moderate but sustained contribution to international security, participating selectively in multilateral
initiatives oriented toward peacekeeping, supporting and promoting the creation of
rules and regimes that facilitate the collective prevention and management of problems
directly affecting stability at the regional and global levels.
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At the Global Level
The government of Chile has repeatedly stated its willingness to participate actively,
within its means, in the strengthening of the United Nations and its various organs,
14
especially in the security area. In the 2006–10 program of the Chilean government,
President Michelle Bachelet stated: “The relative size of Chile conditions its international policy. For that reason, we will promote multilateralism, respect for international
law, the peaceful solution of conflicts, the inviolability of treaties and International
15
Humanitarian Law.” The president went on to say that “multilateralism is a strategic
commitment of Chilean foreign policy at the subregional level (MERCOSUR [the
Southern Cone Common Market]), the regional level (Rio Group, OAS [the Organization of American States]), and especially the global level (UN, WTO [World Trade
Organization]).”
Important examples of such commitment are the total observance of the Tlatelolco
Treaty; the permanent deployment of Peace Forces in Cambodia; Chile’s participation
in the UN Security Council, 1996–97; a governmental directive that regulates the conditions under which Chile contributes to peace operations; the organization of the first
conference to promote measures of mutual confidence, held in Santiago, 1995; the
commitment to the convention that prohibits chemical and bacteriologic weapons; the
observance of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; a recent agreement that prohibits
nuclear tests; and ratification of the Ottawa Treaty.
In the context of peace operations, within the regional and the United Nations frameworks, Chile has a long history of participation in multilateral mechanisms to maintain
international peace and security.
At the Regional Level
As to the defense and security agendas, there is a great difference between the Andean
region and the Southern Cone. While many of the Andean governments consider their
armed forces responsible for combating drug trafficking, in the Southern Cone the governments insist that the military must be kept away from that task, because it is the
responsibility of the local police forces.
However, in relation to drug trafficking, Latin American actors have had the political
will and the ability to develop increased cooperation when common criteria have been
established. The agreements provided for a multilateral mechanism of evaluation and a
wide agenda of cooperation through the International Commission for Drug Control
and Abuse. Recently, they have also recognized that terrorism is a new, common threat.
Ultimately, the region presents a situation of changing and dynamic security conditions, but in general, it also exhibits a very high degree of cooperation. Some steps have
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been taken to reduce the level of conflict among states and to remove the threat of
weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, cooperative security measures have been
developed that have improved transparency and stabilized relations in the realm of
defense, such as mutual confidence-building measures, defense publications, and the
development of methodologies for comparing defense expenditures between Argentina
and Chile, Peru and Chile, and between Peru and Ecuador.
At the Institutional Level
Following its government’s policies, the Chilean Navy bases its international action on
two pillars: deterrence and cooperation. Both concepts are important in keeping peace
and stability in a globalized world and thus contributing to the development of our
country. According to the former commander in chief of the Chilean Navy, Admiral
Miguel A. Vergara, “No country is big enough to act alone and none is too small not to
contribute something.” In the international maritime context, Admiral Vergara added,
“The international commitments of Chile and its Navy are not limited to geographic
16
space, because in the context of maritime interests, boundaries do not exist.” He concluded that “security in itself is an indispensable component of economic and social
development, Chile could not refrain from contributing to the achievement of peace
and stability in international relations. This implies being willing to participate, as far
as our capabilities and resources permit, in international operations like crisis or peace
management, or humanitarian assistance.”
In a world of growing and irrevocable interdependence, the search for common security or cooperative security is one of the main features of any strategy intended to prevent and resolve conflicts. Undoubtedly, international law is the core of this
interdependent system.
The United States and Maritime Security
The present essay attempts to offer some thoughts about the way in which the Chilean
Navy would cooperate with its counterpart in the United States in the international
implementation of a strategy for maritime security. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the way in which that large country understands and implements its strategy.
The National Strategy for Maritime Security, published in September 2005, asserts that
the economic and general security of the United States depends upon the secure use of
17
the world’s oceans. Overcoming the threats to maritime security demands common
understanding, joint effort, and action on a global scale. Maritime security is required
to assure freedom of the seas, facilitate free navigation and trade, improve world prosperity and liberty, and protect marine resources.
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On the other hand, nations have a common interest in achieving two complementary
objectives: facilitating maritime commerce that supports economic security, and protecting themselves from hostile, terrorist, criminal, and other dangerous acts in the
maritime environment. Due to the fact that all nations benefit from collective security,
all must share in the responsibility for maintaining maritime security against the
threats that emerge in this domain.
The threats identified are state support to terrorist and unlawful activities, terrorism,
piracy and transnational crime, environmental destruction, and illegal immigration.
Therefore, the U.S. maritime strategy considers four objectives that must guide national
activities related to maritime security: “prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile
acts,” “protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructures,” “minimize damage and expedite recovery,” and “safeguard the ocean and its resources.”
The United States recognizes that because of the extensive global connectivity among
businesses and governments, its maritime security policies affect other nations, and
also that significant local and regional incidents will have global effects. Success in
securing the maritime domain will not come from the United States acting alone but
through a powerful coalition of nations that maintains a strong, united front.
A secure maritime domain can be achieved only by simultaneous employment of all U.S.
measures in concert with those of other nation-states, in a highly coordinated way and
under international law. In this context, the following strategic actions are envisioned:
• Enhance international cooperation to ensure lawful and timely actions against
maritime threats
• Maximize Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) to support effective decision
making
• Embed security in commercial practices to reduce vulnerabilities and facilitate
commerce
• Deploy layered security to meld public and private security measures
• Ensure continuity of the marine transportation system to maintain vital commerce
and defense readiness.
Finally, the United States has concluded that because of the challenges that remain, the
adversaries it confronts, and the environment in which it operates, it is compelled to
strengthen its ties with allies and friends and to seek new partnerships with others.
Such collaboration is fundamental to worldwide economic stability and growth, and it
is vital to the interests of the United States. It is only through such an integrated
approach among all maritime partners—governmental and nongovernmental, public
and private—that the United States can improve the security of the maritime domain.
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Participation of Chile in a Cooperative Scheme of Maritime Security
Ultimately, we must think realistically about the cooperative participation of the Chilean Navy under the guidelines laid out in a new international maritime strategy of the
United States. Owing to a consensus that the security of states depends on global security, the principle of international cooperation as the basis for development and stability of nations is increasingly accepted, strengthened, and promoted. In this respect,
naval cooperation exists among states when certain political, economic, and military
conditions are shared by all.18 In this sense, and from the fact that our country is an
oceanic country, the exercise of sovereignty and control of its maritime area become a
fundamental element in its overall development.
Chilean security and stability are achieved through an international legal framework.
In that sense, and having in mind the international legal framework in force, as well as
the ideas of Admirals John Morgan and Charles Martoglio concerning a “thousandship navy,” Chile shares the need to cooperate in the safety, surveillance, and protection
19
of the world’s seas. This commitment to the protection of the seas is reflected in our
participation, through our navy, in a series of multinational exercises attempting to
protect specific maritime zones that have particular importance for both our country
and the international community.
Special attention must be given to Operation PANAMAX, which since its creation in
2003 has brought together the Chilean and U.S. navies and lately other navies, along
with the coast guard of Panama, with a single aim: to secure the Panama Canal, as well
as to protect free transit in its adjacent waters. Chile is highly dependent upon a secure
and efficient Panama Canal for its growth and prosperity. The maritime cargo that is
shipped to Atlantic coasts via the Panama Canal ranks Chile fourth among the users of
the canal, after the United States, Japan, and China. This motivates our permanent concern for the safety of the canal itself and the other choke-point areas associated with it,
both in the Pacific and the Caribbean.
Therefore, international cooperation is paramount for the protection and defense of
our interests, and at the same time, it is imperative that Chile act jointly with other
states. That leads us to consider as a key element of our maritime and naval strategy the
increase in our interoperability with other navies and development of strategic capabilities in relation to the international participation we seek. It is in this sense that we have
called our strategy the “Three-Vector” strategy—it is aimed at establishing control over
the sea in three different conditions or situations.
This strategy aims for international participation and cooperation, given the limitations of our national power, which by itself cannot secure our national interests or
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those of the broader community. In the context of international maritime security, the
Chilean Navy believes that to serve the highest national interests, it must participate
not only in the promotion and maintenance of global, hemispheric, and regional security but also in the identification of opportunities for cooperation to consolidate this
security. The same perception is the leitmotif that moves Admirals Morgan and
Martoglio to think of a thousand-ship navy, under the principle of “thinking globally
and acting locally.”
In other words, we need maritime friends and allies with whom, sharing similar interests, we can act jointly in order to create, maintain, or restore peace, security, and order
at sea that our own national interests require. That means, if Chile wants to accomplish
its national objectives, it must have an active international participation and be willing
to cooperate and accept cooperation by other states that share its interests. From the
foregoing, we can draw various premises, which we would like to underscore:
• The stability, prosperity, and progress of our neighborhood are good for us.
• States and groups that threaten the freedom of movement, particularly in the
maritime environment, and introduce uncertainty into the international system
(e.g., terrorism) harm us and thereby become our opponents.
• States that take elective and unilateral action to settle their political, commercial,
financial, or other disputes go against our interests. We feel committed to the United
Nations; therefore, we support its actions, and we work to reinforce that
organization in everything related to peace, security, and international order.
• Our interest in free trade is shared with the international community.
It is in the context of this strategy that the development of our naval forces is situated,
within the limits of our available resources. However, having in mind that we share the
same conception of cooperation, the Chilean Navy and the U.S. Southern Command
believe it necessary to continue developing more deeply the Naval Operational Com20
mittee, as well as other organizations such as the Pacific Fleet.
This is in addition to the Chilean efforts to comply with the standards that arise from
the international agreements that secure maritime transportation, mainly the whole
implementation of the ISPS Code, the last-generation system in service associated with
the Vessel Traffic Service and automatic identification systems, and the adoption of the
new maritime transportation control system (Naval Cooperation and Guidance Shipping, or NCAGS).
Having mentioned what Chile and in particular its navy are now doing that could be
useful in the future to cooperate with the new U.S. maritime strategy, we will examine
new ideas that will contribute to implementing this strategy effectively.
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Chile has assumed enormous international commitments in its jurisdictional area,
such as the role of south-east Pacific coordinator of the International Hydrographic
Organization, naval control of maritime traffic, tsunami warning, and responsibility
for maritime search and rescue within a zone even greater than our “Presencial Sea.” In
order to cooperate better with the new U.S. maritime strategy, our country should
increase its means for those activities; for its part, the United States should provide
without restriction the necessary information, knowing that our country will act
reciprocally.
At the same time, better cooperation with the new U.S. maritime strategy would be
possible if we intensified control and surveillance over our maritime spaces, over such
important oceanic passages as the Strait of Magellan, the Beagle Channel, the Drake
Passage, and our Presencial Sea, preventing any illegal activity from being carried out in
the high seas adjacent to our coasts. Furthermore, Chile could exercise more rigorously
the authority supported by international and national laws as a flag state, coastal state,
and port authority state. Therefore, and in light of the new U.S. maritime strategy, it is
evident that our country should be willing to cooperate, according to its capabilities,
with all those activities consistent with the national interest, humanitarian motivations,
and the international legal order. We should think constructively, then, about how to
translate that political will into commitments and restrictions agreed upon together,
serving the strategic objectives of both countries.
Chile’s opportunities to act in a coordinated way with the United States will emerge
essentially from cooperative commitments under UN mandates and the national political will. The action of the Chilean Navy within its own jurisdictional territory and its
Presencial Sea, in support of a new U.S. maritime strategy, would be always framed in
international law. In addition to this we must consider our ability to coordinate the
action of multiple national and international agencies seized with facing “new threats.”
Interoperability will be an indispensable condition for reaching effective cooperation in
support of a new U.S. maritime strategy. It will be the responsibility of both sides to
understand the other, build confidence, develop common procedures, train in the
means, and share information in real time, in order to be able to complement each
other’s efforts in pursuit of common interests.
Conclusions
Changes affecting the naval and maritime environment create a need to maintain good
order at sea, which must be the concern of everyone. Our country, through its state
policies, believes that in order to have a more secure world, it is indispensable to act
through the international community and under the rule of the law. The UNCLOS and
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the regulations passed by international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization constitute the proper tools for that purpose.
Emerging threats tend to exceed the capabilities of individual states to meet them,
which generates a need to respond in a coordinated, cooperative, and multilateral manner. At the regional level, acting through agreements among neighboring countries, it is
possible to share the burden of maintaining conditions of peace and security at sea.
The inter-American region presents a changing and dynamic security situation, but
also a very high degree of cooperation, shaping a new phenomenon: the appearance of
a cooperative agenda among the majority of states in the region. Multilateralism is a
pillar of the foreign policy of Chile. The Chilean Navy is willing to participate,
according to its capabilities and resources, in international operations such as crisis
management, peace operations, and humanitarian assistance. For our country, the
international commitments it accepts must be linked to international law.
The United States, on the other hand, states that security in the maritime domain can
be attained only by the simultaneous employment of all the tools of its national power,
in concert with other nation-states and under international law. Likewise, it recognizes
a common interest with other nations in obtaining economic security and protecting
against hostile acts performed at sea. The United States believes that all the nations that
benefit must be jointly responsible for maintaining maritime security. It asserts, at the
same time, that only through an integrated approach among maritime partners—governmental and nongovernmental, public and private—will it be possible to increase
security in the maritime domain.
To Chile, the exercise of sovereignty and control of its maritime territory are essential
for overall development. Our country requires peace and stability with its neighbors,
within the region, and in the critical areas where its trade is developed. In addition, it is
obliged to seek international cooperation to achieve better defense and protection of its
vital maritime spaces. The security and stability that Chile needs are accomplished by
means of an international legal framework that ensures them. Chile shares and is committed to cooperate in the safety, surveillance, and protection of the world’s seas, especially choke-point areas. Cooperation is crucial for the defense of our interests, as well
as the capability to interact with other navies.
The Chilean Navy shares with the U.S. Navy a similar concept of cooperation and of
the duty to comply with the requirements flowing from the international agreements
to which their countries adhere. Therefore, it is willing, under the UN Convention of
the Law of the Sea and regulations passed by international organizations, to cooperate
at the regional and global levels in order to achieve adequate maritime security within
the conceptual framework that the new U.S. maritime strategy establishes.
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PART THREE
Cooperation through Regional Maritime Partnerships

CHAPTER ELEVEN

A Regional Maritime Strategy against
New Threats
C A P TA I N FE D E R I C O R E C H KE M M E R PR I E TO, PE RU V I A N NAV Y
C A P TA I N R I C A R D O M E N É N D E Z C A L L E , PE RU V I A N NAV Y
C A P TA I N C A R LOS PI LC O P É R E Z , PE RU V I A N NAV Y

In a context of increasing globalization, the external and internal aspects of security are
firmly related. The capital flows, the development of new technologies and the progress
of democracy associated with globalization contribute to prosperity and freedom for
many people, but others perceive globalization as a source of frustration and injustice.
The states of the Western Hemisphere have to confront traditional threats and new
ones of diverse natures and multidimensional reaches that have grown in importance
in recent years. Since these threats include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects, we have to fight against them in all those fields.
In this context, some of these new threats have spawned organizations formed by networks with different bases and purposes. This problem will bring as a consequence the
need to draw on technological resources to control activity on the sea, an area that is
used by those who represent these threats and mount actions in the name of inequality
or religion, or through eagerness to engage in criminal activities against humanity.
In comparison with those of other regions, the recent history of the Americas and the
Caribbean demonstrates a smaller proportion of interstate armed conflicts than elsewhere, and this area can thus be considered one of the most stable regions. On the
other hand, the region has experienced numerous internal conflicts that have resulted
in armed confrontations of a domestic character, caused, among other reasons, by the
absence or weakness of institutional mechanisms for prevention or resolution of conflict, within the frameworks of both authoritarian and democratic systems. Unlike
interstate conflicts, which tend to promote national unity and fortify social cohesion,
those of a domestic nature generate and exacerbate divisions within the citizenry.
Changes in the international system since the 1980s have introduced a new set of factors that have the potential to increase armed conflicts, associated with the weakening
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of states and public institutions, the emergence of new actors at the transnational and
local levels, and the emergence of new threats, mainly of a transnational character.
In a world of new threats and global markets and mass media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on the existence of an effective hemispheric security system.
In that sense, establishing a regional maritime strategy that identifies new threats and
defines the strategic targets of the Americas will enable the creation of a new cooperative system of preventive, deterrent, and effective regional security, one that contributes
to conditions for lasting peace, stability, and sustainable development in the region.
Development of the Regional Maritime Strategy
The regional maritime strategy ought to be a management mechanism of the American
states to carry out multinational combined naval operations within the framework of
regional security cooperation, aimed at addressing the new threats.
With the purpose of obtaining a balance among the numerous variables that allows us
to view regional maritime strategy with a long-range vision adapted to the current
surroundings and the foreseeable future, we can outline the general features for the
strategic development, taking as a reference the model proposed by Professor Henry C.
1
Bartlett.
The Scenario Expected in the Middle Term
Unless dramatic changes occur, armed conflicts between states in the region will not
emerge, as opposed to internal conflicts and tensions (linked to transnational crime,
migration, environment damage, drug trafficking, radical transnational ethnic movements, and international terrorism) that could transcend national borders. Although
this last kind of conflict does not necessarily entail armed confrontations, it may give
rise to them. This could contribute to the proliferation of all kinds of arms in the
region and an increase in transnational crime, especially drug trafficking.
Consequently, although the possibilities of interstate conflicts have diminished, the
character of overseas expansion of the new threats brings singular challenges to more
than one state. This is particularly dangerous, because these kinds of threats are generated by players or agents who do not represent governments or states.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, against the United States set a new international
agenda in security matters. The axis of this new agenda is focused on the frontal fight
against global terrorism, as well as against the networks and states that can maintain it,
support it, or give rise to its development. Nevertheless, the perceptions of proximity or
imminence of this threat vary radically in different regions of the world.
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For many countries of the Americas, terrorism is also perceived as a serious threat,
along with drug trafficking, but terrorism is often identified with local movements. On
a secondary level are poverty and social problems, arms trafficking, environment problems, and natural disasters. On a third level, we have organized crime, although this too
could be related to arms trafficking, terrorism, and drug trafficking.
Globalization, banking deregulation, and free trade agreements no doubt facilitate economic development in the region, but they are also exploited by drug trafficking organizations and organized crime, which themselves sometimes act as great multinational
enterprises. Malefactors use maritime transportation widely, and it is likely that they will
continue doing so as a matter of cost-effectiveness, just like great corporations in their
legal commerce. Such a situation generates a sense of uncertainty, or “fog,” where the
weak presence of states facilitates other kinds of illegal activities, like arms trafficking and
terrorism.
One of the greater vulnerabilities foreseen in the region comes from a crisis of governability that affects some countries. This obviously makes it difficult to offer proper levels of security to the citizens of these countries; it also generates anxiety, in the form of
the fear that social violence could break out as a consequence of claims of a wide sector
of the population whose basic necessities are not satisfied. Bad management of public
affairs (e.g., corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, and a failure to fulfill obligations) feeds internal unrest and may give rise to social conflicts that corrode states
from inside, destroying or seriously affecting their institutions. The weakness of the
states is an alarming phenomenon that undermines governance and contributes to an
increase in regional instability, because in those countries new threats arise more easily.
The International Normative Framework
The charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS)
motivate member states to behave proactively to keep the peace and international security, to take collective and effective measures to prevent and to eliminate threats to
peace, and to suppress acts of aggression or other violations of the peace.
At the hemispheric level, the organs operating this security architecture are the InterAmerican Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), the Inter-American Committee
against Terrorism (CICTE), and the Inter-American Committee on Natural Disaster
Reduction (CIRDN). Additionally, one can include the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the Inter-American Defense Board (JID). Also, the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) establishes a system of hemispheric security
against possible external aggression and, along with the American Treaty on Pacific
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Settlement (the pact of Bogotá), establishes mechanisms for avoiding conflicts among
2
the states of the continent.
In addition, diverse agreements and bilateral and subregional mechanisms in security
and defense matters contribute to fortifying the hemispheric security structure. The
dispute related to the TIAR that arose over the Falklands War, as well as the increasing
preoccupation of American states with new threats, led the OAS to issue a declaration
on security in the Americas (28 October 2003) reaffirming its commitment to revitalizing and fortifying the organs, institutions, and mechanisms of the security system in
the hemisphere.
All these treaties and declarations constitute the legal framework on which a better
American security system can be constructed, but the main precondition for achieving
it is that norms evolve in harmony with events. In that sense, it is urgent to review this
regulatory framework and to adapt it to the current and future security and defense
needs of the continent, thus building a truly cooperative system of regional security
3
that can provide effective answers to the new threats to peace and continental stability.
Suitable operation of that system will require the determined support of the participating states.
Objectives
The Objectives of Regional Security.
• To prevent the security of the hemisphere from being affected by the new threats,
concerns, and other diverse challenges, countering them by political, diplomatic,
and defense means
• To contribute to the strengthening of organs, institutions, and mechanisms of the
inter-American system, as well as subregional elements
• To collaborate, with the creation of an atmosphere of confidence among member
states
• To contribute to the strengthening of democracy in the hemisphere, favoring
cooperative action by various national organizations and, in some cases, the private
sector and civil society.
The Objectives of Regional Defense.
• To establish and operate multinational military organizations that can act against
the new threats in a timely and forceful way
• To control maritime and aerospace areas of common interest, establishing efficient
systems of intelligence to ensure access and the interchange of timely and accurate
information
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• To establish cooperative mechanisms to contribute to the collective defense effort
and thereby improve regional security.
Regional Maritime Strategy
Strategic Assumptions.
• The new threats cannot be resolved by negotiation.
• The most effective way to fight the new threats is direct, rapid, and timely military
intervention.
• Political instability and the resource limitations of some countries represent a
danger to the effective operation of a cooperative security system in the region.
• The new threats will continue to use maritime means to pursue their activities.
• Combined multinational operations will be handicapped by different degrees of
recruitment and training of forces from country to country, as well as by
technological differences among them.
Strategy. In order to fight effectively against the new threats in the maritime domain,
it will be necessary to employ a regional or continental security model that provides for
carrying out multinational combined operations. This system will be based on the following concepts.
An atmosphere of confidence and true commitment: it is essential to discover new channels of information exchange and mutual support among the participating navies,
which can reduce technological differences, establish common operational doctrines,
standardize procedures, and make communications equipment compatible, as well as
develop capabilities of mutual logistic support. These factors will make it easier to
identify and fight against the new threats.
A multinational combined task force: the characteristics of the new threats and the difficulty of identifying them create situations of uncertainty and crisis in the maritime
domain that require a response by means of the proper use of the force. For that reason, it will be necessary to have a very versatile task organization, one that ensures a
rapid and effective response. This organization would be formed by multinational and
combined forces, directed from associated command posts, under the authority of a
temporary or permanent task force commander, as merited by the situation.
The multinational forces would need great capability for reaction and flexibility, and
for rapid deployment, nationally and internationally. Forces of this kind provide an initial and urgent answer to collective security because they are standby organizations,
capable of being mobilized on short notice for specific emergencies. Their high
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mobility and readiness allow them to be in the zone of conflict in a short time, able to
engage in time to neutralize a threat.
For this to be carried out, each member country of the system should contribute a certain quantity and type of units to carry out the tasks and operations required, ready in
their home ports to incorporate themselves into task organizations in a relatively short
time. Task organizations would be formed in regions, as described below, and the forces
would be classified according to their degrees of availability.
This initiative will stimulate greater regional security cooperation, supporting a professional dialogue in which the authorities of the various countries can take part, in strict
compliance with the legal framework in force. It will also have an impact at the
national level, stimulating the modernization and standardization of units and all their
systems. All that will have an obvious impact on national naval organizations, which
will have to adopt more agile and flexible structures and maintain a high level of training and versatility so as to act in different scenarios and fulfill diverse missions.
As for the operational level, effective integration will have to be arranged, starting with
the establishment of a multinational combined staff. This will encourage a common
defense culture and allow development of doctrine and strategy accepted by all the
states.
Also, the proposed structure will adjust the unique capabilities of each navy and
improve interoperability of systems and national capabilities to harmonize logistics. In
a cooperative regional security effort, lack of interoperability among navies can diminish the quality of the multinational task organization. In order to avoid this negative
result, it will be necessary to reduce technological disparities, as well as to adapt and
standardize doctrines, techniques, and operational procedures, stressing continuous
and high levels of training.
Facing new threats can imply situations of crisis or conflict, which require the development of specific strategic concepts, such as
• Dissuasion, through the demonstration of real capabilities during the systematic
training of a force that is suitable in structure and magnitude.
• Containment, carrying out permanent surveillance and maritime patrol operations.
• Interdiction and cooperation: patrolling and monitoring operations in the maritime
domain in coordination with other governmental organizations, as well as
implementing plans of maritime interdiction at subregional levels, with the
objective of achieving effective control of areas of interest, which must always be
within the national and international legal framework in force.
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• A cooperative regional security system: taking into account the extent of the concept
and the great number of actors involved, we consider that a cooperative regional
security system must be organized into five subregions, each one assuming control
of a maritime area. Each subregion will establish its own organization reflecting the
capabilities of the forces involved, receiving the support of other subregions if the
situation deserves.
A security architecture founded upon and developed from a subregional perspective
will be flexible, modular, cooperative, and collective. Navies with greater means will
act in one or more subregions, collaborating in the protection of areas of common
interest.
SUBREGIONS

COUNTRIES

Southern South America

Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay

Andean Region

Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru

Central America and Mexico

Central America and Mexico

Caribbean

Caribbean island nations and environs and Venezuela

North America

United States and Canada

Subregions as established by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS).

• Compatible information technologies: in order to facilitate horizontal integration of
intelligence, monitoring, and naval reconnaissance (IMR) platforms compatible
information technologies should be employed that allow appropriate and efficient
command and control. The characteristics of the new threats make it necessary to
reduce technological disparities in order to establish a means of timely exchange of
information among the institutions responsible for control of areas of interest in
real time.
Necessary Tools or Means
These means include treaties and regional security agreements, and economic
resources. The member states of the system will have to use their respective budgetary
resources efficiently as well as the contributions they might receive from international
cooperation so that their respective naval forces can reach the desired levels of mobility
and flexibility.
Human and Material Resources. The member states of the system will target these resources on achieving the levels of recruitment and compatibility of equipment required
by the system.
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Information Technology. Timely and reliable information will be the key to success of
operations carried out by the system. This will demand not only effective intelligence
operations and adequate exchange of information but also technological compatibility
in systems and equipment.
Limited Resources. Just as with individuals, governments often must reach national
goals that exceed the resources available. All countries must choose among competing
needs and alternatives that are mutually exclusive. The armed forces compete for resources with many other governmental entities, especially when no serious threat to the
national security is perceived. It is then important to emphasize that the degree of investment in security and national defense is in direct proportion to the society’s perception of the threats it has to confront.
Conclusions
Regional maritime strategy will contribute to consolidating a cooperative system of
regional security that allows an effective response to the disruption of peace and international stability and to new threats of a transnational character. It is not the perfect
solution, because it requires the participation of many regional actors to obtain a total
solution; nevertheless, it can strengthen a cooperative regional security system.
Security cooperation is complicated and diverse, and each country assigns a specific
weight to it, according to its perception of the threat and its own circumstances. Maritime strategy seeks unified criteria that can stimulate cooperation and mutual support.
It is essential to create, develop, and maintain processes of mutual confidence in the
face of new threats; otherwise, obstacles will arise in the treatment of sensitive matters
that could put at risk the achievement of the intended strategic goals.
Strategy depends on the commitment of the countries involved in it. The political will
of states to fight against new threats will be a determining factor in getting agreements.
The willingness of states and navies to contribute the material and human resources
that naval forces embody, as well as other economic resources that contribute to lasting
peace in the region, will flow from this political disposition.
Making equipment compatible, along with ensuring efficient and timely exchange of
information, is the key to the success of these operations. The great challenge is to
achieve the compatibility of information technologies required for suitable and efficient command and control.
Resources are always limited, especially budgetary ones. In this context, what is
assigned by the countries to regional security in the context of the dichotomy of
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security versus social expenditure will be a limitation that must be considered for any
joint operation against the new common threats.
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CHAPTER TWELVE

Grey on Grey
The Critical Partnership between the Canadian and
U.S. Navies
D R . JA M E S B OU T I L I E R , C A NA D I A N NAV Y

The Canadian Navy is a midsized navy. It consists of three Iroquois-class destroyers,
twelve Halifax-class guided-missile frigates, two tankers, four Victoria-class conventional submarines, and twelve coastal defense vessels, all of which are supplemented by
a modest array of helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft.
Born the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) on 4 May 1910, the Navy was, in many ways, a
product of the Royal Navy (RN). The infant, seagoing service embraced RN culture and
remained a de facto subset of the Royal Navy until World War II, when it began to drift
into the gravitational field of another great navy, the U.S. Navy (USN).
During the Cold War the RCN (and after 1968, the Canadian Navy) became more and
more profoundly influenced by the USN. Being a small navy, the Canadian Navy
sought from the outset to leverage its way upward in the councils of power by exploiting niche capabilities. Thus, during World War II it became, perforce, an antisubmarine
navy, hunting and destroying German U-boats in the North Atlantic. It maintained
that capability and reputation thereafter, seeking to function as a partner to larger
navies. This paper explores the growth of what is, arguably, the most intimate naval
relationship anywhere in the world, namely, the relationship between the Canadian
Navy and the U.S. Navy. How did it come into existence, what are its characteristics,
and how is it likely to develop?
The contemporary Canadian Navy is in some respects an accident of history. While the
Navy’s destroyers and tankers were commissioned in the 1970s, the frigates were built
in the 1980s and delivered in the 1990s. Thus, they are Cold War vessels that entered
service in a post–Cold War world. It is extraordinarily unlikely that any Canadian government would have authorized such a class of muscular, elegant, long-range warships
in the penurious 1990s.
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What made the frigates even more valuable was the fact that the twelve coastal defense
vessels entered service at very much the same time, freeing up the larger vessels for
blue-water deployments. These serendipitous developments were compounded by a
decision to amend the traditional disposition of Canadian naval assets in recognition
of the growing importance of the Pacific Ocean. Prior to the mid-1990s, roughly 70
percent of the Canadian Navy had been stationed in Halifax. This was hardly surprising
in view of the imperatives of antisubmarine warfare in the Atlantic, not to mention the
institutional ties that linked Canada with NATO and Halifax’s 250-year association
with sea power.
The west coast of Canada, by way of contrast, was seen as remote from the Cold War
contest and as best suited for training. This perception began to change after the fall of
the Berlin Wall. Defense and foreign-policy white papers in 1994 highlighted the growing importance of Asia (transpacific trade having surpassed transatlantic trade in 1983)
and enjoined the Canadian Forces to engage Asia more closely. The Canadian Navy was
the obvious vehicle for doing so, and ships were transferred from Maritime Forces
Atlantic (MARLANT) in Halifax to Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC) in Esquimalt,
British Columbia.
However, equality was not achieved. The Navy’s overall disposition remained asymmetric, with roughly 55 percent of the fleet based in Halifax. Tradition, the Navy’s administrative structure, NATO commitments, and the abundance of repair facilities argued
persuasively in favor of this east-coast weighting. This paper, however, focuses on the
Pacific, because it was in that ocean that partnering between the Canadian Navy and
the USN reached unexpected heights.
To begin with, the sheer scale of the Pacific and the lack of an institutional framework
like NATO placed a premium on cooperation in that ocean. A Canadian-U.S. agreement allocated the northeastern quadrant of the Pacific to the commander of
MARPAC in the event of war. At the same time, training areas in southern California
were ideally suited for destroyer and frigate crews eager to escape from the cold and
turbulent winter seas of the North Pacific.
Some would have argued that the presence of firing ranges, missile telemetry, and logistical facilities in the Esquimalt–San Diego–Pearl Harbor triangle discouraged more
demanding long-range deployments. Nevertheless, in the mid-to-late 1990s this argument began to lose its validity, and MARPAC ships were committed to a regular schedule of deployments to Hawaiian waters for the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)
exercises and beyond to Northeast and Southeast Asia for the purposes of naval
diplomacy.
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The frigates, by virtue of their “long legs,” were ideally suited for these deployments. It
would be misleading to imply that the Canadian Navy was operating very much on its
own, because the late 1990s saw a steady deepening of technological cooperation
between the Canadian Navy and the USN, particularly in the C4ISR realms. This cooperation was due in no small part to the vision and boldness of flag officers in the USN
who realized not only that their navy was shrinking in size (and, like the Royal Navy of
pre–World War I fame, needed support from friends and allies) but also that there was
a multiplier effect inherent in common operating systems and in information/intelligence sharing. This was not, of course, a risk-free strategy at a time when the confidence of the American defense and intelligence establishments had been rocked by the
lethal security breaches associated with the Walkers, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen.
Nonetheless, a deep reservoir of trust existed between the two naval communities after
half a century of working together, and it was decided to elevate the partnership to a
new level.
At first this involved Canadian warships supplementing vessels in U.S. carrier battle
groups (CVBGs) or surface action groups (SAGs). This meant months of arduous
workups and prolonged deployments to the Persian Gulf and north Arabian Sea. In
many ways, that was easier said than done. While the American and Canadian naval
cultures were broadly similar, there were technological and organizational impediments to cooperation.
The USN is the most technologically advanced navy in the world, and any navy opting
to act as a partner must make its communications suite congruent with American
equipment. This is a major challenge, because technology is changing so fast that small
navies must sustain considerable and ongoing expenses to remain abreast of the USN.
The practical outcome of this adaptive process is that ships tend to be “laddered” technologically—that is to say, the most recent deployer with a CVBG or SAG will be fully
modernized while her sister ships are in various stages of technological regression. For
better or for worse, the USN appears to be in no hurry to slow the pace of modernization for the purpose of benefiting smaller partners.
These technological challenges, primarily in the world of C4ISR, are only the tip of the
iceberg, in the sense that communications compatibility is only the first step toward
full partnership. An equally compelling challenge is informational interoperability.
Thus, data from certain sources or judged to be of a certain sensitivity will rapidly
(some non-American and even American observers would suggest that the process is
too rapid and comprehensive) be labeled “NOFORN,” so that no non-U.S. nationals
can gain access to it. Fortunately for the Canadians, this prohibition has begun to wane
after years of close and highly effective collaboration. But access is still not
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untrammeled, and, paradoxically, Canadian naval commanders often find themselves
barring the further dissemination of data to other coalition partners because the latter
do not share the inestimable advantages of being part of the “Four Eyes” community of
Britain, Australia, Canada, and the United States.
Deployments to the Indian Ocean area present a challenge of a different sort—the tyranny of distance. Frigates or destroyers deploying to the north Arabian Sea to join
Coalition Task Force 150, a force dedicated to prosecuting the war on terrorism, find
themselves taking thirty-five to forty days to take up station. Depending on the circumstances, their passage could be in company with a carrier battle group, but frequently it
is on their own. Either situation permits the honing of seafaring and warfighting skills
but cuts heavily into the time remaining for service on station.
There is, nonetheless, a positive dimension to these global deployments, in the sense
that ships’ tracks usually take them close to preferred destinations for naval diplomacy
and exercises, like Australia, Singapore, or India. In fact, in February 2007 HMCS
Ottawa, transiting out of the Persian Gulf area, stopped off the west coast of India to
take part with her American and Indian counterparts in Exercise MALABAR.
In the post-9/11 era, Canadian Navy and USN cooperation intensified. In the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center/Pentagon attacks, the Canadian Navy had four
east- and west-coast vessels on station in the north Arabian Sea. This was clearly an
unsustainable level of participation, and gradually the number of Canadian warships
was scaled back. Nonetheless, over the years the Canadian Navy has deployed every one
of its major surface combatants to the Indian Ocean, in some cases twice.
This has meant, among other things, that the Canadian Navy has had to develop elaborate, worldwide supply and repair chains—no mean feat for a midsized navy. On the
other side of the coin, Canadian naval personnel have gained access to hugely impressive situational-awareness systems while in theater. Arguably, the greatest contributions
to coalition warfare came in two disparate spheres: the role of Canadian commodores
as deputy task force commanders and the role of Canadian ships’ companies hailing or
boarding hundreds of vessels for seagoing inspections.
Another post-9/11 phenomenon is related to Maritime Domain Awareness. The conservative, far-flung, and private (not to say secretive) world of commercial shipping has
long defied the sort of comprehensive informational mastery that we associate with air
travel, where every major airliner is tracked on its scheduled course. No such knowledge exists with respect to ship movements, particularly at a time when those movements are increasing dramatically in number as a consequence of ever-accelerating
globalization. Maritime Domain Awareness—the achievement of a comprehensive
understanding of worldwide ship movements—involves not only technical tracking
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devices but also collaborative inter- and intra-agency cooperation. This is a challenge
in the maritime realm, because, typically, so many government departments have mandates that cover the waterfront or extend out to sea.
While cooperation between the Canadian Navy and the USN has long been close, it has
become equally close in recent years between the Canadian Navy and the various U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG) districts. Unfortunately, the concept of a seamless continental
security presence is particularly difficult to achieve because of the lack of cultural congruence between the U.S. Coast Guard and its Canadian counterpart. Whereas the
USCG constitutes one of the largest armed naval forces in the world, the Canadian
Coast Guard is a modest-sized, unionized merchant marine service content to observe
and report on vessels of interest and maritime threats.
Another challenge thrown up by the global war on terror (GWOT) is the tension
between the “home” and “away” games—a debate over the most appropriate utilization
of national naval forces, one that has a direct impact on partnership between the Canadian Navy and the USN. While the U.S. Navy can concede coastal security to the USCG,
the Canadian Navy does not enjoy that luxury, for the reasons just outlined.
Instead, there is or has been a debate in some quarters as to whether the Canadian Navy
should confine itself to patrolling Canada’s national waters at the expense of longrange naval diplomacy, exercising, and coalition endeavors—the so-called Away Game.
This either-or representation was pleasing at the journalistic level but facile when it
came to addressing the complexity of maritime threats.
Fortunately, this false dichotomy appears to have been set aside as politicians and policy makers have come to realize that the Home Game concept is altogether too parochial as a strategy. Influencing the points of origin of international threats is clearly a
priority and can best be achieved with global deployments. Global deployments also
permit the Canadian Navy to fulfill Canada’s commitments to the Proliferation Security Initiative, one of a number of post-9/11 regulatory initiatives designed to strike at
the roots of terrorism and at the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their
component parts.
More recently—that is to say, in 2006—the concept of naval partnership was further
refined and advanced with the USN’s articulation of the “thousand-ship navy” concept.
This concept has two drivers, one practical and one principled. As Professor Paul Kennedy of Yale University has observed, Western navies appear to be in decline while
Asian navies are on the rise. This thesis certainly holds true for the Royal Navy and the
USN; the latter, the world’s greatest navy, has been halved, numerically, since the mid1980s. One can argue that the naval vessels currently in service are more sophisticated,
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far reaching, and lethal than their predecessors, but the fact remains that a single
destroyer cannot be in two locations at the same time.
This quantitative reduction might be that much more bearable if America’s global
commitments were not on the rise. But they are, and this reality has given rise to what
Kennedy has called, in another context, “imperial overstretch.” In practice, the situation
is reminiscent of the one confronting the Royal Navy on the eve of World War I, when
in desperation the Admiralty turned to the dominions seeking contributions of men
and materiel for a Grand Fleet facing the mounting threat posed by the German High
Seas Fleet. A century later, the USN is seeking to bridge the gap between ends and
means by appealing to the maritime fraternity to share the burden of maintaining
peace and good order at sea.
There is, of course, a further motivation, one that derives from a realization that the
oceans are the world’s last great commons and that it is incumbent on all seafaring
communities to embrace that principle. Here again, the long-standing partnership
between the Canadian Navy and the USN comes into play. The exercise of that partnership is not a luxury but an imperative, particularly at a time when the Indo-Pacific
region has begun to exhibit a troubling degree of brittleness at sea.
Of course, the fact that Canadian warships have first supplemented American CVBGs,
SAGs, and related formations and then replaced U.S. naval vessels within these formations does not necessarily mean that Canada can sustain that partnership in every circumstance. Clearly, the Canadian Navy has not been party to the war in Iraq, even if, in
practice, there may be a fine line between tracking vessels as part of the GWOT and
tracking vessels that may turn out to have some association, on closer examination,
with hostile elements in Iraq. The same is true when it comes to Taiwan or North
Korea. Canadian ships might be working up in Asian waters with their American counterparts, but it would be highly unlikely that they would remain in the company of
those USN vessels in the event of hostilities associated with Taiwan or North Korea.
The ultimate determination would come in the form of a cabinet decision in Ottawa,
and the most likely scenario would see Canadian warships standing away on their own.
In other instances the Canadian Navy/USN partnership is constrained by third-party
considerations. Thus, while there is an increasingly close relationship between the
Canadian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), complete with
goodwill exercises and navy-to-navy talks, Japan’s concerns about collective security
have, until recently at least, inhibited that nation from engaging in robust naval exercises with the Canadian Navy or in Canadian Navy/U.S. Navy/JMSDF exercises.
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One of the great advantages that the Canadian Navy enjoys is its common ground with
such navies as the JMSDF, the South Korean navy, and the Royal Australian Navy, in the
sense that they all have long-standing associations with the USN. That said, the Canadian Navy is entirely without historical or ideological baggage and thus is perfectly situated to be a partner for these other midpower navies.
Nevertheless, partnership will be increasingly difficult to achieve as the Canadian Navy
enters a period of extensive recapitalization in which long-serving warships will be
taken out of the line pending replacement and others will be sidelined for midlife refits.
Thus, the Canadian Navy is entering a particularly demanding period in which the
transformation of the Canadian Forces, the demands associated with campaigning in
Afghanistan, and the expenses and dislocations associated with revitalizing the fleet
will have the effect of qualifying the Navy’s overall effectiveness at the very moment
when advancing maritime partnerships in general, and with the USN in particular, represent a national imperative.
By virtue of its size, history, and location, the Canadian Navy has always been a niche
navy. It has come to the table in times of peace and war with an array of talents
designed to enhance the overall effectiveness of naval coalitions. From the outset, the
RCN, and then the Canadian Navy, has been a blue-water naval force. The centripetal
and parochial forces at work in Canada might very well have dictated otherwise, but
the Canadian Navy’s long association with the world’s greatest imperial navies ensured
that blue-water aspirations were an inherent part of the Canadian naval experience.
These two phenomena—the niche-navy reality and the blue-water legacy—when taken
together have ensured that the Canadian Navy is the quintessential naval partner. This
was certainly the case during the Cold War, with the NATO Standing Naval Force
Atlantic, and it has remained the case in the post–Cold War era, in which the association between the Canadian Navy and the U.S. Navy has matured and deepened on a
global scale, to the mutual benefit of all who put to sea.

Note
The views presented in this paper are those of the author only and do not represent the official policy
of Canada’s Department of National Defence.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Cooperation on National Security
Toward a New Hemispheric Security System
C A P TA I N JA M E S T H O R N B E R RY S C H I A N TA R E L L I , PE RU V I A N NAV Y
C O LON E L C É S A R AGU I R R E ROD R Í G U E Z , PE RU V I A N A I R FO RC E
C A P TA I N LU I S GA RC Í A BA R R I O N U EVO, PE RU V I A N NAV Y

In a changing world, the twenty-first century begins with an overwhelming reality, that
while the United States consolidates its position as a leading power, many Latin American countries are still immersed in their usual political and social turbulence. The fact
is that all these countries share a continent with the world’s premier superpower, but
diverse ideological currents, as well as divergent visions, make it difficult to operate
jointly against common threats.
It is undeniable that these threats exist, but it is also certain that each state reacts in its
own way, according to its particular perception of the threats. Nevertheless, all the
states ought to equip themselves with the necessary means and resources to provide a
suitable level of security to their citizens, developing their potentials in a free and balanced way and in a social and economically stable atmosphere. This also demands that
they be ready to defend their corresponding interests effectively against actors who can
threaten them.
Unfortunately, this scheme does not seem to be responding to the challenges posed by
the new security threats, which to a great extent are transnational and asymmetrical in
nature. These threats include terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental pollution, illegal immigration, illegal arms trafficking, smuggling, piracy, proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and the overexploitation of natural resources. With the panorama
posed as it is, it is increasingly necessary that states act in a cooperative way so they can
defend themselves against these new threats. This reality leads us to identify interests
and common objectives in the realm of security and defense, and it is there that our
continent would seem to confront its greatest difficulties.
So, although in October 2003 the countries belonging to the Organization of American
States (OAS) committed themselves to working “to revitalize and strengthen the
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organs, institutions and mechanisms of the inter-American system related to the various aspects of hemispheric security to achieve greater coordination and cooperation . . . to meet the traditional threats, as well as the new threats, concerns and other
challenges to hemispheric security,” specifically the matter has advanced very little.1 An
example of that is the low effectiveness of the system of hemispheric defense and its
mechanisms of action—so low that in practice it can be considered nonexistent. This
generates continuous questions by the countries that are members of the OAS.
Analysis of Threats
Situation
After the demise of the Soviet Union and with it the main promoter of communism,
the Western countries had to redirect their security schemes, because until then their
multilateral and regional defense organizations had been founded on the assumption
that communist influence would be manifested in direct conflict. In this sense, for
more than forty-five years, defense doctrines of the main powers were focused on symmetrical threats with conventional and nuclear capabilities, taking into account the
possibility of using chemical and bacteriologic weapons. In our continent, this kind of
threat was represented by Cuba and the leftist movements that opted for armed struggle. In parallel, several Latin American countries experienced border disputes that, to a
greater or lesser extent, prevented them from consolidating a scheme of cooperative
security.
The disappearance of the communist threat eliminated one of the main arguments for
the operation of the system of hemispheric security and again brought into the arena
old disagreements and mistrust, which are still reflected today in the documents related
to security generated in the OAS and in other regional and subregional forums. In fact,
in spite of the effort undertaken by heads of state and ministers of foreign affairs and
defense, the American continent has not consolidated its mechanisms for peaceful
2
solution of controversies as foreseen by the Bogotá Pact. Although these mechanisms
have performed successfully in some cases, those rare exceptions were due to the intervention of extracontinental mechanisms, such as arbitration or the International Court
3
of Justice.
The new threats today hanging over the continent are not absolutely new but now have
a size and extent that transcends state borders. Problems like terrorism that previously
were concentrated in the territory of some countries and were promoted generally by
radical, Marxist-style political ideologies have given way to true criminal organizations
funded by illegal activities and extending from country to country according to their
needs for funding. In that sense, threats to security that formerly were the
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responsibility of each state have been superseded by a complex network of organized
crime that has consolidated for economic reasons and that often hides behind apparently lawful businesses. This situation is intensified by poverty and social exclusion and
often exceeds the capability of states to counter the threat it poses without the support
of other countries of the region.
In spite of the complexity of these security problems, the Western Hemisphere constitutes one of the minor risk zones of conflict in the world, so that the focus of attention
of the United States is centered on other areas. North Korea, Iran, China, India, and
Russia are given ever-greater attention as potential threats to North American interests,
and most of the defense efforts are focused upon them, with understandably less attention paid to this continent. Not even the turn to the left of some governments or the
clearly anti-American rhetoric of some of their leaders has changed this situation.
What does seem to worry the United States to a greater extent is the possibility that
new threats could overflow and unbalance the region and finally affect its interests.
Projection
This situation permits us to see that in the middle term the threats currently hanging
over the hemisphere are gaining ground in the face of the incapacity of states to counter them. In this scenario, it is possible that drug trafficking could extend its networks
of influence through corruption, using funds obtained through drug trafficking and
money laundering. Also, it could support solidarity movements of cocaine, marijuana,
and poppy farmers that could possibly become political groups of great influence in
countries like Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. Also, one can imagine that the
means for transferring narcotics to the markets of the United States and Europe will
continue evolving to adjust to law enforcement measures, adopting any and all means
to get the merchandise to its destination.
For that reason, no country can be considered safe from the influence of drug trafficking by virtue of not being a producer of the raw material, because a great part of the
activity of the large trafficking organizations is carried out in nonproducing countries.
In the same way, the growth of links between drug-trafficking organizations and violent groups is considered likely, with the purpose of carrying out actions as “smoke
screens” to distract the local authorities. International terrorism will find this atmosphere of confusion a fertile field for preparing or even mounting its attacks.
Other illegal activities, like piracy, illegal trafficking of people, and arms smuggling,
will continue to threaten the security of countries of the region. One cannot rule out
the possibility that a future outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East or in Asia could
force countries of this hemisphere to take a position with respect to it. This possibility
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could bring threats to the region and reinforce the need for a cooperative security system to deal with them.
Scenarios
One could imagine a series of specific scenarios that, if analyzed, could provide insights
into how to organize to protect security interests.
Pessimistic. In this scenario, the increasing openness of Asian markets, especially the
Chinese, produces an increase in drug demand, impacting illicit drug trafficking of the
region proportionately. This effect generates greater activity by the armed groups operating with drug traffickers, leading them to take control of broader territories in the
countries in which drugs are produced, in the Andean area and in Central America.
This situation generates a spiral of violence, causing social chaos and serious problems
of governability, spreading over borders into neighboring countries.
Probable. In this scenario, new threats continue operating in the entire region but are
concentrated in the countries where drugs are produced. Other countries are affected
by drug trafficking as suppression compels the dealers to vary their means and traditional routes. The unsafe situation within the region continues due to the mobilization
of criminals and to their funding, which in many cases exceeds that of security and law
enforcement agencies. Other criminal groups take advantage of these favorable conditions to continue operating.
Optimistic. In a final scenario, drug trafficking is reduced as a consequence of suppression measures implemented in the hemisphere. This situation induces the drug
traffickers to find new areas in Asia, to which they transfer their cultivation fields and
processing laboratories. Declining incomes reduce the activities of violent criminal
groups linked to drug trafficking. The need to work jointly to fight these threats is reduced, allowing each country to control illegal activities within its territory.
System of Hemispheric Security
Situation
The system of hemispheric security was born with the creation of the Inter-American
Defense Board (JID) in 1942 and was fortified with the signing of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) in 1947 and with the creation of the InterAmerican Defense College (CID) in 1962. Nevertheless, and in spite of more than a
half-century of operation, the system has not been totally consolidated. For example,
the Organization of American States never organized the Advisory Defense Committee,
established in its charter “to advise the Organ of Consultation on problems of military
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cooperation that may arise in connection with the application of existing special treaties on collective security.”4
In 2006, by virtue of a decision of the General Assembly of OAS adopted in 1994, JID
became an organ of technical, consultative, and educational advice on military and
defense subjects in the hemisphere, under the auspices of the Hemispheric Security
Commission and the General Assembly. In this way, the hemispheric defense system
has been entirely subordinated to the power legitimately constituted by the members of
the OAS. Nevertheless, in spite of the multiple statements and documents intended to
articulate common measures to face the new threats, the system still lacks a truly functional structure that allows it to make decisions, define goals, establish strategies, and
above all, define and execute the necessary actions to fight against threats jointly.
Projection
The three scenarios on the possible evolution of the threats demonstrate the necessity
of a cooperative security system at the hemispheric level. In any of the cases posited we
must consider that the threats described as “new” are in fact problems that have existed
for a long time but that in recent years have acquired importance and have exceeded
the capability of states acting alone. For that reason, it is clear that even though in an
optimistic scenario the threats could recede, they could resurge at any moment. In the
other two scenarios (probable and pessimistic), the need to articulate an effective
system becomes even more urgent.
Certainly, the effectiveness of the hemispheric defense system depends to a great extent
on the political will of its member countries, because without appropriate support of
that kind, every effort will be reduced merely to good intentions. For that reason, to
advance along the long path toward obtaining this political support, it is essential to
look for points of consensus and to establish the bases upon which to redefine the current hemispheric defense system. This process must be undertaken through an objective appreciation of threats, an effort to depoliticize the regional agenda to avoid
differences or pending disputes that would prevent the achievement of concrete
agreements.
The system of hemispheric security must be an instrument of operational cooperation
and not just a forum for discussion or an instrument to impose the will of one over
another. This mechanism must be redesigned so as to deal with the threats that exceed
the capabilities of individual states or transcend national borders.
This process must be made on the basis of mutual confidence. As pointed out by
Hernán Patiño Mayer, first chairman of the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security of the OAS, confidence building is one of the fundamental characteristics of a
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cooperative security model. The reconfiguration of the security system must be pursued in a progressive but effective way; it will be necessary to elaborate a program
considering specific phases and actions until it is totally operational as a regional
organism. Although it must be totally subordinated to the legitimate civil power of
the member states, it must be nonpolitical in character and solely operational in
nature.
Additionally, taking into account that participation must be always free and voluntary,
the system must consider the possibility that some of the members may participate
only in a limited way or even refrain from doing so when they decide not to or when
their internal situation does not allow it. In the same way, because we are dealing with a
cooperative system, it is essential to respect the sovereignty of the member countries,
for which reason not including certain zones within the system must be considered if
countries require that. In the same way, national forces must have priority for acting
within their territories, reserving multinational intervention for exceptional and clearly
defined cases and circumstances. Remarking on a cooperative security system, Randall
Caroline Forsberg, chief executive officer of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament
Studies, asserts that “in general, a cooperative security system would cause the world to
6
embark on the way leading to the end of the war.”
Scenarios
In the middle term, there are three possible scenarios with respect to the scope of cooperation and hemispheric security.
Pessimistic. The outlook is complicated. Governability problems and disparities among
states, linked to extreme national positions and the resurgence of old disputes, preclude
reaching a minimum level of agreement on cooperative security measures. Each state
deals with threats according to its particular vision and with its own means.
Probable. Most of the governments are conscious that the threats are transnational and
that they need to act together, but the disparate positions of some states and the lack of
political will to specify intentions confine them to statements of a general character, without agreeing on binding instruments, leaving most of the actions to bilateral, situational
agreements encompassing only isolated and incomplete efforts to deal with threats.
Optimistic. The states of the hemisphere choose to face the threats jointly, articulating
a genuinely operational system of cooperative security with the capacity to face these
threats in a continuous (nonsituational) way, with a continental focus that contributes
to the consolidation of democracy and governability in the middle and long terms.
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Proposal for the Redesign of the Hemispheric Security System
Previous Phases
As has been mentioned, the redesign of the hemispheric security system requires a
political decision to carry it out and a depoliticized process to define its scope of action
and the threats it is to face, as well as a structure and the parameters within which it is
to develop. Obviously, its operation will be subordinated to the legitimate power of
states and will be situated within the framework of absolute respect for the sovereignty
of member countries and the rights of individuals. In that sense, as a basis for the redesign of the current system of hemispheric defense, it is necessary to achieve the
following stages:
• Solution of all the pending controversies between the member states using peaceful
means and proactive action by the OAS over a term of ten years
• Identification of common threats, accepted by consensus, so that they are not
subject to particular policy perspectives of governments or states
• Establishment of concrete (nonpolitical) security objectives that reflect the concerns
of most of the countries of the region
• Elaboration of mechanisms to obtain consensus and commitment of countries of
the Americas to participation in a cooperative security system
• Redesign of the current system of hemispheric security in order to make the
structure truly functional and effective.
Proposed Structure
The system of hemispheric security must be developed on the basis of four levels that
define, on the one hand, its relation with the member states and the control by governments of the activities that such a system develops, and on the other hand, that determine objectives, plans, and actions to deal with threats effectively (see figure).
Political Level. This level is represented by the Hemispheric Security Council, constituted by the heads of state of the hemisphere or their representatives (ministers of foreign affairs or defense), the highest-level organ of the system.
Strategic Level. The current Hemispheric Security Commission would reinforce its organization and empanel a hemispheric staff that would advise on strategic planning for
the system. The operation must be separated from all political connotations and be focused on achieving consensus directly related to cooperative security.
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STRUCTURE OF T HE HEMISPHERIC SECURITY SYSTEM
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Operational Level. This level would be addressed by the current Inter-American Defense Board, which would be adjusted structurally to perform the functions the Hemispheric Security Commission would assign it, which would be strictly operational in
character. The board would be under direct control of the commission and would have
a directive body of a civil nature, assisted by an operational staff.
Tactical Level. Represented by specific operational commands, this level would be activated or deactivated by command of the operational level, depending on the situation,
and maintaining a flexible structure to fit specific situations and permit economy of
effort and resources.
Conclusions
• The new threats to hemispheric security assume to a great extent a transnational
and asymmetric character, and the probable scenario for their evolution
demonstrates the need to act in a cooperative way at the level of the Americas to
defend the common interest.
• The current system of hemispheric security is moribund and without any real
capacity to face new or traditional threats.
• The possibility of creating a truly effective system of hemispheric security will
depend on the political commitment of the member countries.
• Once the appropriate political decision is made, it will be necessary to carry out a
depoliticized process to define the scope of action of the hemispheric security
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system and the threats to be opposed, as well as the system’s structure and the
parameters in which it will be developed.
• The hemispheric security system must be developed jointly among the states and
controlled by legitimately constituted authorities.
• The hemispheric security system must be constituted as a regional organism, with a
nonpolitical character and totally operational nature.
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Final Thoughts
The papers in this volume present a variety of approaches, perspectives, and national
attitudes. What strikes the reader above all, though, is the strong tendency among them
toward consensus on essentials. Perhaps this result was predictable. Men and women of
the sea and those who reflect their commitment to the maritime domain invariably
find that their shared experiences drive them toward common perceptions and cooperation. This may begin as a primordial urge to protect fellow mariners from perils at sea,
but it rapidly extends to an appreciation for the potential of the oceans to provide for
mankind through the bounty of the sea itself or by the improvements in well-being
that flow from international commerce. Accordingly, men and women of the sea are
drawn together when they see threats to fisheries or to the environment, and they feel
an urge to work with one another when they perceive attempts to use the seas to
endanger life anywhere in the world.
Several common themes run through the essays.
Enduring Interests in the Maritime Domain
Rear Admiral Martínez stresses the importance of the sea, reminding the reader that
two-thirds of all states are coastal states, that most people live near the sea, that the
overwhelming portion of international trade is transported on the oceans, and that
waterborne trade has been growing rapidly. Globalization, according to Captain Del
Alamo and his colleagues, has, by increasing the commercial and financial interchanges
among countries, only increased the importance of the oceans. Admiral Niemann
states flatly that Chile’s prosperity can grow only in an environment of stability, security, and respect for international law.
In his essay, Captain Sidders reminds readers that interests at sea go far beyond commerce. Scientific exploration and technological development are essential activities,
and protection of human life and the environment are too. Captain Teixeira Martins
reminds the reader that while 90 percent of world trade travels by sea, a significant
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portion of oil and gas is also produced at sea and, therefore, economic expansion and
stability depend on a secure maritime environment.
New Threats and Traditional Challenges
Rear Admiral Martínez sees a paradigm change in maritime strategy since the end of the
Cold War. He argues that maritime strategy “no longer exists merely to fight and win
wars at sea.” Instead, maritime strategy should be redesigned along cooperative lines
“with a view to consolidating peace, cooperation, and security in . . . maritime areas.”
Addressing another change in the international environment, Captain Del Alamo and
his colleagues argue that terrorist attacks on 9/11 and since represent a new international threat, from which Peru and other countries of the region are not exempt. Similarly, illegal trafficking in drugs and radioactive materials pose new transnational
threats. Frequently, they note, these threats are asymmetrical; therefore they demand
imaginative, new responses.
Furthermore, if nobody knows for certain who will be the probable enemy, according
to Admiral Balaresque and his colleagues, changes in the international environment
will always be very difficult to confront. They observe that many Latin American countries do not consider state terrorism a real menace. In most cases, it is considered an
internal problem where only the state security organisms must act—a view that
expressly denies the employment or even the cooperation of the armed forces.
Professor Möller and her associates judge that the particular features of emerging threats
tend to exceed the capacities that states develop individually to neutralize the vulnerabilities, risks, and threats to their vital interests and that this feature generates a “need for
coordinated, cooperative, and multilateral responses that must be incorporated into a”
multilateral, transnational environment through cooperative security.
Adding yet another dimension to the consideration of maritime strategy, and drawing
insights from colonial history, Admiral Troitiño credits maritime strategy with playing
a key role in the formation of the Argentine nation as Spain sought to protect the
transport of treasures from the Viceroyalty of Peru to the European homeland. Sea
power was subsequently employed to integrate various regions of Argentina and, in
Admiral Troitiño’s judgment, could contribute further to this task in the current era.
The Need to Work Together
Captain Sidders sees maritime strategies developed by different actors but somehow
linked together as having the “advantage of the synergistic power of cooperation, which
multiplies the gains of all participants.” Admiral Niemann agrees that “the improvement of international security must be a shared effort” and adds that when security is
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improved through cooperation “it is unethical to benefit from the security conditions
and subsequent stability without participating actively in their achievement.” Speaking
for his own country, Admiral Niemann offers the view that “Chile [has] to participate
actively in the international scene, contributing to the governance of globalization and
to the development of our region.”
Admiral Niemann writes, “Chile would be willing to cooperate—according to its capabilities—with the U.S. maritime strategy, taking into consideration the national interest, humanitarian motivations, and the international legal order.” He suggests that
identifying areas of cooperation can start with an examination of U.S. and Chilean
naval missions.
Because 95 percent of Brazil’s trade moves through the oceans and 90 percent of his
country’s oil is produced at sea, Captain Teixeira Martins believes cooperation with the
United States to enhance maritime security is appealing—“if such cooperation includes
mutual support in the field of military security, in the exchange of intelligence, in the
implementation of joint exercises, in academic and doctrinal exchanges, and in the
exchange of technology.”
Stressing a similar point, Captain Roth states that the success of any strategy involving
international partners must focus on the importance of sharing intelligence. Technological superiority allows for acquiring a great amount of data in a short period of
time, but unprocessed data are just data, not intelligence. Frequently, data must be considered in light of other information in order to be processed into intelligence. One
“single vessel in the right place, at the right time, and under the right conditions to
curb a threat” can be “worth more than several vessels wandering through the vastness
of the ocean.”
Professor Möller and her team recall that “ultimately, the region presents a situation of
changing and dynamic security conditions”; in general, however, “it also exhibits a very
high degree of cooperation. Some steps have been taken to reduce the level of conflict
among states and to remove the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly,
cooperative security measures have been developed that have improved transparency and
stabilized relations in the realm of defense.” Examples are “mutual confidence-building
measures, defense publications, and the development of methodologies for comparing
defense expenditures between Argentina and Chile” and between Peru and Chile, as
well as between Peru and Ecuador.
Captain Del Alamo and his colleagues propose new domestic and international organizational arrangements to meet the new threats. In the first instance, the Peruvian Navy
should work more closely with the National Police; the authors underscore the need for
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closer cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence organizations. Similarly,
they argue that the new threats call for greater cooperation among navies.
Drawing lessons from North America, Dr. Boutilier recalls that after the Cold War “the
sheer scale of the Pacific and the lack of an institutional framework like NATO placed a
premium on [Canadian-U.S. naval] cooperation in that ocean. A Canadian-U.S. agreement allocated the northeastern quadrant of the Pacific to the commander of [Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific] in the event of war. At the same time, training areas in
southern California were ideally suited for destroyer and frigate crews eager to escape
from the cold and turbulent winter seas of the North Pacific.”
According to Dr. Boutilier, “this cooperation was due in no small part to the vision and
boldness of flag officers in the [U.S. Navy] who realized not only that their navy was
shrinking in size (and, like the Royal Navy of pre–World War I fame, needed support
from friends and allies) but also that there was a multiplier effect inherent in common
operating systems” and in the sharing of information and intelligence. Moreover, “a
deep reservoir of trust existed between the two naval communities after half a century
of working together, and it was decided to elevate the partnership to a new level.”
The Complexity of Maritime Security
In Admiral Niemann’s view, “maritime security is achieved by blending public and private maritime security activities on a global scale into a comprehensive, integrated
effort that addresses all maritime threats.” This observation tracks well with the comprehensive approach taken by the U.S. sea services in developing a new maritime
strategy.
Professor Möller and her colleagues suggest that better Chilean “cooperation with the new
U.S. maritime strategy would be possible if we intensified control and surveillance over our
maritime spaces, over such important oceanic passages as the Strait of Magellan, the
Beagle Channel, the Drake Passage, and our Presencial Sea, preventing any illegal activity from being carried out in the high seas adjacent to our coasts.” Furthermore, the
exercise of the authority supported by international and national laws could be applied
more rigorously as a flag state, coastal state, and port authority state.
Addressing organizational aspects of cooperation, Captain Roth points out that the
strategic interests of the Brazilian Navy are not just those associated with the area of
responsibility of the U.S. Southern Command, as traditionally thought, but extend also
over the area of the future U.S. Africa Command.
Captain Thornberry and his colleagues approach strategy through a process of positing
several different but plausible scenarios and then considering their strategic implications and available responses. This approach was one technique employed at the U.S.
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Naval War College in organizing certain war games and workshops as part of the Maritime Strategy Project.
The Difficulties of Working Together
Captain Sidders recognizes a conceptual tension between governance of the sea and
freedom of navigation. The challenge, he writes, is to find a way “to respect the international order and each nation’s interests and within a framework of indisputable cooperation.” He posits a dilemma: “whether to preserve the customary principle of
freedom of the sea or to exercise increased control over all maritime areas—that is, by
guaranteeing their use to those who have the right to use them and denying their use to
those who intend to carry out unlawful acts.” Addressing the same issue, Admiral
Balaresque and his colleagues see as the most sensitive aspect of operational integration
the free access to areas where coastal states have sovereign rights. They see no substitute
for deferring to the authority established by international maritime law.
In Admiral Niemann’s view, the Chilean concept of a Presencial Sea is to oversee and
“be part of the activities that take place on the high seas, [confronting] the threats that
may come from the common space, without weakening the [UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea] or affecting the freedom that governs those common areas.” Making a
strategy both persuasive for friends and allies and a threat to opposing powers is, in the
judgment of Captain Teixeira Martins, “the most difficult challenge.” He cautions that
Brazil’s decision to participate or refuse to participate in a world network proposed by
the United States will depend largely on whether that country will engage as a participant and not as a mentor and also whether the United States will show a real intention
to implement an operational and tactical exchange.
Admiral Balaresque and his group observe with regard to the integration of small
navies that it is possible to foresee schemes where they can integrate with U.S. operational groups (as in PANAMAX) or simply where they could assume surveillance of their
own maritime spaces, with an organization in charge of common administration of
networked information and operational control. Whatever these options, one must
take into account a realistic and objective vision of Latin American allies.
Contrasting Strategies
Characterizing U.S. foreign policy as “hegemonic,” Captain Rogerio contrasts it with
Brazil’s policy of “cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind.” In the Brazilian case, he writes, “‘cooperation’ comes up as a way to achieve peace, not as a way of
increasing our military power.” Nonetheless, Captain Rogerio suggests that the Brazilian and U.S. navies could better stand up to terrorist threats if they integrated naval
means of communication.
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Professor Möller and her colleagues observe that while the governments of many
Andean countries “consider their armed forces responsible for combating drug trafficking,” governments in countries of the Southern Cone insist that the military must
be kept away from that task, considering it the responsibility of local police forces.
They see a contrast between the Chilean and the U.S. approaches. The Chilean Navy is
willing to participate, according to its capabilities and resources, in such international
operations as crisis management, peace operations, or humanitarian assistance. For
Chile, the international commitments it accepts must be linked to international law. In
the Chilean view, the United States considers
that security in the maritime domain can be attained only by the simultaneous employment of all the
tools of its national power, in concert with other nation-states and under international law. Likewise,
it recognizes a common interest with other nations in obtaining economic security and protecting
against hostile acts performed at sea. The United States believes that all the nations that benefit must
be jointly responsible for maintaining maritime security. It asserts, at the same time, that only
through an integrated approach among maritime partners—governmental and nongovernmental,
public and private—will it be possible to increase security in the maritime domain.

Interoperability
Admiral Niemann’s concept of interoperability includes mutual knowledge, common
procedures, and trust: compatibly trained units, shared real-time information, shared
goods and services, efforts united to meet common interests. He sees technological
developments in connectivity as presenting an ever-changing challenge. Above all,
though, Admiral Niemann stresses the need to build the capacity required to become
partners. In this respect, training is key, and interactions at the tactical level between
the navies of Chile and the United States have produced improvements. Similar progress at the operational level is needed, and improvements in the training of human
resources and the sharing of the maritime picture would help achieve that.
Captain Teixeira Martins argues that because navies usually have their own rules, systems, and procedures, issues related to command, control, and technology may become
challenges to be overcome, requiring the standardization of equipment and procedures.
Interoperability starts at the politico-strategic level, according to Admiral Balaresque
and his colleagues, with rules of engagement designed to allow political leaders to
apply force gradually and manage the political consequences.
Admiral Balaresque’s group also notes that if the United States is involved in a multinational operation, great technological differences become the main factor hindering
interoperability at the strategic-operational level. They caution that if no interface and
code arrangements are made to permit fast, effective, and timely data links among units
and commands, the operations will lose the synergistic benefits of cooperation and
only modest, or perhaps even risky, operational results will be achieved.
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Admiral Balaresque and his colleagues argue that the reduced logistical capability of
Latin American navies, considering the need for training to perform their priority roles
in the field of national defense, requires “compensations” to facilitate the use of their
resources on tasks or activities that are not always understood by the national political
community. “Agreements on access to professional training and education, exchange of
personnel, no-cost use of U.S. naval bases, supply of fuel for operations under UN
authorization, opportunity to purchase naval material of interest, and support for
upgrading weapon systems . . . could undoubtedly enhance political support and facilitate the execution of these operations.”
Stressing human factors in interoperability, Professor Möller and her colleagues argue
that when countries work together it is the responsibility of both sides to understand
the other, build confidence, develop common procedures, train in the means, and share
information in real time, if they are to complement each other’s efforts in pursuit of
common interests.
Dr. Boutilier draws from the Canadian experience to write that the U.S. Navy is the
most technologically advanced navy in the world and that any navy opting to act as
a partner must align its communications suite so that it is congruent with American
equipment. This is a major challenge; technology is changing so fast that small navies
must sustain considerable ongoing expenses to remain abreast. The practical outcome of this adaptive process is that ships tend to be laddered technologically—that
is to say, the most recent ship to deploy with a carrier battle group or surface action
group will be fully modernized while its sister ships are in various stages of technological regression. “For better or for worse,” he observes, the U.S. Navy “appears to be in no
hurry to slow the pace of modernization for the purpose of benefiting smaller
partners.”
An equally compelling challenge is informational interoperability. Thus, data from certain sources or
judged to be of a certain sensitivity will rapidly . . . be labeled “NOFORN,” so that no non-U.S. nationals can gain access to it. Fortunately for the Canadians, this prohibition has begun to wane after
years of close and highly effective collaboration. . . .
While cooperation between the Canadian Navy and the [U.S. Navy] has long been close, it has become equally close in recent years between the Canadian Navy and the various U.S. Coast Guard . . .
districts. Unfortunately, the concept of a seamless continental security presence is particularly difficult
to achieve because of the lack of cultural congruence between the U.S. Coast Guard and its Canadian
counterpart.

Adding another element, Captain Rogerio cautions that “interoperability cannot be
dissociated from the national defense industry and must not affect strategic developments and innovations.”

138

THE NEWPORT PAPERS

The Importance of International Law
Professor Möller and her colleagues stress the belief that if we are “to have a more
secure world,” nations must act within “the international community and under the
rule of law.” Relating cooperation on maritime security to international law, Admiral
Balaresque and his associates state that a basic requirement for obtaining the necessary
political support for joint employment of forces is that it “be undertaken in the letter
and spirit of international agreements approved by the United Nations.”
Referring to Resolution 41/11 of the UN General Assembly in October 1986, which
declares the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and South America the “Zone of Peace and
Co-operation of the South Atlantic” (ZPCAS), Rear Admiral Martínez describes the
arrangement as a major tool for protecting Argentina’s national interests.
Captain Teixeira Martins sees a serious problem related to the posture of the United
States on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and comments that “most countries will not trust someone who, backed by his military power,
ignores the decisions made by a consensus of nations.” He asserts that the country
“willing now to rely on international support in the area of maritime security is the
same country that so far has refused to ratify the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea.”
In 1983, President Ronald Reagan issued the U.S. Ocean Policy Statement, which
declared, in essence, that the United States would follow the non-seabed-mining provisions of the convention because they fairly balanced the interests of the United States
and all states with respect to traditional uses of the oceans. President Clinton subsequently signed the UNCLOS document after provisions on seabed mining were renegotiated, but the U.S. Senate has not yet ratified it. Despite the continuing voluntary
compliance of the United States with the convention, one is entitled to be concerned
that the United States is not bound to it by international law. Recognizing this problem,
President George W. Bush has called for ratification, and the heads of the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marines have followed suit with an unusual joint letter urging Senate
passage. As if to underscore the relevance of the treaty to our consideration of maritime strategy, a broad coalition has formed in favor of UNCLOS among U.S. diplomats,
defense experts, environmentalists, and petroleum and fishing interests.
New Institutional Arrangements
Captain Sidders observes that “at present, when a critical situation arises, the immediate response is provided by an ad hoc coalition.” He suggests that we could “probably
arrive at a more effective and efficient solution for the region” if we made “a combined
capabilities assessment based on a principle of strategic complementarity.” He
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advocates the development of a “common surface picture” through the exchange of
information and suggests as a model the South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination—
CAMAS—formed in 1965 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with the
United States and South Africa recently added as observers.
Noting that full operational integration with the United States is complex politically,
Admiral Balaresque and his colleagues call for the establishment of “a regional agenda
reflecting objective and reciprocal interests . . . so that initiatives of strategic integration
can gain backing and authorization at the political level.” Professor Möller and her
team recall that at the regional level, geographically close countries have sought to
share activities leading to the achievement of conditions of peace and security at sea
and of restoring these conditions when they are altered. Because this might be impossible for one state acting alone, “it is indispensable to develop cooperative strategies and
joint actions” with neighboring countries.
In this regard, Captain Rechkemmer and his colleagues call for the creation of a
regional maritime strategy as a mechanism by which the American states could carry
out, within the framework of regional security cooperation, multinational combined
naval operations against the new threats. Building on existing hemispheric agreements
and institutions, they advocate the establishment and operation of multilateral military
organizations against new threats, controlling aerial and maritime spaces of common
interest, and establishing efficient systems of intelligence to facilitate the exchange of
timely and accurate information.
They recognize that their proposals presume a new atmosphere of confidence and
commitment among the partners. This factor can be achieved only through an intense
professional dialogue within an effective legal framework. An important challenge to
be addressed in their scheme is the disproportionate distribution of resources among
countries of the hemisphere. Understandings will have to be sought to allow each
country to participate in accordance with its own ability and, perhaps, to find ways to
share resources among participating countries with different means.
Consideration of ways to respond to various hypothetical scenarios leads Captain
Thornberry and his colleagues to question the adequacy of hemispheric security
arrangements to deal with contingencies that could plausibly arise. This realization
suggests an array of new institutions. These range from a hemispheric security council
that would coordinate positions on security matters at the political level to a hemispheric security commission at the strategic level, a reconstituted inter-American
defense board at the operational level, and a series of operational commands to work
tactically.
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Conclusion
We may indeed be grateful that a knowledgeable and thoughtful group of military and
academic thinkers and leaders have taken the time and devoted the effort to writing
down their thoughts and sharing their varied experiences. In the process, they have furthered the debate over maritime strategy and explored ways in which the sea services of
the Americas can cooperate to improve maritime security in our hemisphere.
One could draw from these essays plenty of reasons to conclude that the glass of interAmerican maritime security cooperation is half-empty. The countries of the Americas
do not share exactly the same perception of the threats they face; in any case, no one is
suggesting that current challenges reach the level of the existential threat that brought
democratic nations together in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most noteworthy manifestation of an international security alliance in recent memory. Furthermore, several writers have underscored difficulties in the realm of interoperability,
ranging from incompatible equipment to the inability to share codes and intelligence,
to incompatible systems of command and control, and, perhaps most vexing of all, to
the human problem of culture, both organizational and national.
Area for Cooperation

Maritime Strategy
of Country A

Maritime Strategy
of Country B

Nonetheless, the papers also give encouragement to a more optimistic outlook. Two or
more countries do not have to have identical perceptions of threats in the maritime
domain to have a basis for working together on maritime security. They need only
some overlap in their threat perceptions to be able to find common cause. Clearly, as
writer after writer reminds us, seaborne commerce plays a vital role in the well-being
of all the countries of the Americas. The great bulk of international trade by countries
in the Western Hemisphere is conducted with other countries of the hemisphere, and
most of that trade moves by ship. Furthermore, contributions from every country
acknowledge that international terrorism and other forms of transnational crime pose
some threat to that country, even if not all give it the same priority as U.S. policy
makers might assign.
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Questions of interoperability loom large, in part because the solution to them seems to
be so dependent on capturing scarce resources. Dr. Boutilier’s comment that the U.S.
Navy “appears to be in no hurry to slow the pace of modernization for the purpose of
benefiting smaller partners” could be taken as a challenge to leaders of the U.S. sea services—to ask themselves what it costs in terms of American interests to seek to be
always faster, more secure, or stealthier. If we start from the point, made over and over
in these papers, that no unilateral maritime strategy can be as effective as one that
engages partners, and if we add to that the realization that the U.S. sea services can
always benefit from local knowledge that only regional partners can provide, a more
conscious effort to avoid leaving our friends in our technological wake might be a good
investment.
Some of the human factors in interoperability will take years to correct, but again the
Canadian-U.S. relationship offers some useful insights. Dr. Boutilier reminds us that “a
deep reservoir of trust existed between the two naval communities after half a century
of working together.” This relationship started with a shared continent, a shared language, and similar histories and institutions. These factors do not pertain in quite the
same way to U.S. relations with other countries. Nonetheless, there are specific features
in the manner in which the United States and Canada have worked together that could
be applied elsewhere. A long tradition of naval exercises, war games, educational and
training exchanges, exchanges of staff officers, and joint planning have built trust and
confidence and made joint responses to new threats easier and more rapid. Some of
these activities are already under way elsewhere in the hemisphere. A clear message of
the essays in this work is that effective interoperability is an edifice that must be built
one brick at a time. The task is long and potentially arduous, and it cannot be
completed except by taking it up.
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automatic identification system

APEC

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

C4ISR

command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CAMAS

(South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination)

CEMA

[Brazilian] (Chief of Staff of the Navy)

CHDS

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

CICAD

[Inter-American] (Drug Abuse Control Commission)

CICTE

[Inter-American] (Committee against Terrorism)

CID

(Inter-American Defense College)

CIRDN

[Inter-American] (Committee on Natural Disaster Reduction)

CNO

[U.S.] Chief of Naval Operations

CON

[Brazilian] (Chief of Naval Operations)

CVBG

[U.S.] carrier battle group

DGTM

[Chilean] (Directorate General of Maritime Space)

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

EEZ

exclusive economic zone

FARC

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

GFS

Global Fleet Station

GMP

Global Maritime Partnerships
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GWOT

global war on terror

IMO

International Maritime Organization

IMR

intelligence, monitoring, and naval reconnaissance

ISPS

International Ship and Port Facility Security [Code]

JID

(Inter-American Defense Board)

JMSDF

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

LRIT

Long Range International Tracking System

MAP

Mutual Assistance Program

MARLANT

[Canadian] Maritime Forces Atlantic

MARPAC

[Canadian] Maritime Forces Pacific

MDA

Maritime Domain Awareness

MERCOSUR

(Southern Cone Common Market)

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCAGS

Naval Cooperation and Guidance Shipping

NDP

[Brazilian] National Defense Policy

NOFORN

[U.S.] no foreign dissemination

NSHS

[U.S.] National Strategy for Homeland Security

NSMS

[U.S.] National Strategy for Maritime Security

NSS

National Security Strategy of the United States of America

NWC

[U.S.] Naval War College

OAS

Organization of American States

ONC

[U.S.-Chilean] Operational Naval Committee

RCN

Royal Canadian Navy

RIMPAC

Rim of the Pacific

RN

[British] Royal Navy
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ROCRAM

(Operational Network of Regional Cooperation of Maritime
Authorities for Latin America, Panama, Mexico, and Cuba)

ROE

rules of engagement

SADC

Southern African Development Community

SAG

surface action group

SALVAMAR

[Brazilian] (Search and Rescue Service)

SAR

search and rescue

SISTRAM

(Information System for Maritime Traffic)

SOLAS

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

TIAR

(Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)

UCC

[U.S.] Unified Combatant Command [system]

UN

United Nations

UNCLOS

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

USAFRICOM

U.S. Africa Command

USCG

U.S. Coast Guard

USN

U.S. Navy

WTO

World Trade Organization

ZPCAS

(Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic)
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